


14 SEPTEMBER 1987



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

14 SEPTEMBER 1987

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SOVIET UNION MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ARMY GEN LIZICHEV DISCUSSES PARTY-POLITICAL WORK RESTRUCTURING

Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 10, May 87 pp 31-38

[Article by Army Gen A. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, under the heading "Restructure Party Work, Renew its Forms and Methods": "Restructuring Party-Political Work in the Armed Forces"]

[Text] Our life is regulated so that as the years go by, gaining historical experience and analyzing the active practice of party work, it brings true joy to follow how reality confirms the Leninist theoretical tenets we adopted from youth. It is precisely this thought which again stirs the memory when you think about the decisions of the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Firmly based on a knowledge of the laws of social development, scientific foresight and the very rich experience of organizing the working masses gained after April 1985, on the foundation of all-memorable lessons of the 27th CPSU Congress, and masterfully using the vast arsenal of organizational and party methods and means, the Plenum defined precise directions for further restructuring party work in close connection with questions of personnel policy. The philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, which we know was "cast from one piece of steel," helped the Plenum to build a chain of concrete transformations of domestic life and the practice of party relations.

Reflecting today on ways to implement the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum in party organizations of the USSR Armed Forces, we see more clearly than ever before that our experience of intra-party work and improving intra-party relations has a number of "sore spots," unresolved problems, obvious pluses and equally obvious minuses. Strict observance of Leninist norms of party life are not in high esteem everywhere. Unity of word and deed has been violated. Political bodies and party committees and bureaus have often gotten carried away with controller and distributive functions, sometimes replacing commanders, engineer-technical workers, and logistics workers. Some Army communists, endowed with the authority given them by the party and the people, have lost contact with people. In some places, criticism and self-criticism have begun to subside. As a result, there has appeared in certain officials a lulling desire to "win approval," that is, to be satisfied with average results in combat and political training. One sometimes gets the feeling that someone's not very intelligent minds are interfering with putting out of the way of the restructuring of intra-party work the accumulated rubble of old approaches to solving certain problems,

including speechifying, creative paperwork, excessive organization, and adapting to some "supervisory prestige."

But restructuring is proceeding and gaining momentum. "The Soviet Armed Forces are also living with restructuring," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted at the Plenum. Our people, all military personnel, and the party-political apparatus of the Army and Navy compare with great satisfaction today's great change with the revolution. The complexity, acuteness, and scale of restructuring are breaking down the set stereotypes of thinking, which have become firmly established over the years, psychology, and organizational skills. That which suited us yesterday is no good at all today. The emphasis in the methods and forms of work have shifted. Yesterday it was still just a matter of shortcomings and we applied, so to speak, the congress' lesson of truth to our affairs. But today, in our waking ours even, as they say, we feel the first sprouts of restructuring.

In his time, V.I. Lenin required careful study of sprouts of the new, help them grow in every possible way, and "nurse" them. In the famous "Great Initiative," he wrote: "It is inevitable that some of them will die... But that is not the point. The point is maintaining all and every kind of sprout of the new, from which life will select the most viable."

Not long ago at the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, they examined the question of restructuring and enhancing the leading role of communists in carrying out the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress in the party organization of a Guards tank regiment of the Leningrad Military District. Capt S. Zholovan, the regiment's party committee secretary, gave a report. Stepan Vasilyevich [Zholovan], being of the age when energy and desires often prevail over experience and wisdom, had managed to organize the party committee's work in such a manner that he became the topic of discussion in many party collectives of the Army and Navy. He had turned the intra-party work around so that a person began to sparkle in it by all facets of his capabilities and talents.

Here is one small example. The party committee drew up and implemented exemplary criteria for assessing the leading role of communists. It became a rule--at every party meeting in the battalion's of the regiment that a group of members and candidate-members would receive a personal assessment of their leading role for three of the most important positions: how a party member fulfills his official duties; what role he plays in public and political life; how much his morals and moral makeup corresponds to the requirements of the CPSU Rules. There were skeptics in this matter. There were those who had their doubts. But what real deed does not have? But the crooked smiles gradually disappeared, and more and more often a shameful blush began to come over the familiar faces. The assessment found support in the people--does a communist ensure a leading role or not; criticism in principle; a thorough analysis of the reasons for negligence; deserving honest and modest praise--all this broke the habit of working and serving in the old manner and being satisfied with what has been achieved.

The problem of the "average person" came to the attention of the party committee. Strictly speaking, this involved an officer who shoots, drives a

combat vehicle, serves, educates subordinates, and learns on an average level. We must combat the "average person," the party committee decided. Together with the regimental command the party committee began planning an offensive on the position of those officers, communists, whose desire for easier work was stronger than the need to work better. "We are raising winners, but an officer with withered aspirations is a notorious candidate for a loser," they said at the party committee. The evaluation criteria for the leading role of communists were increased. They became stricter. "Why did you receive 'satisfactory' at the tank firing training session?" they asked the communist. "Explain to the party organization why your battalion, having all the conditions, has not 'reached' the excellent rating?" they asked the battalion commander. They asked each one specifically, regardless of rank and position held. The members of the party committee were constantly in the barracks, at the tank gunnery range, in the combat vehicle motor pool, and in the field. People reached out for the party committee. Before communists most of the time had to be summoned to come there. But now they come to seek advice, to talk about sore subjects, to address some leading experience. In the regiment they have come to call it the "open-door party committee."

The Guards tank regiment completed the past training year with an excellent rating. The people developed. There are twice as many masters of military affairs--class specialists. Nearly all communists received 'good' or 'excellent' on the basic combat disciplines. Socialist commitments were fulfilled. But there are new boundaries ahead; they must be approached by casting aside all doubts, strengthening and intensifying the restructuring.

Today's tank regiment is a large and complex mechanism. People, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, small arms, the repair base, diverse logistics. One person, even if he is a Solomon, can hardly raise this bulky and cumbersome thing to the high level of an excellent rating. This requires the efforts of the commander, deputy for political affairs, staff, party committee, and battalion and company commanders. That is why I would particularly like to note the role of Capt Stepan Vasilyevich Zholovan, the party committee secretary.

His path to the party committee secretary and Army party-political work in general is non-typical. He did not prepare himself to be a political work since school days. He graduated from a vocational technical school in Chernovtsy Oblast. He traveled to Kazakhstan on a Komsomol tour where at Arys Station, working as a metalworker and an assistant diesel locomotive machinist, he gained his worker's mettle. Then came the Army--soldier and deputy platoon commander. Here he became very involved in work with tanks. He decided and became trained as a warrant officer. He was elected secretary of the battalion's Komsomol organization. His political work also began at that time. He began serving as secretary in the regiment's party organization from the position of deputy battalion commander for political affairs, having completed in turn a higher military-political school without regularly attending classes and the Leningrad State University by correspondence. His new job coincided in time with the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, when the energetic word "restructuring" imperiously came forth from newspapers, television, and laconic radio reports and captured everyone's attention.

Stepan Vasilyevich immediately became a messenger and worker of this cause. He felt with his heart that his place was in front. And it seems to me that he understood the main, most important point in restructuring--attention to the person and the cause which he serves. Constant changes on paper, speechifying, and other attributes of formalism are the rust of the past and, the new secretary decided, must be swept up, cleared away, and replaced by lively intercourse with people, professionalism, a considerate attitude toward personnel, and organizational-educational work directly in the military collectives. For example, the secretary helped Maj V. Dymov believe in his own strength and give up drinking; helped Capt A. Varavin to implement and important innovative suggestion; "prevailed upon" CWO A. Akimov to take the position of chief of the soldier's dining hall in order to improve the quality of food preparation; added truly human virtues to Maj S. Lanovik; and whisked the dust of complacency and smugness from Sr Lt I. Bordik.

One could go on and on with the list of similar deeds by the secretary during his 2 years of activities. He know how to argue, prove his point, and educate the lackadaisical and sluggish people. But the most important this is that he sees people's talents, develops them, and puts them to work for combat readiness, military discipline and educating personnel. He understands that bare management harshly avenges itself and that psychological restructuring is also a front today; therefore, it is important to develop in party committee members and secretaries of the battalion and company party organizations a desire to work actively on this front as well.

The first and greatest joy for a party worker, the writer V. Ovechkin once wrote, "is to see growth in the people around you, to see the flourishing of human talents in all their diversity. This demands of him the ability to guide these talents and these people so that each works at full strength, with inspiration, with a perceptive vision of our great and long-range goals."

Our Soviet classical literature has revealed to the world remarkable human personalities and talents which professional party workers and communists, whose main years of life were illuminated by the Great October, have helped flourish. Their selfless devotion to the proletarian cause, political and organizational boldness, prestige, and influence in the masses made up the foundation on which the strength of our party has always been supported.

Chapayev probably would not have been the legendary Chapayev had he not encountered Commissar Furmanov along life's way, who in his remarkable novel about a Civil War hero told in a calm but firm manner how Fedor Klychkov--a commissar, close friend, and political instructor of V. Chapayev--strengthened in every possible way the authority of the chief of the 25th Division and channeled his tireless energy in the direction of Bolshevik organization; to do this he he expanded Vasilii Ivanovich's political views, helped him to the end to overcome the attitudes of poor discipline and explained the impermissibility of separationism.

"He said and know that the seeds were falling on good soil. He noted lately that Chapayev sometimes was passing his ideas off as his own..." These thoughts of Commissar Klychkov were touching his soul and he wanted to say:

"Here it is, real party work." After all, the relations between the division commander and the commissar were not structured easily. Klychkov could understand the division commander's nature, expose from within his unique individuality, the essence of his interrelations with the Red Army environment and, having understood and viewed everything together, begin planned party work, raising Chapayev to new ideological and moral-political horizons.

In this sense, Pavel Korchagin ("Kak zakalyalas stal" [How The Steel Was Tempered]) was just as lucky as Chapayev. Shepetov communists and the Baltic seaman Fedor Zhukhray turned out to be his mentors. The Bolshevik Zhukhray gave proper direction to the young man's abundant energy. He explained to him that he must not simply become engaged in the fight, but know "who to fight and what to fight for," and taught him not to act alone and not in bursts, but in a combat collective, consistently and stubbornly.

In short, the heroism of the revolutionaries and Leninist-Bolsheviks was not a momentary outburst which quickly died out, but a willingness to fight daily for the cause of the party and the people and, in this sense, to make their entire life a heroic deed.

Not all professional workers of the party, its unsung heroes, became heroes of books. There was a great many of them--the people of the great October change in the history of mankind. In the article "How to Organize Competition?", V.I. Lenin noted that "...organizational work is within the grasp of the rank and file worker and peasant possessing literacy, a knowledge of people, and practical experience."

Lenin himself possessed the remarkable qualities of a party organizer around whom the people rose and grew stronger, gaining independence and demonstrating their capabilities and talents to the fullest. Our history has thousands of the most brilliant cases of Vladimir Ilich's sensitive, attentive and at the same time exacting attitude toward people and their deeds and heartfelt concern for their needs.

Tens of years later, we read with emotion the correspondence of the leader of our revolution, organizer and leader of the Communist Party with Aleksey Maksimovich Gorkiy. Certainly, those who say that Lenin's concern for the health of Gorkiy, who suffered severely from tuberculosis, added 10-5 years to the writer's life are right. But there are no numbers which can express everything that Lenin's concern meant for Gorkiy's revolutionary spirit and ideological and moral health. The great writer derived faith, uncompromisingness and love of life, escaped beyond the confines of narrow parochial ideas, and resigned himself to the most perfect Leninist dialectics.

Returning to the documents and decisions of the January CPSU Central Committee Plenum and analyzing our party experience of the last 10-15 years, we must be honest with ourselves: Some things from Lenin's organizational legacy have gotten lost and been forgotten.

We must take the path of organizational work, Lenin said at the Eighth Party Congress. The rising policy of restructuring in the party practice of

political organs and primary party organizations of the Army and Navy is primarily lined with improving organizational party work.

There are reassuring changes in the activities of military councils and political directorates of the services of the Armed Forces, districts, groups of forces, and fleets. For example, the Moscow Military District Military Council's contact with commanders, political organs, local primary party organizations, and military collectives has become closer, and the reaction to cases of inertness, bureaucratism, and other violations of the norms of our life has become sharper. The commander of the district, Col Gen V. Arkhipov, and other members of the military council are working in the troops more than before and very critically delving into all spheres of military life, combat training, and military discipline. It has become an immutable rule on all trips to the garrisons, particularly remote ones, to hold question and answer evenings with personnel, receive people for personal questions on one of the days, and meet with the families of service members. This is already yielding tangible results. Military order has become stronger, military discipline is better, and the indicators in combat and political training are higher.

Today the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces is operating in a new, non-typical manner. Before, its representatives also worked in political organs and party organizations. But, as a rule, their organizational activities amounted to "photographing" the state of affairs. The "pictures," even the most unpleasant ones, did not bear the mark of constructive steps. Now the situation has changed: Every trip to the sites is aimed primarily at helping the party organizations and political organs to select the most effective organizational forms and at eliminating through common efforts the identified shortcomings, making sound personnel decisions on the spot, seeing sprouts of the new and giving them life. In short, the requirement of practicality and efficiency in party work has been moved to the forefront. It is precisely the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces that has become the initiator in disseminating the progressive experience in restructuring gained in the large unit [soyedineniye] commanded by Maj Gen Yu. Kuznetsov.

Receptivity to the new and a spirit of practical creativity are typical today of the organizational-party work of the political directorates of the Belorussian, Baltic and Leningrad military districts, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and others. Recently I was told of a dialogue which took place in one of the political departments of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

"I have been going to the political department for a week and cannot find anyone there," one of the officers complained to a party registration worker.

"They are all in the units. Comrade, you ought to drop by the neighboring regiment. The political department is working at full strength there today."

"I did not know..."

The chief of the political department, Col I. Shevchenko, commented on this dialogue simply:

"Today life has required us to turn the shoulder and not chatter in vain. Everyone is fed up with windbags. Fighters in words are out of fashion."

Restructuring is having a profound effect on our lives. There is continuous process, for the present largely contrasting--obvious and latent, resounding and faint, for the masses and for the individual personality--going on over the entire front of party work. The main thing, in my opinion, is that new people have appeared whom we did not know before, but who lived among us, thought, analyzed, and aimed for some job and today have authoritatively announced their presence.

Lt Col G. Degtyarev, commander of an antiaircraft missile regiment, decided to submit a list of the vacant positions for discussion at a meeting of officers. In the Army, as we know, the commander is everyone's boss and he alone has the right to submit subordinates for promotion. "Of course, I had a list of candidates. But I really wanted to check myself with the collective opinion. Was I in step with the collective or hopelessly behind," said Degtyarev. "Perhaps I had run ahead? But everything turned out normally. The people named the same officers who were on the list. With only one correction. They recommended promoting Sr Lt Aleksandr Revko to the position of deputy battery commander. They nominated him first. But Revko himself stood up and asked the collective that he be recommended for battery commander immediately. You know, the people did not object. No one detected a bit of self-seeking in his request. True self-seekers do not like the light of openness and hold their tongue at such meetings." Recently I was told that A. Revko had made captain and was handling his duties as battery commander in excellent fashion.

In my opinion, a person who has received his party membership card--a most obligating document--must his entire life develop a distinctive sense of the forward edge. Like at the front, he must always be ready to fire. He must always be ready for action--by order or on his own logical initiative. If the party has made a decision, he no longer has the right to feel he is in the rear, in the line, he immediately moves up to the line of fire--where the fighting begins, where it is particularly difficult and perhaps dangerous for his own prosperity and career or for some immediate benefits. Now, we believe, we must promote first of all those people who have this sense of the forward edge in their blood. It is important to take notice of them, identify them, and arm them with experience.

The regular election campaign concluded last December in the party organizations of the Army and Navy. Typically, the staff of the party committees and bureaus of the regiments and class I and II ship was renewed this time mainly by communists of subunits, those who are performing alert duty and combat duty, taking over the guard, teaching people combat skills, and educating them.

Never during the entire postwar period has there been such a large number of "activists" whose illusory merits have been renounced by the party organizations themselves. The number of party bureaus, committees and secretaries who have been rated unsatisfactory in their activities has sharply increased. Another thing is noteworthy--the aspiration to record and name in resolutions of party meetings the names of communists with serious complaints

against them. In the statement portion they name them, and in the resolution portion the demand that the shortcomings be corrected. Communists and party organizations are becoming more intolerant of their comrades who live and act improperly.

In short, the moral tone of the internal life of party organizations is improving. Now there is less formalism in the work of the meetings. It has become customary for many party organizations to familiarize meeting participants with the theses of the report and the draft resolution 2-3 days before the meeting. Less and less often party committees and party bureaus resort to discussion of the agenda by a list of narrow-minded individuals compiled in advance. Criticism, particularly criticism from below, is gaining strength. This strengthens the spirit of party comradeship.

Unfortunately, the old ways still hold on. We will not oversimplify anything. In the party organization of one of the artillery regiments, Lt Col A. Kirpanev was instructed to give a report "On the Pure and Honest Make-up of a Party Member" at the party meeting. He had three party punishments, including a severe reprimand entered on his registration card for family trouble. I was least of all surprised that Kirpanev agreed to make the report. The indifference of the communists in the regiment disturbed me deeply. They should have refused having him give the report and demanded clarification from the party bureau secretary. But the meeting was held.

The report was given, there were speakers, and there was a decision. But one thing was lacking--party principle. Apparently, it had not been instilled in the communists. It seems to me that at the crucial stage, considerable emphasis in organizational-party work must be made on party indoctrination of all communists, above all the young ones. Helping each person to acquire a party nature, his own political character--today this is the same task as developing the sense of the forward edge. It is difficult to separate these tasks; one supplements the other, one merges with the other.

Mass forms of organizational-party work in recent years have suffered the same as individual forms. Meetings, conferences, and other forms have been devaluated somewhat and have often lost some very important features. Individual work most often has only been proclaimed. The party committee secretary frequently reports to the political organ on the number of meetings, conferences, lectures, and talks conducted. There are also commanders who have said arrogantly to the secretary: "If I bring the regiment up to the outstanding level--they evaluate your work; if I do not--they will say that you failed." Leadership ambitions have placed beginning party leaders in a difficult position.

Many professional political workers have forgotten how to converse on party topics. You sometimes listen to the commander's report and the party committee secretary's report, compare them, and come to the unencouraging conclusion that they are like twins, as they say, two peas in a pod. You begin talking to such political workers and you do not understand with whom you are dealing. He "spouts" out percentages. For example, a political worker from an aviation unit will talk about everything: aircraft, missiles,

percentages of class specialists, and aerial combat tactics. Where are the people, communists? Where is your work, comrade secretary?

Unfortunately, such conversation fully suits many Army and Navy political workers holding high leadership positions. They themselves have forgotten how to ask a political worker the right questions which particularly pertain to his jurisdiction. Whom have you indoctrinated? Whom have you set right? Whom have you helped rid themselves of bad character traits and bad habits? How have you struggled with the sycophant, the flatterer, the opportunity seeker? Whom have you debunked as a person of narrow interests? Our press also has somehow quietly forgotten how to write about party work. One or two words about a meeting or committee conference...and it is a "pure" production: plans, percentages, and so forth. But after all, party work is not the plan by itself but the people planning the work.

In disseminating progressive experience, we also operate with meetings and conferences, not knowing how to disclose in all its complexity and diversity the precise mechanism of what is most important--organizational work. How we concentrated efforts on the basic direction; how we lived and got by using the experience of others; how we were able to approach people and win their confidence; how we set us control from above and below; with whom we aligned ourselves--these are probably the priority questions which should have troubled the party worker.

It seems that typical in this connection is the example of the party organization of the Red Banner Tank Regiment imeni Leninskiy Komsomol of the Belorussian Military District, which until recently was commanded by Lt Col Georgiy Nikolayevich Yadykin, a talented officer. After the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, he said the following: "I see my party task as rearming people and preparing them for great and difficult jobs. We will work and serve to our maximum." Here one cannot help but recall the remarkable words of our country's beloved son, Valeriy Pavlovich Chkalov, who repeated time and again: "My job for the party is to fly."

The Regiment imeni Leninskiy Komsomol was going through difficult times at that time. Something had gone bad in its mechanism. Many officers, having stopped looking at the future in the service, had lost their zest. Others were infected by a more profound disease--self-complacency and tranquility. In short, the collective was feverish. A new collective had to be created from the old one. This is far more complex than starting everything from the beginning. In a short period of time the regimental commander found the opportunity to meet with each person. He first talked things over with the party committee. Clearly aimed individual work opened the gates for a flow of mass initiative. Restructuring was becoming a specific job. Each person knew his maneuver. Substantial corrections were made in personnel work; people felt the changes, movement. Stagnant phenomena in combat training were overcome without a note of exclamation; the training process took a new course through intensification, increasing organization and the quality of trips to the field, and innovation. Party committee members armed themselves and their party comrades with the necessary composure, patience, persistence, and energy in the struggle for the new psychology of man. A new party committee secretary was elected.

The most important element of the success which the Regiment imeni Leninskiy Komsomol achieved--it became the best regiment in the Belorussian Military District--was the ability of the regimental commander and the party organization to unite the military collective, primarily through direct contact with people.

The restructuring goes on. The restructuring is gaining momentum. Not all the problems have been resolved in the Regiment imeni Leninskiy Komsomol. There are still some bottlenecks. But the main thing has already made itself known: any action by a communist is checked with the CPSU Rules. Here they now constantly think about ideological conviction being demonstrated in deed showing through in every action by a communist like in a drop of clear water. They try to see that in the party collective there is always felt an atmosphere of genuine comradeship which organically combines respect for the person and his dignity, sensitivity, and a constant readiness to come to his aid with profound principles and exactingness. Work has intensified. Sometimes it does not have enough purposefulness, clarity, and completeness. But these are growing pains. They, perhaps, will be simpler to treat.

Pondering immediate and long-range goals and today's and tomorrow's tasks, one concludes that we must take up arms against passiveness toward what can be called the distant future. To equip people with accurate and clear knowledge of the prospects, to stir the imagination, to bring the future closer--really, is this not party work?

The great goals and prospects illuminated by the unfading light of the October Revolution are our constantly active weapons in the struggle for communist maturity of each person. They actively serve us today as well. In recent years we have somehow simply begun to give them less consideration. It seemed to us that our dreams did not need to be carried forward, that they would be transformed into deeds without our active intervention. But this was a delusion: We made our desires pass for reality. A creative dream is not a whim, but the essence and weapon of today. That means that we must learn to dream and teach our young people to do this.

Thoughts about the Motherland, its prosperity, and about peace are the most cherished dream of the fighting men of the Army and Navy. The marshal, gray with age and with a half-century of service to the party, the lieutenant who received his party membership card in the mountains of Afghanistan, the sailor-submariner and the battalion commander from the combat engineer troops in Chernobyl--all Army and Navy communists are fully aware of the special responsibility they have in ensuring the security of the Fatherland. They understand the entire complexity and scale of the task which today is determined both by the unprecedented acuteness of the international situation and the serious changes which have taken place and are taking place in the means and methods of waging war. The aggressiveness of the policy of imperialist states, above all the United States, is a harsh reality of our time. It is not abating. That means we must increase the combat readiness of the Army and Navy, perfect combat skills, and strengthen discipline.

Today's party life is illuminated by a new light. Word is fused more closely with deed. Fighting party activists and leaders leave for the expanses. They try on for themselves the norms of the future and speak aloud--in talks and at meetings, in soldier barracks and under the thick ocean water on long voyages--about what was yesterday, what is today, and what will be tomorrow. They advocate stepping up the pace of restructuring. Their concerns are for what is most sacred to everyone--the Motherland, its present and its future.

Lenin, the victorious weeks of October, the 27th Party Congress, and the January Central Committee Plenum arm us with a new vision and make us wiser with new experience in the struggle.

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CSO: 1801/207

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MAJ GEN KATAYEV TRANSPORTED PERSONAL GOODS ON OFFICIAL AIRCRAFT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jun 87 p 2

[Response by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Pacific Fleet correspondent Capt 1st Rank Yu. Timoshchuk to letter to the editor from Maj V. Aleksandrin, senior financial service inspector-auditor, Pacific Fleet Air Forces: "Using Aircraft for Personal Purposes"]

[Text] In making official visits to various units and subunits of the Pacific Fleet Air Forces, I have noted: In urging subordinates toward restructuring and combating waste and mismanagement, individual commanders quickly forget these appeals if it concerns their personal interests.

When such occurrences, even if isolated, come from those who by their official position are obligated to be an example of principle and modesty, they deal great moral damage on the matter of educating people. That, say, was the example which the former chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet Air Forces set for his colleagues to imitate. Leaving for his new duty station, he used an An-12 transport aircraft for the specific purpose of transporting personal goods from Vladivostok to Leningrad.

If one believes the flight records, technical equipment of aviators was transported. But in the course of an audit it was not possible to come up with either the sender or the receiver of the allegedly transported cargo. The pilot, Col V. Kuzmin, confirmed in an explanatory report that nothing other than household goods were transported.

In using an aircraft for personal purposes, the former chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet Air Forces at first did not pay a single kopeck. Only after we stepped in was he forced to contribute 1,412 rubles. The flight cost the state a considerably larger sum. True, a small part of the costs was made up by transporting cargo on the return trip.

As it should be, I reported this violation to the chief of the financial service and the commander of the Pacific Fleet Air Forces. I reminded them that the governing documents require full retribution of damages to the state by the guilty parties. But it was recommended to me to "close" this issue, since none of the commanders were or, they say, will be held materially accountable for such large amounts.

Indeed, none of us finance officers can recall such an instance. And it is not because aircraft flights for personal purposes have been completely eliminated owing to the money. They are made with impunity before the very eyes of people, undermining their faith social justice.

Major V. Aleksandrin
Senior Financial Service Inspector-Auditor
Pacific Fleet Air Forces

On assignment for the editorial board, I traveled to the transport air regiment and headquarters of the Fleet Air Forces. The facts outlined in Maj Aleksandrin's letter were confirmed completely. As Maj Gen Avn I. Ivkin, acting commander of Pacific Fleet Air Forces, explained, there in fact was a flight scheduled to Leningrad on the day in question to carry aviators' technical equipment. But the equipment was delayed in being delivered to the airfield. Maj Gen Avn E. Katayev, former chief of staff of Fleet Air Forces, who was authorized to load the personal goods as en-route cargo, considered it unnecessary to wait for the technical equipment. Alluding to deteriorating weather and without coordinating his decision with the acting commander of the Pacific Fleet Air Forces, he ordered the commander of the An-12 to take off. When the cargo scheduled for shipment was delivered to the airfield, the aircraft was already airborne. This was how the scheduled flight was transformed into a flight for personal purposes.

"Personally, I would not under any circumstances have authorized the flight of an aircraft loaded only with personal goods," Maj Gen Avn Ivkin emphasized in the conversation.

On the return trip, it turned out, incidental cargo was taken. Let us say, a case of "Zolotoye rudno" cigarettes found its way on board the aircraft, delivered by air from Moscow for the Military Trading Organization. The question arises: Why was this delivered urgently as scarce medicine if it is in abundance locally?

However, the organization not only of cargo but also passenger shipments is puzzling. There is enough confusion here for the time being. Thus, in January of this year, according to flight records, several dozen passengers were transported over the route Vladivostok-Leningrad-Yevpatoria-Kiev. However, all of them do not have accompanying documents. And those that do exist were carelessly validated. Lt Col G. Manishov, for example, included as part of the flight crew Lt S. Durnitsyn, a submarine physiologist, authenticating the list with signature and stamp.

Validation of documents and the loading of aircraft should be approached in accordance with established requirements. After all, it is precisely here that each deficiency serves as a loophole for those who are interested in violations. Let us say that in the instance about which Officer V. Aleksandrin to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, with a cursory glance at the papers it is difficult to find deviations. Had it not been for the auditor's meticulous checking of the state of affairs, no one would have found out anything: The

accompanying register indicated the transporting of technical equipment. It was signed and stamped.

Now after sending the letter to the editor, Officer Aleksandrin is again seriously looking into aircraft flights which raise questions. For example, on a Tu-134 aircraft from Vladivostok to Moscow, according to flight documents, Capt V. Vlasov transported more than 2 tons of cargo for the Military Trading Organization. But for some reason, the documents do not indicate the sender, receiver, or the type of goods.

There were similar facts on record earlier also. This, in particular, is apparent from the report of the audit conducted in October of last year by representatives of the Navy Finance Service. It contains the following entry: "...Prepare documents to recover from the Military Trading Organization for services requiring payment in the amount of 30,500 rubles for transporting goods by aircraft of the Fleet Air Forces."

However, this was not carried out, although local finance officers know well that due to the over expenditure of the estimated sum for travel payments, the flight crews, spending weeks wandering around various airfields, cannot receive financial compensation.

Questions of the efficient use of military transport aircraft have escaped the attention of the people's inspectors, whose activities in the Fleet Air Forces are coordinated by Col V. Yermolkin. The state of affairs indicates a need for serious work in this area. It must not be forgotten that military aircraft, taken for weeks to the other end of the country for no good reason, may at any moment be needed by the Fleet to carry out missions related to ensuring combat readiness. Furthermore, control will help obtain the mandatory payment for the cargo being transported by air, which will make it possible to reduce considerably the number of those desiring to rush aircraft without any special need for "urgent" goods which later end up in storage for months. Such a measure, which is also very important, will make it possible to identify the real owners of the property being transported.

Everyone with whom I have had the opportunity to talk--from the rank and file pilots to command representatives of Fleet Air Forces--believe that Maj Aleksandrin has raised an urgent issue in the spirit of restructuring: There should be no unprofitable flights, much less those used for personal purposes.

One cannot help but agree with this. In determining each person's extent of responsibility for free rides on aircraft, senior commanders also must take this stand in approaching this.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

CHIEF OF LEGAL SERVICE POINTS OUT LEGAL REMEDIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jun 87 p 4

[Interview with Col Justice V.A. Dzyuba, chief of USSR Ministry of Defense Legal Service, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA stringer Col Justice I. Vashkevich: "The Law Is Mandatory for Everyone"]

[Text] The 27th Party Congress and January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum named socialist law and legality as among the key factors of those revolutionary processes taking place in the country today. Col Justice V. Dzyuba, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Legal Service, talks with a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA stringer about how they are used in the interests of restructuring in the Army and Navy.

[Question] Vladimir Antonovich! It is known that certain commanders and chiefs, unfortunately, still have a poor mastery of the methods of employing legal means to resolve problems which arise. What is more, among some of the officials there is the opinion that under certain circumstances it is quite permissible to deviate from the requirements of the law and regulation in the name of "higher interests of the service," so to speak. Let us recall at least the problem of so-called "responsible" officers... What is being done to improve the situation?

[Answer] Much. Let us say that a number of positions in military command and control bodies related to application of the law now will be filled by specialists with a law education. The level of mastery of the fundamentals of Soviet legislation by officer candidates and students, I believe, will increase noticeably with the appearance of law instructors in military educational institutions.

Implementation of the Officer's Minimum Knowledge of the Law is of fundamental importance. Mastery of this document must mean more than memorizing some statutes. The task is to inculcate in people the habit of checking their every step with the requirements of the law and regulations and to teach them to find answers quickly for questions which crop up. By the way, use of the appropriate legal documents is authorized even during interviews (tests) which will be conducted on the Officer's Minimum Knowledge of the Law.

All this, I believe, will contribute to an increase in the legal culture of military personnel.

[Question] The editorial staff of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is getting signals that there is a shortage of copies of normative documents in some units. Because of this, it is difficult for officers to study them.

[Answer] Senior commanders and staffs have been tasked to resolve this problem during 1987-1988. Steps are being taken to provide units and institutions with orders and directives of the USSR Ministry of Defense in accordance with requisitions of the headquarters of military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and other formations [obyedineniye]. The Handbook on Legislation for officers of the Soviet Army and Navy is being prepared for publication.

[Question] Where, in your opinion, should an officer begin in mastering legal documents?

[Answer] He should begin by including the Officer's Minimum Knowledge of the Law into an individual plan of independent study. Organizers of legal training should see to it that the most complicated questions are included in topics of commander training classes and that military lawyers are called in for lectures and consultations.

[Question] All the same, we associate further strengthening of legality in units and on ships not only with increasing the level of legal education of officials...

[Answer] Needless to say, an important role here belongs to military justice bodies, including the USSR Ministry of Defense Legal Service. Lawyers at directorates, headquarters, institutions and enterprises must become active assistants of commanders and chiefs in carrying out the tasks facing them.

One such task is the fundamental improvement of military discipline. There are some positive changes. In the Moscow Military District, for example, legal advisers of a number of large units [soyedineniye] and garrisons are working out well. In the Southern Group of Forces and in the Baltic Fleet, more attention is now being given to disciplinary practice, particularly of non-commissioned and senior non-commissioned officer personnel, and to using the capabilities of public opinion in the Army and Navy as preventive measures for violations of the law. But these are merely the first, unfortunately, small steps.

Another equally important task is to ensure the safety of socialist property. After all, considerable material valuables are lost and become unusable only because procedures for their accounting, storage, operation, and writing off are not followed. Mismanagement and waste must be stopped, including with the aid of Army and Navy lawyers.

[Question] As we know, lawyers in military command and control bodies are also called upon to provide legal advice on the orders and directives being published.

[Answer] Orders and directives are the most important tools a commander has available for supervising subordinates. Today, I would add, they are also important key factors in restructuring. But they can be effective only when they conform to the letter and spirit of the laws, regulations, orders, and directives of senior commanders. In carrying out a given task, a commander or chief must take into account the interests of the state and the military unit as well as the rights and lawful interests of service members and other civilians. The lawyer is the first assistant in this.

I will cite a fairly typical example. When drafting a document on providing living quarters for Northern Fleet seamen in the maritime engineering service, they believed it possible to grant a living area at the rate of 7 square meters per person. After discovering a contradiction with the existing norms, the chief of the fleet legal service, Lt Col Justice A. Sukhorukov, asked about making the draft document conform to the law, which was done.

[Question] Unfortunately, it does not always happen like that. After all, until now certain decisions are being appealed by military procurators as being contrary to laws and regulations.

[Answer] The problem is that by no means do all military command and control documents go through a legal check. The level of legal training of individual officials, as has already been said, is not high. That means we must teach officials of all categories to treat the law with respect and to increase the work efficiency of the legal service.

[Question] That is to say, it must be restructured also?

[Answer] Of course. This must be done primarily by restructuring the work of legal advisers. The need to spend more time in the units and on ships and renounce the old work style, which I would call the inspector style. The must also take part in eliminating shortcomings.

There is much to be done by troop and fleet lawyers to incorporate a new management mechanism at enterprises and in organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense and to increase the effectiveness of contract relations and the quality of equipment and property being delivered to the units and the ships.

In general, a situation of lawfulness and firm order in all areas of our life is one of the most important conditions of restructuring.

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CSO: 1801/206

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LINGUISTIC, OTHER SHORTCOMINGS OF TADZHIK DRAFTEES

Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 10 Jun 87 p 4

[Article by G. Kleynman, KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA special correspondent, Dushanbe, Leninskiy Rayon: "Without Preparation There Is No Soldier"]

[Text] In one of the rayons I had a conversation with a military commissar. The young-looking lieutenant colonel, having recently taken over the complex job, advised that there are young people who are not burning with the desire to serve in the Army and even try to avoid it.

The republic solemnly sends its sons off to the ranks of the nation's armed forces. The slender, neat, physically strong lads go to the Army and Navy. The majority of them are ready for the service. They leave home for 2 and sometimes 3 years to return as mature adults having passed a genuine school of manhood. It is correctly believed that every male should serve in the Army or Navy. Not only is a man's character developed here but also a sense of responsibility, which the lads sometimes lack.

In the spring and fall it is crowded at the assembly point of the republic's military commissariat. Young people whose time has come to serve and those who accompany them go there. Here the lads meet their final pre-induction medical board and receive their "ticket" to Army service.

On this day, draftees of Garmskiy Rayon were meeting the board. In the anthropometric department, some husky lads struck me as having unusually flabby muscles for their age.

"It is not surprising," Officer Bobogado Boltayev responded to my question. "We often get such youngsters from the Garmskiy group of rayons.

"It is the result of doctors in these rayons conducting prophylactic examinations occasionally. Although every polyclinic is required to have adolescent offices where draftees are supposed to be registered, the "deep" rural areas have not yet reached the necessary level and are not alarmed."

A short, skinny boy approaches the table. He responds when asked his first and last name. They ask his year of birth. No answer. They ask another

question or two. The lad requests to speak in Tadzhik, since he does not know Russian at all.

They discovered with difficulty that he was from the kishlak Soviet Kalailabiob and had graduated from Secondary School No 19. The had Russian language classes, but they were conducted...in Tadzhik.

Abdulzhalidov Dzhumabek, a graduate of Secondary School No 13--the picture was the same. Things were somewhat better with Sukhrob Khuseynov, a graduate of Secondary School No 8, but the credit does not at all go to the school but to DOSAAF driver courses.

"You do not have to go far away, right next to the capital there are places where the young lads do not know Russian at all," says Officer Davlyat Muradovich Muradov, chief of the assembly point. "And some are not prepared any better physically. Go to Leninskiy Rayon. Some curious facts were brought to light recently..."

"Yes, not long ago Maysara A., born in 1970, began going by the name of Ubaydulo," confirmed Khayrullo Khaydarov, an officer at the Leninskiy Rayon Military Commissariat. "This was discovered at the kishlak Soviet imeni Sardarov Karakhan. There were such cases before this as well."

Somewhat earlier D. Muradov had explained to me the behind the scenes activities of turning boys into girls:

"It all comes from the unconscientiousness of chiefs of military occupational departments of kishlak and village soviets. They have complete control of the house-registers. Unfortunately, locally they have not been and are not being held accountable, although they are the ones who find the loopholes for those desiring to avoid the service."

Leninskiy Rayon is one of the largest in the republic and has 85 schools. Virtually all of them are staffed with military instructors, but roughly one-fourth of them do not have a higher education. Nearly 60 percent of them have not served in the Army; in some schools military instructors have the rank of privates and sergeants.

Naturally, such instructors of initial military training cannot properly prepare the draftees. Classes on initial military training are supposed to be conducted in Russian, but not all schools adhere to provision. Things are in particularly bad shape in the schools of Ziddov and the kulak Soviet imeni Sardarov Karakhan.

"Why talk about the students if the teachers know Russian poorly," notes Lt Col A. Glushkovskiy, military commissar. He offers me some character references written by school teachers. All of them are like they were written by an illiterate person and contain a large number of mistakes.

This year the military commissar personally interviewed all draftees. Many of them could not answer basic questions like: "In what year were you born?" "How old are you?" "Name the capital of our motherland." and the like.

Matters are no better with physical training of students in their senior year in the rayon. Here there is a total of three firing ranges, six gymnastic courses, and six military obstacle courses (and they are located at schools in the rayon center). New schools are being built, but they do not provide these either; at best there is a room for storing weapons.

Back to the republic assembly point. We go on to the sports camp. Here construction of a swimming pool and a 50-meter underground firing range is nearing completion.

"For now we check the physical readiness of draftees without swimming," says D. Muradov. "They all arrive here as holders of GTO ["Ready for Labor and Defense"] badges, some of them even "gold" ones. In reality, it turns out that part of the draftees (we check them selectively) do not meet the standards."

"Each year the military commissariats pass on to the rayon public education organs lists of senior-year students who speak Russian poorly," remarks Davlyat Muradovich. "The time for call-up approaches, but the situation does not change. Consequently, in the localities they are acting irresponsibly toward this important work and losing precious time. Local authorities and party and trade union committees are not assisting the schools in organizing initial military training instruction of senior-year students and in building sports and military camps."

Meanwhile, there are positive examples also. In Secondary School No 19 of Leninskiy Rayon (Makhmurod Dzhurabekov, military instructor), in the fifth grade students begin additional studies in specially organized Russian language circles. All schools are capable of doing this.

"The military commissariats often get letters from military units with words of gratitude for preparing draftees," D. Muradov says in conclusion. "But this mail also includes letters which contain reprimands directed toward the military commissariats. They have to be accepted."

About 1 year ago, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution aimed at further improving the preparation of young people for military service. It outlined much, including participation in this work by party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol organs, and the appropriate ministries and departments.

It seems, the addresses are known. But, as the spring induction has shown, there is no end to the work.

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CSO: 1801/206

RESTRUCTURING, RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP TOUTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jul 87 p 1

[Article: "Decisions of the CPSU CC Plenum Are a Program of Vigorous Action"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Introduction]

[Text] Decisions coming out of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the results of the 7th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation, are the main subject of the exchange of opinions in the military and labor collectives today, one of profound thought on the part of each of us. They convincingly show that the restructuring begun on the party's initiative is expanding and intensifying. Its implementation is an extremely important cause of the entire party and of all the people, one in which we are all active participants. The times demand not assurances and words, but practical action and the enlargement of each individual's personal contribution in his area of the service to the enhancement of combat readiness, the strengthening of organization and discipline, and the campaign against all manifestations of indifference, irresponsibility and negligence.

They Signed for Irresponsibility--Major A. Tazekhulakhov

The matter of improving our work received a great deal of attention at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. And although it dealt primarily with the production sector, these requirements are so basic that they apply to all of us.

I recently encountered a situation toward which one could not be indifferent. Privates Zh. Dzhumamuratov, G. Didebashvili, S. Akhanov and T. Osmonov joined us from a training unit. Their papers stated that they were trained mechanic-drivers 3rd class. The very first test of these soldiers' practical skills in driving and their technical level showed that their papers, with the stamps and the signatures, were essentially... a sham. It was simply impossible to put them onto the equipment without additional training.

The servicemen frankly told the commander that they had frequently been assigned to various kinds of details instead of training. As a result they all had only one fifth to one eighth of the required practical experience.

One other thing. One has the impression that officers such as Captain Osin and Senior Lieutenant Stolbov (their names are on the papers) signed the graduation

papers for their subordinates without reading them. How else does one explain the fact that the information contained in the service records differs strikingly from the evaluations given the mechanic-drivers in their certificates of graduation from the training subunit? Private G. Didebashvili's record, for example, states that he mastered the military specialty with excellence and had only good or excellent grades in the training subjects. In fact, this soldier's certificate shows only one good evaluation, while all the others are satisfactory.

I would therefore like to tell my colleagues through the newspaper that a signature on a document is more than just a stroke of a pen. It is a guarantee. It is a warranty.

The Difficult Burden of the One in Charge--Labor Veteran R. Fedchenko, Tolyatti

When I read the account of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, I could not help thinking what a complex job it is to direct people, and how much responsibility it involves. I had previously thought that military personnel would not have this kind of problem. There are sole-commanders, there are subordinates who must obey them unquestioningly, there are regulations.... I can now see that things are not always so simple in the army and navy. This is apparently because being a commander means more than just issuing orders and instructions. It means directing--that is, indoctrinating and convincing people, setting for them an example in the service, responding to their needs. And all of the processes involved in the restructuring, processes which embrace the society today, and particularly those having to do with openness and democracy and the enhancement of the sense of responsibility in those in charge, directly apply also to the work of the military cadres.

It is very important for the individual in charge of a collective to see that it is a collective of like-minded members united by high civic purpose. In order to do this, we must have the trust of the people. I would like to mention in this respect A. Sapozhnikov, former director of our reinforced concrete plant. He organized the construction of the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant in such a way that the government assignment was accomplished in the best possible manner. The director's good professional qualities were in evidence. I would attach the greatest importance to his ability to get close to people, however, to be in the thick of the collective's interests. But Sapozhnikov's predecessor, although no less energetic, clearly lacked this gift.

One can see particularly clearly today that success comes to those leaders who know how to reveal and rely on human potential.

When we encounter difficulties in the work, we sometimes say: "That can't be done. That is simply more than we can do." I do not agree. All problems can be resolved when the people themselves have an inner need for vigorous action and deeds. Such a need comes out only when a personal approach is taken to each individual.

Improve the Training Methods--Lieutenant Colonel A. Borovkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner North Caucasus Military District

The tank battalion commanded by Major V. Samotuga is one of the best subunits in regiment "X." The tankmen persistently seek and find ways to enhance the tactical and fire training.

Captain S. Ragzin, a company commander, is considered to be the best with respect to training methods. He thinks out his actions, carries them out competently, and rejects routine ways of doing things. Senior Lieutenant A. Konev still lags behind his comrades in the methodological training, however. He lacks the ability to get the interest of subordinates. The battalion commander therefore gives special attention to this subunit. Without substituting tutelage for assistance, he constantly teaches Senior Lieutenant Konev to make fuller use of progressive know-how, to make competent decisions on his own and see that they are carried out.

Relying On the Collective--Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) M. Lagun, Red Banner Belorussian Military District

The June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee identified the extensive development of the collective contract as one of the most important ways of fundamentally restructuring management of the economy. Life itself has made such a step necessary. We have seen this demonstrated more than once in our own experience.

Things were going fairly well even in the past in our UNR [work supervisor's section], which is directed by Colonel S. Lomashko. The brigade contract was being effectively employed, and labor productivity was growing at almost twice the rate of growth of average wages. Just what made the collective enter actively into the restructuring? Primarily the fact that we had achieved our economic "ceiling," and only one third of the construction and installation work was being performed by contract. We had to look for reserves.

And so, on 1 February of last year, the sanitary engineering section, which is headed by Communist I. Turchenkov, was converted to the contract system. Not just all of the workers in the section, but also engineering and technical personnel, military construction workers, specialists in auxiliary operations and drivers, were assigned to the section and formed a single, economically accountable collective.

It should be noted that the new method of labor organization did not take hold without some friction. Many people doubted that the undertaking would succeed, and even certain chiefs of UNR departments did not believe that the Travkin Method could be used in military construction. Gradually, however, through our own efforts, we began to feel out ways to resolve problems as they arose.

We all waited impatiently for the first results of the work, and they surpassed all expectations. The economically accountable section was clearly superior in every way. Another three sections soon went over to the contract system, followed by the collectives of the central procurement shops and the garage. This was facilitated to a significant degree by the introduction of a wage system not tied to specific orders.

No one believed that we had found a universal formula for resolving all of the problems, of course. And although the results were encouraging, there was also

a perceptible increase in wages, and the new work system did not guarantee a life of peace. One month, for example, the engineering and technical personnel in the economically accountable section headed by Soviet Army Employee N. Khripun let the work bog down. Not only did they not receive any bonuses, but they even received less than the previously guaranteed rate of pay.

The most important thing, however, was that in time the people began to believe that the production organization was reaching a qualitatively new level and that their conscientious work was properly appreciated. They became genuinely interested in the work, and their sense of responsibility for the end results increased. The supply section headed by Captain A. Voroshukha, a young and energetic Communist, began to function better. The section and service chiefs put their full effort into the system. I think that it was precisely the enthusiasm of the people which played the crucial role in the decision to convert the entire UNR collective to the collective contract system in March of this year. For now this is a unique case in military construction. It is still too early to talk about any kind of results, because too little time has elapsed. The main thing, however, is that the course outlined is being adhered to: commercial output is increasing, and the growth of labor productivity is outstripping the increase in wages, even though the wages are not "frozen."

We already have numerous problems, however, which it does not appear possible to resolve on the scale of the UNR. The main problem, perhaps, is the fact that the collective is operating under subcontract terms, while the general contract organizations of the district construction directorate have fallen behind somewhat in their management methods. Any hitch or lack of coordination hurts the sanitary engineers.

The same old "behind-schedule" outside planning is creating serious difficulties with respect to ensuring the smooth and stable functioning of our collective. The material and technical supply system for the construction projects also needs to be completely restructured, using the comprehensive production technology principles. The urgent need arose to select and train cadres capable of rejecting purely bureaucratic administration and of operating with the economical methods.

The command element and the trade union and party organizations are now relying on the collective in every undertaking, and I believe that this is natural. There is greater confidence in the people, their initiative and beneficial undertakings are supported, and the principle of social justice is becoming firmly established. We see this as a guarantee of the successful implementation of decisions coming out of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

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CSO: 1801/210

RESTRUCTURING NEEDS, SUCCESSES NOTED

Officers Need Greater Independence

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 87 pp 1, 2

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank V. Ogarev, commander of the large ASW ship Udaloy, Red Banner Northern Fleet, under the rubric "Turning to Decisions of the CPSU CC Plenum": "The Degree of Independence"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The current phase of the restructuring is referred to as a period of practical deeds, of vigorous action. In order to implement decisions coming out of the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 7th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, it will be necessary for everyone to make an in-depth, demanding analysis of the state of affairs in the section entrusted to him, to demonstrate activeness and initiative in the work, a high level of organization and discipline. This is what the letters from our readers published below are about.

"The 'sanctuaries' of passivity and lack of initiative still exist in some places"--I am confident that these words from the report delivered at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee drew the attention of all officers. I self-critically admit that it is still the work style of a considerable number of commanders and political workers to constantly wait for assistance from the side and prompting from above. Experience has shown that when a military man relinquishes his independence and initiative in his area of responsibility, this can lead to large blunders. This is why it is so important right now to overcome the attitude of dependency and evasion of responsibility. The situation today demands decisiveness, boldness and total orientation toward the interests of the job. People possessing these qualities must be promptly identified and supported.

I would mention Captain 3rd Rank S. Chubarov, my supply officer, in connection with this. People in his field sometimes have "second-echelon" attitudes. Chubarov is by nature a purposeful man, however. He is acknowledged as the best watch officer on our ship. His example unquestionably motivates many others to boldly take on difficult tasks.

Many, but not all, unfortunately. Poor training and deficiencies in the service apparently do not trouble very much Senior Lieutenant P. Antonov, chief of the chemical service, for example. He accepts criticism as something due him. He has reconciled himself to the situation, taking comfort in such justifications as "I tried, but it did not work out."

Diligence which does not produce results.... I consider this to be the same as inaction, as open dependency. I recall how we urgently needed to obtain canvas covers for the weapons and equipment on the ship prior to setting out to sea. The supply agency found it impossible to fill our order. Captain 3rd Rank Chubarov had every right to throw up his hands. It was not his fault that we had not been issued the covers. He did things differently, however. Well aware of the real state of affairs with respect to the availability of the needed supplies in the fleet, the supply officer still provided the ship with everything necessary. A perfectly legal way out of the situation was found. It was necessary only to take an interest and be persistent.

Enthusiasm alone will not take one very far, however. I agree with those who advocate granting the officers greater authority--greater legal independence, let us call it. There is a direct reason for this. People at the site can frequently see more clearly how to correctly resolve specific problems at the level of the subunit or ship. I myself--and all of the ship's commanders with whom I have exchanged opinions--would include among these problems the procedure for conferring ratings upon the warrant officers. Under the current system the ship's commander has no opportunity to influence the activeness of the warrant officers by determining their ratings. At the present time they are automatically assigned to a rating, if I may put it that way. The ratings should be "assigned" to the specific individual, however, to his level of knowledge and training, to the way he handles the job. This sometimes gives rise to situations bordering on social injustice. The highest rating is set for the position of chief sonar operator. When a young warrant officer, a specialist 3rd class who has not even fully proved himself in the service, is assigned to this position, he benefits more materially than some master of military affairs, a highly experienced specialist and skilled indoctrinator of subordinates who has a lower rating, because of the position he holds. Would it not be more sensible to give the ship's commander the authority to determine who is to receive a certain rating? This would enable the commander to more effectively influence the process of indoctrinating the warrant officers.

More independence and greater accountability. This approach is now becoming established in our society. That is the way it should be also in our military situation.

Counterproductive Vehicle Restrictions

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 87 p 1

[Article by A. Sachkov, chief of an economically accountable section, under the rubric "Turning to Decisions of the CPSU CC Plenum": "What the Contract Revealed"]

[Text] I am chief of an economically accountable section in a military construction organization. Naturally, I am interested in having the section operate smoothly and profitably. I have to count every ruble spent on production needs and assess the practicality of specific outlays. I would like to raise in connection with this one question, which is not a petty one in my view.

This is the essence of the matter. Our tower crane section services construction projects sometimes hundreds of kilometers apart and hundreds of kilometers from

our base. I was assigned a UAZ-469 automobile with a yearly travel limit for providing operational technical assistance and exercising direct supervision over the unit's work.

The travel limit was enough for only 5 months, however, and the vehicle, which was put to a lot of use in our section, was removed from use and parked.

One does not halt the production process, and we have been forced to use other, larger vehicles--ZILs and MAZs, specifically--on a daily basis for making long trips.

This has resulted in a direct loss of 780 rubles to the section every month, not counting the extra 66 liters of gasoline consumed. Since there are 10 economically accountable sections in our organization, it is not difficult to calculate that these trips by truck cost "an extra" 100,000 rubles a year. Almost 9,000 liters of additional fuel is consumed.

It is not just a matter of our losses, however, although they cannot help but affect the labor mood in the collective. We are causing a direct loss to the state against our will.

There was discussion at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee about needing to reveal braking factors and throw off old work procedures and methods. The existing procedure for using automobile transport has become such a brake for us. It was a sort of barrier against mismanagement at one time, and probably still is in some places. We operate with full economic accountability, however, and we are ourselves interested in making efficient use of available equipment. I believe that such restrictions should be lifted for organizations switching to the collective contract. A more effective regulator, not administrative but economic, has been put into effect, after all.

Good Results in Lower Level Restructuring

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 87 p 2

[Article by Guards Captain S. Zholovan, secretary of a tank regiment party committee, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District, under the rubric "Party Life: How the Restructuring Is Going": "The Position of the Primary Organization"]

[Text] 1. What has been done in your collective? In your area of the work? Tell about the most significant things.

2. What is hampering things? What kind of problems are seen, and how can they be resolved?

1. A year ago the work performed by our party committee under the restructuring was given the stamp of approval of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Many letters and questions followed from those who were applying our experience in the work of their own party organizations. It became clear that there is no simple attitude toward it--and there probably cannot be one. This is because every collective has its own makeup, its own sore spots. We ourselves have considerably enriched our work methods during the 2 years.

The important thing is that the restructuring of party work in the regiment urgently demanded a search for new ways to influence the personnel. We decided to use personal evaluations of the Communist's example and his avant-garde role. The secretary of the company or battalion party organization would present an evaluation in the following areas at a party meeting: personal example in the combat training and activeness in maintaining it at a high level; personal example in military discipline and activeness in strengthening it in the assigned area; and personal example in raising one's ideological and theoretical level, and activeness in the political work and the indoctrination of subordinates. In a small party organization, all members are evaluated (the first item on the agenda). If there are more than 20 Communists, then half of them are evaluated at one meeting, the rest at the next meeting.

There were some misgivings that this system would result only in the formal listing of shortcomings and would evoke opposition: after all, most of the picture would be in "shady tones." Everything fell into place, however, when the Communists saw that this sort of analysis helped us to advance.

There was a question about how the Communists in charge, the regimental commander and his deputies, were to be evaluated. The matter resolved itself. Guards Colonel A. Grigorash, the regimental commander, made it clear at the outset that all of the Communists without exception would be evaluated.

"We have a common cause, a common goal," he said. "And if I were to isolate myself from the Communists and not know their honest opinion of me and my work, we could hardly be successful."

Indeed, beginning in 1985 when we began to apply the personal evaluation system, the combat training and discipline began to improve markedly. The regiment began to consistently fulfill its commitments, and we pass inspections by inspectors of any rank without fear of any sort of unforeseen circumstances or fortuitous events. This is because the sense of responsibility of the Communists has increased.

Here is an example. At one of the party meetings Senior Lieutenant V. Buslayev was given a poor evaluation for not engaging actively in professional self-education. What would have happened in the past? If something bad had been said about someone, that would have been the end of it, or else we would have returned to the matter to impose a penalty. Following the personal evaluation in this case, however, Major S. Skorzhhevskiy, secretary of the party organization, assigned Communist A. Varavin to help the young officer. From one meeting to the next, from personal evaluation entries, one could see how Buslayev was doing. He was rigidly monitored. In the second half of the year the platoon commander and his subordinates had made up the lag and received a "five."

This year dozens of Communists have received personal evaluations, and only 12 of them were not criticized. The number was twice that last year. This means that demandingness is increasing, that the party organization no longer accepts even petty shortcomings in the work. While 17 Communists were brought to party accountability last year, the number was only eight this year. The secret is simple: the stress in the work of the party organizations has shifted. As I have already mentioned, a poor evaluation is followed not by punishment but by individual work.

Something else is also typical. It is important not merely to point out deficiencies, but also to reveal the causes. One of the battalions "made a poor showing" when it was tested. It had a new commanding officer. It was determined that errors had been made in the planning of the training, the tanks in the combat training group were being poorly prepared for firing, and the officers were conducting the exercises poorly. We came to an agreement with the regimental commander to have a meeting of the party committee immediately, without delay. And that is what we did. The meeting was very intense. From 24:00 to 02:00 we analyzed the causes of the breakdown, defined ways to overcome the lag and talked about prospects for the work of each Communist.

Of the 46 people taking the test in fire training in the spring, 35 performed with excellence.

Time passed. We constantly sought ways to improve on our know-how. It was sometimes necessary to take a different tack. For example, we came to the conclusion that the personal evaluation could be made not on a monthly basis but less frequently, once every 3 months.

We made one's personal contribution to the restructuring an item for evaluation. Some people verbally approve of it, but this is not apparent in their work. And the task today is one of making 1987 a year of real results in the restructuring for each party organization, and the specific evaluations are producing big improvements in the personnel.

2. In answer to the question about what is hampering things, I want to stress the fact that it is the attitude that acquired know-how is something fossilized which is hampering things. It should be "flexible," should be developed and adapted to the new conditions so that it does not at some point become a "sanctuary" of inertia.

We turned our attention to the fact that the personal evaluations most frequently reiterate deficiencies pertaining to discipline in the subunits. There is a direct dependency between this and the results of the combat training. We began to study the causes and to look at the methods used by the officers in their work with subordinates. The talks brought out one thing: that the subunit commanders are poorly acquainted with the science of indoctrination.

There are numerous systems for studying the individual in human science. To my great surprise, however, I found nothing in our modern science suitable for the military collective. I turned to the departments of VUZs, to the military schools and to Leningrad State University, but, regretfully, I was shown cumbersome diagrams with multiple stages of analysis designed for application only with the latest generation of electronic computers. But what is the company commander, for whom electronic computers are not in the foreseeable future, to do? I would like to direct this question to academic military science.

A way was found, however. We adapted certain questionnaires and tests to our needs. By using them and by conducting more subtle and intensive individual and group talks, we were able to gain a better understanding of the fightingmen, of their personalities, their inclinations and aspirations.

We began with Captain A. Kucherov's company, in which discipline was not always good. Frankly, a totally different picture of the soldiers and NCOs emerged. It became more apparent how a certain person could be influenced, what approach to take to whom.... And the errors of the company officers became clearer. Captain A. Kucherov, it turned out, worked hard and enjoyed irreproachable prestige as a professional. He was alone in this, however. He was to a considerable extent performing the jobs of Warrant Officer A. Smirnov, senior company technician, Lieutenant A. Lubchenko and Senior Warrant Officer B. Dolinin, platoon commanders, and Warrant Officer N. Bondarchuk, company sergeant major. It goes without saying that this is not normal. Taking on the organizational work of all those in charge, the company commander overlooked much in the indoctrination.

Although on the surface the NCOs--and there are eight of them in the company--appeared to be in good shape, it was determined that they were not at their best. We were troubled by the fact that six of the soldiers found the service to be a burden and were not interested in their military occupation, and that eight people were dissatisfied with the moral climate.

After this detailed analysis there was a long talk with Captain Kucherov, and the company commander showed great concern. He and Major T. Nigmatulin, communications chief, subsequently worked out a set of measures to improve the political and indoctrinational praxis. It is important to point out that more than a year ago Captain A. Kucherov was issued a reprimand by the directorate party organization for deficiencies in his work with the personnel, but the party committee has now initiated the lifting of the penalty because the situation in the company has improved considerably.

Following the same sort of analysis, but a more extensive one, the repair company is now the strongest collective in the regiment. This came as a total surprise to us. Senior Lieutenant S. Kulga has succeeded in creating a collective of truly like-minded individuals. Only two of the men were dissatisfied with the service. One was dissatisfied because he had a bent for a different kind of work--and he was immediately found a job to his liking--while the other was dissatisfied because of a conflict in the platoon. After looking into the matter in detail, Senior Lieutenant S. Kulga transferred the soldier to a different platoon. His performance is now normal.

As I conclude these comments, I would like to stress the fact that the experiment which we are presently conducting in the regiment to improve the individual work and unite the collective is not without its difficulties. The subunit party organizations are not demonstrating enough determination. Many of the Communists still do not understand the need for a scientific approach in the work performed with the personnel. And the restructuring demands that we look to new approaches and aim toward new heights in this area as well. Innovativeness and a sense of heightened responsibility must become the dominant feeling on the part of the Communists. This is the mood of the restructuring, the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee stressed. And to fall behind in this area is to retard our advance.

11499

CSO: 1801/211

OPENNESS SEEN NO THREAT TO ONE-MAN COMMAND

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 87 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel T. Mironenko, Red Banner Far East Military District, under the rubric "Time and Work Style": "Openness in a Low Voice"]

[Text] I recall the persistence and purposefulness with which officer K. Volkov prepared the subunit for final exercises after remaining for the battery commander. Looking at him, I was amazed: how does he catch everything?! He had also distinguished himself before as the deputy commander of the antiaircraft missile battery by his high businesslike qualities, but now, by finding independence--even if only for a short time, he demonstrated them to their full extent and brilliance, so to speak. One need not wish for a better nomination for the position of battery commander to be vacated soon afterward--that was the conclusion of the regimental command when Volkov had successfully passed his "probation period."

Volkov did not have to wait long for the assignment. And suddenly it spread through the regiment: Volkov has a "hand" somewhere "at the top," because he has "special standing" with the unit commander. But I know that there is no trace of such a thing, and Volkov--he is now a major--did not acquire the battery for his attractive eyes. But as they say, you cannot throw a handkerchief over someone else's mouth...

The appearance of all kinds of gossip is a result of persons being inadequately informed. Or, speaking in the language of today, the result of the lack of openness.

How was Volkov assigned? An extremely limited group of officers at regimental headquarters took part in discussing his nomination. And afterward they did not inform people why Volkov had been promoted. And here came the gossip: when there is no official comment on events, people interpret them in their own way.

The personnel problem is one of the worst sore points. Here as nowhere else, probably, what is personal is interwoven with what is public, and the fate of one person is interwoven with the fate of the entire collective. And it is

very important when the appropriate officials consult with people and are guided by the opinion of party organizations when assignments and changes in position take place in an atmosphere of openness. Then it will not take place the way it did with Volkov, as an example.

Conversations surrounding this assignment brought to light one more aspect of the problem. Rumors could not have been started if persons in the regiment had known Volkov well--as a first-class specialist, an excellent methodologist, a capable organizer, and an exacting and tactful commander. If they had known all this, no one would have thought that he was someone's protege. Thus, in addition to everything else, we reaped the fruits of inattention to the dissemination of advanced experience and propaganda about those who have excelled.

The "fog" of significant mystery and "confidentiality" in resolving personnel problems serves the purpose of those officials for whom the matter is--excuse the pun--the last thing to worry about. The absence of openness enables them to conceal blunders--as well as abuses--in work with personnel, to push up the official ladder the persons who are pleasing to them and artificially suppress the official growth of persons worthy of advancement.

Under a condition of openness, persons would know who initiates an advancement and who is charged with implementing it. Here is a person who joins the party, let us say. The communists who recommend him bear the responsibility for objectivity in describing the political, work, and moral qualities of the person recommended. In personnel matters, no such documents are made public, as a rule.

Do not think that I am encroaching on one-man management by standing up for openness. Not at all. If openness is undermined, it is not one-man management, but one-man rule. It cuts the ground from under the voluntarists, self-seekers, money-grubbers and those who seek influence--all those whose way of thinking and acting is in contradiction with the spirit of our socialist system. On the other hand, the authority of commanders and supervisors who are motivated in their official activity by the interests of the work, not self-interest, is strengthened. Persons will go through fire and water for such commanders. So openness--and it is one of the manifestations of democracy--does not undermine one-man management; on the contrary, it contributes to its reinforcement.

A reserve of officer personnel has been established in our unit for promotion to higher positions and for assignment to study in higher educational institutions. It is formed as a result of the discussion of nominations at regimental headquarters, and then it is brought to the attention of all officers. Majors K. Volkov and A. Stepanov, Captains I. Shilo and V. Begun, and Senior Lieutenants V. Sokolov and Yu. Zakutkin are preparing themselves intensively for higher positions.

We thought that everyone in the regiment was adequately informed of the state of affairs in the reserve. However, a check revealed that there are still quite a few "blank spaces" here. Many do not know what is taking place in the reserve camp, how things are going for one candidate or another, and who needs

to focus efforts and energy on what. We should have given wider publicity both to the new candidates for advancement and to those who are turning over their positions, I think. Persons would have a complete picture of what is going on in such a case. They would know that a higher position can be acquired only through work, and not because time in grade has "run out" or there is a "hand" somewhere.

Captain P. Donchenko and Senior Lieutenant O. Fomichev were promoted recently in the regiment. When they were assigned, their high technical preparation was brought to light first of all. Isn't that really an incentive? But here is the problem--few in the regiment are aware of these officers' professional skill. Again the reason is lack of publicity. But more accurately, it is the lack of skill (and desire) to resolve problems openly, and thereby inform and educate the collective.

Professional skill is demonstrated most vividly in competitions, where it is obvious who is who. So some persons avoid participating in them, especially officers at regimental headquarters who are obligated to improve their professional skill regularly, but who frequently are "not present" during this time. This has also led to measured doses of information, as they say. During the winter training period in the regiment, more has been mentioned about the unfinished work of supervisors' teams and less often about battery commanders' neglect in training; silence has been maintained altogether on the indicators for the officers in regimental headquarters.

We also have to get rid of an authoritarian attitude and subjectivism in evaluating officers' work, which impedes the extension of openness appreciably. In a recent field exercise, the team of Sr Lt A. Shapovalov was defeated in competition with a subordinate lieutenant, V. Pershin.

"How come?" I ask Shapovalov.

"I don't agree with the battery commander's decision. Everything was determined by the last competition, where my team was negligent for the first time. We won in all the previous laps."

I don't intend to accuse the battery commander of prejudice; Major V. Buchits is a competent and objective officer. But explain that to people. And it would not be a disgrace to talk things over with them. Even if with his deputy, Sr Lt O. Fomichev, who is also secretary of the party organization.

I draw this conclusion from the experience of my many years of army service: the more some problem disturbs people, the more publicity there should be when it is resolved. And in social matters above all. I recall this case.

The turn was coming for the family of one of our officers to receive an apartment. His wife came to me, as a member of the party bureau. How is it that the family appears first in the list of those waiting their turn, but two apartments just assigned for the unit were given to others? I was offended at

first: we discuss each square meter, and here are claims! Then I listened to my visitor more closely and I realized that we ourselves are paving the way for dissatisfaction. After all, people do not know the housing commission's motives for making such a decision.

But this is what had happened. At that time an officer had arrived in the regiment who had children with a chronic illness. The doctors came to the conclusion that their recovery would be impossible unless normal living conditions were provided for the family. Well, you are not going halfway here, really. The second apartment was received by the family of a warrant officer which was in critical need of better living conditions. The officer's wife who came with a complaint about the unfairness realized after the situation was explained that the housing commission had "acted according to its conscience."

Giving publicity to matters that have traditionally been considered "not for dissemination" requires that a definite psychological barrier be overcome. This is a new matter for us, and a great deal must be learned. Let us take this assignment of apartments. I think that not only the lists of those waiting their turn, but extracts from the minutes of housing commission meetings as well, should appear on the bulletin board.

Social justice for persons is especially important. The official diligence of an officer depends on it to a large extent. For this reason, it is very difficult at times to draw a distinction between what is personal and what is official in resolving social problems. And publicity is like a path, a bridge, toward social justice.

Under army conditions, the last word belongs and always will belong to the commander who is in charge. And we are obligated to support his authority by all means. But this in no way means that the way is closed to officers, as well as warrant officers, sergeants, and soldiers, in discussing different vitally important matters. Such democratization will not detract from the commander's merit in any way, but it will help him to work out a solution that is more correct: one head is good, but two are better. And persons will become active participants in the work rather than those who blindly perform actions without knowing at times what they are doing and why they are doing it. And because they do things without wanting to, they do them poorly.

All the work on the front of extending openness lies ahead. A start has been made, and attempts are being made in the regiment to comprehend the processes of changing the thinking that has persisted. This correspondence is the fruit of that, in particular.

8936

CSO; 1801/209

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

BRIEFS

DRA VETERANS' CLUB SESSION -- Minsk -- Today a meeting of the all-union veterans club "Patriot" opened here. Former soldiers, who fulfilled their international duty as members of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan], gathered in the Belorussian capital from the Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Udmurt ASSR. They are sharing their experience in military-patriotic indoctrination of young people and discussing new forms and methods of this work. [Text] [Moscow KONSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 87 p 1] 9069

CSO: 1801/184

BOOK REVIEW: MOTORIZED RIFLE (TANK) BATTALION IN COMBAT (1986)

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 87 p 2

[Review by Marshal of Armored Troops O. Losik under the rubric "A Commander's Bookshelf" of textbook "Motostrelkovyy (tankovyy) batalyon v boyu" [A Motorized Rifle (Tank) Battalion in Combat] by D. A. Dragunskiy, Yu. I. Pivovarov, S. I. Tkach and others, edited by D. A. Dragunskiy, Moscow, Military Literature Publishing House, 1986, 304 pages]

[Text] As a result of changes in the nature of combined-arms combat, more and more importance is assumed by the high tactical independence of units and subunits in carrying out their combat missions and the ability of commanders and staffs in demonstrating creativity, proficiency and flexibility in managing forces and equipment. It is clear that the experience of the Great Patriotic War, intensive training under conditions as close as possible to those in combat, and indoctrination in boldness, courage, decisiveness, readiness to act on a calculated risk and to make an unconventional, bold decision should form the basis of training officers for such work.

In this sense, the textbook "A Motorized Rifle (Tank) Battalion in Combat" will be of substantial assistance in training officers at the battalion level. With the support of specific examples, the book sets forth quite fully the sequence and content of a battalion commander's work in organizing combat and managing battalion subunits in an attack, in an encounter engagement, in defense, and during a march, taking into account current theoretical views on the specific nature of combined-arms combat.

The authors have correctly stressed the complicated conditions in organizing modern combat, the increased importance of swift reaction to sharp changes in the situation, the making of bold and original decisions, resourcefulness, and initiative. The conclusions concerning the role of combined firing and movement by a battalion and its subunits in combat and close interaction by all forces and equipment as the most important factors in achieving success are entirely reasonable.

In speaking of a creative approach by battalion commanders to solution of one task or another and to the selection of methods of action in one specific situation or another, the authors correctly direct attention to the importance of high professional training for officers and to the ability to foresee

changes in the situation and the enemy's intention without permitting a pattern to develop in actions. I cannot help but agree with them as well that "swiftness and surprise in actions are more important at times than establishing numerical superiority over an enemy."

In my view, it is of no small importance that theoretical positions are supported by examples of the battalion commander's work under practically all conditions of a combat situation, which unquestionably will be of great assistance in training military school cadets in the practical work of military commanders. Each form of battalion combat actions is examined in the book as a complex: views on the conduct of combat by a probable enemy, the fundamentals of battalion actions, the substance of a battalion commander's work with examples--from definition of the mission to the briefing and then in the dynamics of combat. In the tactical situations described, the authors try to create a complicated, tense situation and incline the reader toward a creative approach.

At the same time, the textbook is not devoid of drawbacks, unfortunately. To begin with, the account of the nature of a number of problems being resolved by the battalion commander is unduly extensive because of unnecessary details. For example, the account of an assessment of the situation in an attack and the decisions take up to 10 pages of text. At the same time, summarizing conclusions are not drawn in assessing the situation as a whole, but conclusions are drawn only on its elements. Incidentally, particular conclusions on elements of a situation often may be contradictory. Obviously, the necessity for tactical calculations should be more accurately substantiated in the course of assessing the situation.

More attention in analyzing a situation and in decisions should have been devoted to the problems of the effect of highly accurate enemy weapons on selection of the means of action in combat, as well as to measures for fighting against these weapons in considering the tactical example of an attack under conditions in which nuclear weapons are used. The recommendation to attack in approach march formations a strong point against which a nuclear strike is not being delivered is disputable, and there are a number of particular errors in the textbook.

At the same time, even though a modest number of copies of the book have been published, in my view, I have no doubt that it will contribute to extension of officers' tactical outlook.

8936

CSO: 1801/209

SESSION OF PACT MILITARY COUNCIL

Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 18 Apr 87 p 3

[BELTA report: "A Reliable Guarantee of Peace"]

[Text] On 17 April the session of the Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces continued in Minsk, under the chairmanship of MSU V. G. Kulikov, commander-in-chief Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Army Gen A. I. Gribkov, chief of staff and first deputy commander-in-chief, Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization took part in the meeting, as did delegations from the Bulgarian People's Army, led by Col Gen Kh. Dobrev; the Hungarian People's Army, led by Lt Gen (L. Morocz); the National Peoples Army of the GDR, led by Col Gen (F. Strelets); Wojsko Polskie, led by Armor Gen A. Yasinskiy; the army of the Socialist Republic of Romania, led by Col Gen M. Nicolescu; the USSR Armed Forces, led by Army Gen I. M. Tretyak; the Czechoslovakian People's Army, led by Col Gen (K. Rusov). Military Council members -- Ch Mar Avn A. I. Koldunov; Col Gen Avn V. K. Andreyev; Adm N. I. Khovrin and Lt Gen P. A. Mamchur -- and responsible officials from the ministries of defense of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states and the administrative organs of the Combined Armed Forces also took part.

On the same day the participants visited the Katyn Memorial complex, where they laid flowers and made the following notes in the book for honored visitors:

"The Katyn Memorial complex made a profound impression on each of us. The first thought that came to mind was about what had to be done so that the tragedy experienced by the Belorussian people, and the population of other countries during World War II, would never be repeated.

"Glory to the invincible Belorussian people, who maintained unbending spirit throughout the entire war and displayed staunchness and will for victory!"

In the evening masters of art of Belorussia gave a concert for the meeting's participants.

9069

CSO: 1801/184

COL GEN VEREVKIN-RAKHALSKIY NOTES PACT'S 32D ANNIVERSARY

Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 14 May 87 p 3

[TASS article by Col Gen V. N. Verevkin-Rakhalskiy, first deputy chief of staff, Warsaw Treaty Organization Combined Armed Forces: "An Alliance for Peace"]

[Text] Thirty-two years ago, on 14 May 1955, the European socialist countries signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, which went down in history as the Warsaw Treaty. It vividly expressed the will and aspiration of the fraternal peoples for unity and their collective responsibility for the reliable defense of the gains of socialism, and for preserving peace and ensuring international security.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization, which originated as a response to the aggressive intrigues of the NATO bloc, has withstood with honor the test of time and confirms that it is an inviolable shield against which are dashed the aspirations of the imperialist claimants to world domination, so dangerous to peace and socialism.

As they signed the protocol extending the existence of the Warsaw Treaty in April 1985 the highest party and state officials of the fraternal states, in complete unanimity, noted that it would have to continue to play an important role, as long as the aggressive NATO bloc exists, in defending the positions of socialism in Europe and the world, and serve as a reliable instrument for preventing war and strengthening international security. Without it, it was stated at the 27th CPSU Congress, it is difficult to imagine world policy today as a whole.

The Warsaw Treaty participants consistently come out in favor of affirming the principles of peaceful coexistence, strengthening European security, curbing the arms race and improving the international political climate. The statement by Comrade M. S. Gorbachev of 15 January 1986, and the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the congresses of the fraternal parties, set down a code of principles of new political thinking, which make it possible to change fundamentally the destiny of mankind, and rid it of the fear of perishing in a nuclear war. Important initiatives were made: the Soviet program for the complete elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century; proposals by the Warsaw Treaty Organization states

to reduce substantially armed forces and conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals, and to declare a mutual moratorium for one or two years on increases in military expenditures by the state of both alliances. Great opportunities, unfortunately blocked by the American administration, were opened during the Reykjavik meetings. The Soviet proposals on intermediate range missiles in Europe, and the new initiatives, associated with them, advanced by the USSR in April in Prague and Moscow, received widespread world response and support.

The fraternal countries favor the simultaneous disbandment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Alliance, and as a first step, the elimination of their military organizations. Meetings between the commander-in-chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states, and the Supreme Commander of NATO Armed Forces in Europe, and of working groups of experts, created within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO on questions of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons on the continent, if the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance agree to hold them, could play a significant role in reducing international tension.

Largely due to the active and flexible position of the socialist countries, success became possible in the first stage of the Stockholm Conference on confidence building measures, security and disarmament in Europe. The final document of the conference included an important section on the non-use or threatened use of force. Progress has been achieved in limiting military activity in Europe, and controls have been placed on major military ground forces exercises and their transfer to Europe.

The peaceful steps taken by the Warsaw Treaty Organization states are, however, confronted by opposition from militaristic imperialist forces. The main efforts of the U. S. and NATO are aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR and Warsaw Treaty Organization. American imperialism continues to strain to achieve world domination. The center of efforts in its aspiration for this objective have shifted to the military field. The U. S. violated the interim SALT-I agreement and the SALT-II treaty, and is implementing major new military programs to build up both nuclear and conventional offensive weapons.

Needless to say, the countries of the socialist community cannot look at all this with indifference. They are not striving for military superiority, but also will not allow disruption of military-strategic parity between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. It is precisely this parity that frustrated plans of the aggressive imperialist circles for victory in world nuclear war, and that is an important guarantee of peace and international security. It should be said in this regard that the high military readiness of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the fraternal armies, is one of the important factors in maintaining strategic military parity in Europe.

The leadership of the armed forces, and of all defense matters, which is implemented by the Marxist-Leninist communist and workers parties, is of paramount importance in strengthening the security of the socialist countries. In this leadership is found the main source of the strength and invincibility

of our armies. The fundamental questions associated with the development of the cooperation of the fraternal countries in the political and military fields are resolved at sessions of the Political Consultative Committee, the highest political organ of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The Sofia (1985) and Budapest (1986) PKK [Political Consultative Committee] sessions were of great importance in this regard in strengthening collective defense capabilities.

Much work of implementing the defense measures of the fraternal countries is carried out by the military organs of the Warsaw Treaty Organization: the Committee of Defense Ministers; Combined Command; Military Council; Combined Armed Forces Staff; and the Technical Committee. Their activity is democratically based, taking into account the interests of all the allied countries, and is precisely in accord with the requirements of their party and state leadership.

As a result, the armed forces of the fraternal countries today possess, essentially, a single, scientifically based system of views on the employment of the forces and resources of the armed services and branches of arms. This makes it possible to solve in a more purposeful way the complex questions of military theory, and to structure military training on common foundations, which take into account both international and national interests.

Profound ties exist among the fraternal armies in the field of operational and military training. They are aimed at an extensive exchange of experience and training, and the development and introduction into practice of advanced methods of training the forces and naval forces. Joint exercises of various scales occupy a special place in their ranks. They play an important role in preparing the allied armies and the Combined Armed Forces for collective actions to repulse imperialist aggression. Field, air and naval training of the personnel is most fully perfected in joint exercises. Exercises held in recent years, Soyuz [Alliance], Shchit [Shield], "Bratsvo po oruzhiyu" [Brotherhood in Arms], and "Druzhba" [Friendship] have become for the soldiers of the allied armies a school of combat skill and of experience in joint actions.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization stands vigilantly on guard over the peaceful creative labor of the peoples of the fraternal countries. The stable unity of its members and military alliance of their armies are a reliable barrier in the path of aggressive imperialist forces that threaten mankind with a new war.

9069

CSO: 1801/184

PROBLEMS OF PRE-DRAFT TRAINING IN TAJIK SSR

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jun 87 pp 1-2

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major N. Burbyga on problems of pre-draft training in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast, Tajik SSR: "You Cannot Substitute Words for Deeds"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A year has passed since the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers approved the decree aimed at further improving the training of young persons for military service. How is it being implemented locally? What changes have taken place? Our correspondent was sent on an official trip to find this out. As always, the address was determined by the editors' mail.

A letter from a group of military instructors in Kurgan-Tyube Oblast reads:

"We are confident that hardly any military instructor will be found who was not inspired by the decree. After it was issued, our first thought was this: well, now things will move off dead center. But enough time has passed, and as far as we can judge, we have not had noticeable progress in the training of young persons for service. And we doubt that progress will be made if only military instructors alone are involved in this matter. Incidentally, it also turned out that we military instructors had not been trained to properly instruct the young persons in military matters. And we were taught an object lesson in this by a person from the oblvoyenkomat [oblast military commissariat], aviator captain (we don't know his name, unfortunately, but he was in our area recently).

"The officer inspected several schools and gave unsatisfactory ratings to all of them for basic military training. Many of us also received low ratings. Frankly, we were indignant at first; we had not once been rated with such a low mark. But what is there to be indignant about? The rating was fair. The knowledge of our students, and our knowledge as well, in the final analysis, is wide open to criticism..."

Let us say frankly: among the large number of letters to the editors which mention shortcomings in the military-patriotic training of young people and their preparation for service in the Armed Forces, a letter such as this is an exception.

I wanted to believe that the writers of the letter were simply exaggerating and raising the shortcomings to an oblast scale. However, my first days in the oblast and familiarity with the organization of training in military matters for students of the SPTU [rural vocational and technical school] showed that the letter writers were correct. Many of the pre-draft trainees that the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent and Lt Col A. Semchenkov, chief of the oblvoyenkomat political department, talked with could not answer the simplest questions in the program of basic military training. Quite a few of them were encountered who have an extremely vague idea of service in the Army and Navy and what it demands of a young person. We do not have to speak about the practical training of many of the youths. According to information from the oblvoyenkomat, a check of the GTO ["fit for labor and defense" physical training] standards for five types of athletics showed that many had not met these standards.

Why is the kpd [efficiency] of the system of military training for civilian youths' in the oblast so low? Part of the answer to this question is contained in the same letter from military instructors. Here is what they write:

"Everyone demands one thing of us—that we ensure the provision of training aids. But how are we to provide them if we have no physical resources, equipment or specialists at our disposal? There is one answer to all questions in this connection--find a way out, look for it."

I heard about the poor provision of training aids for basic military training from many authorities. The situation in the oblast has turned out to be really difficult: today educational institutions are short of 80 percent of the shooting ranges, 75 percent of the gymnasiums, 40 percent of the sports centers, and 50 percent of the obstacle courses.

What steps are being taken? Plans to improve training aid projects have been put together at all "levels." A little has begun to be done. But just a little. Basically only the military instructors are involved in the work as before. Supervisory organizations and base enterprises more often than not are standing aside. And local organs of authority often wink at this.

Twice the ispolkom of Shaartuzskiy Rayon approved a decision making it incumbent upon mobile mechanized column No 28 to assist one of the schools in building a firing range. And both times they were not built. Why? Kh. Usmanov, the manager of the Bishkentvodstroy Trust, which has jurisdiction over PMK-28 [column No 28], provides a simple answer: "We don't have the funds." There are really no funds. The decisions approved, it turns out, were made without a material guarantee. And this is not the only case.

But if there is an attitude such as this toward the needs of the schools locally, the alarm must be sounded to someone—without the provision of modern training aids for NVP [basic military training], young persons will not be prepared for military service. Most likely the republic's ministry of education, which directly supervises the students' basic military training? However, I did not sense that the ministry was particularly concerned about the situation that had developed.

"We have many problems, of course, and we are trying to resolve them," Minister A. Rashidov said during our discussion. "but it must be kept in mind that the construction industry is poorly developed in the republic. We have been compelled even to build new schools in accordance with truncated plans--without pools, firing ranges... At the same time, firing ranges are planned for a group of schools. Such are the construction standards and rules--you cannot avoid them."

But if these standards and rules have become obsolete and have come into conflict with the needs of everyday life? And this is obvious.

Unfortunately, the republic's minister of education is not submitting these and other problems which concern improvement in the provision of training facilities for discussion by competent organs. M. Babayev, chairman of the republic's Gosplan, believes: if the minister of education had showed concern in a timely manner, many firing ranges and other training projects for basic military training would have been built already.

It turns out that the Ministry of Education did not come out with proposals to the republic's Gosplan in good time for construction of the needed projects and did not make the appropriate calculations. And it was left without limits.

It turns out to be a strange situation: the minister of education failed to take it into account, the Gosplan did not remind and did not demand, and the republic military commissariat remained on the side, and as a result an extremely important action on which the quality of youths' training for the service depends remains at a standstill. But after all, these three departments are almost next to each other in the same city. Evidently their representatives met more than once and possibly even discussed measures to implement the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree which, incidentally, directs the appropriate ministries and departments to carry out additional measures to increase the level of pre-draft training for young people.

The dissociation and lack of coordination in actions is characteristic of a number of organs and organizations in the oblast, not only in resolving the problems of improving training facilities. These words appear in the military instructors' letter to the editors:

"Our trainees receive much criticism for their poor knowledge of the Russian language. And we also realize how hard it becomes for commanders in the army. We try to conduct all exercises for basic military training in the Russian language. However, there is little benefit from such exercises--the majority cope with the basic military training program with difficulty. So what is the solution? How do we solve this problem?"

The problem is really complicated and we will not oversimplify--it is critical not only for this oblast. But it is being resolved slowly at present. Numerous examples attest to this. At rural vocational and technical school No 34 in Kumsangirskiy Rayon, my attempt to converse with students was to no

avail: we did not understand each other. I had to resort to the help of Jr Lt (Reserve) A. Sandalov, the military instructor. At secondary school No 11 in Vakhshskiy Rayon, only a few students could speak Russian fairly well, and even the Russian language teacher who was present during the conversation, S. Sayfaliyev, preferred to remain silent--he does not speak Russian well enough.

The poor language training of the teachers themselves, in the view of O. Kurbanbekov, chief of the oblast's public education department, is one of the basic reasons why many children of indigenous nationalities have a poor grasp of the educational program and a poor command of conversational speech. Particularly serious complaints have been made by oblonos [oblast public education] employees and the heads of educational institutions about graduates of the Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube Teacher Training Institutes.

And I would like to say something about this here. Many years ago this practice was widely followed in the republic: specialists in philology who had completed VUZes in the RSFSR were invited to work in the educational institutions. Now this practice essentially has been neglected. Only about 20 percent of such specialists remain in the oblast today.

In Moscow, at the USSR Ministry of Education, they told me that Tajikistan is given an application every year for the number of graduating students to be sent to teacher training VUZes in the RSFSR. And every year it is not completed. The republic prefers to train this category of personnel with its own resources. But it does not turn out well with their own resources, as we see. So perhaps in such a case it is not worth striking the attitude: we ourselves?..

Since the discussion has turned to personnel, we need to speak about the selection of military supervisors as well. Who are they, the oblast's military instructors of today? They gave me this information at the oblast military commissariat: out of 339 military instructors, more than one-third are sergeants, and 123 are soldiers in the reserve. Nearly half--144 military instructors--have a secondary or secondary specialized education. The remainder are basically those reserve or retired officers who completed military institutes or courses at one time. Those who wrote the letter to the editors are in the latter group. I managed to meet some of them for a discussion in detail. I admit that I did not refrain from asking questions related to the basics of military matters during the discussions. And I was convinced that most of those I spoke with are not very knowledgeable. However, they admit this themselves. They are also worried about something else--poor methodological training. They wrote about this with concern in their letter:

"Each one of us has many questions related to the methods of instruction for basic military training. How do we resolve them? It would seem to be simplest in the methodological studies which are being conducted with us. But how are they conducted? We usually gather in one of the schools, a warrant officer comes from the rayon military commissariat and begins telling us how to conduct registration or to prepare young persons for being drafted into the army. We cannot get an answer to one of our questions related to basic military training. This is how they teach us."

These lines from the letter aroused indignation from a number of oblast military commissariat employees: this is slander, lessons are conducted regularly, and precisely instructors' methodological lessons. There are plans where the topics for lessons are established and there are attendance books... Everything is really completely in order in the bookkeeping here. But the oblast public education department inspector for basic military training, V. Semenov, did not conduct 5-day training sessions with the Kurgan-Tyube military instructors in August last year, but they showed me the plan for these sessions and the appropriate signature at the city military commissariat. Jr Lt (Reserve) A. Sandalov, the military instructor, did not attend the sessions at all during the year, but his attendance is noted in the record book...

It is not easy for the republic's military commissariats, of course. The volume of work they carry out is very large and it is continually increasing. This is related to changes in the country's demographic situation. So the population of Kurgan-Tyube Oblast has tripled over the past several decades, but the military commissariats are working with the same complement as before. At the same time, the flow of correspondence and the volume of every possible kind of official papers have increased significantly. Some voyenkomat employees have stated frankly: sometimes we cannot get away from our desks for weeks--certificates, accounts, and reports are required. They are not up to the problems of basic military training here. But shouldn't someone change the situation that has taken shape? But this does not depend only on the objective causes. Obviously, the voyenkomats must change their style of work more decisively, move away from the old, inefficient ways, make more extensive use of electronic and other technical means to make their work easier, and interact more closely with the local party and soviet organs.

The rayon voeyenkomat employees welcome suggestions such as this with equanimity. Yes, everything is obvious: we must change, we must utilize, we must interact. But it is not all that simple. They cannot always manage to come to a mutual understanding with rayon leaders...

In the morning I asked for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA at the hotel newsstand, as I usually do; it was not there--they had not brought it in. It was the same situation at two stands along the road to the party obkom. The newsstand attendant at the party obkom looked at me with surprise: I don't know of any such newspaper; I have never received it as long as I have been working. I assumed that obkom employees may be receiving it at home. He explained that they do not receive it. Not KRASNAYA ZVEZDA or any other military publications. Not one of the persons who one way or another deals with military-patriotic work and the training of young persons for military service! The question arises automatically: do these comrades know what the Army and the Navy live with today and what kind of training young persons should have for service in the Armed Forces?

N. Khuvaydullayev, the head of the Department of Administrative Organs of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee, listened attentively to my impressions from the trip to the oblast. He agreed that there really are

quite a few problems at present. But they are being resolved step by step. There is definite improvement, the first progress. Efforts will be stepped up. Particular attention will be given to Kurgan-Tyube Oblast; it needs help first of all.

The meeting with Comrade Khuvaydullayev inspired a fair amount of optimism. And the second thing I took from the meeting was that the state of affairs in the oblast is the exception, not the rule, for the republic. But when I returned to the editorial office, I saw a letter on my desk from M. Pirmatov, a military instructor at secondary school No 3 of the Komsomol Kolkhoz imeni V. I. Lenin in Leninabad Oblast. The facts in it were similar to those which the group of military instructors had written about...

8936

CSO: 1801/0209

REVIEW OF LETTERS ON HOUSING PROBLEMS OF MILITARY FAMILIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 87 p 4

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent T. Bystrova under the rubric "Review of Letters": "And The Apartment Problem Once Again"]

[Text] I deeply understand the feelings of persons who appeal to the editorial staff with their everyday problems, particularly thier housing problems. I remember well when my husband brought me and our small son to Vladivostok after he completed military school. A colleague of my husband gave us shelter. But then we began the search for housing. How many miles we walked over the steep hills of Primoryal.. In a year, we obtained a room in a communal apartment and were very happy. A little less than 20 years have passed since then. Much has been forgotten. And at times the past even acquires a tinge of romance.

But here on the desk are letters from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers, and once again I recall my far from romantic everyday problems.

"What I encountered during my practical training period,"officer cadet A. Chesnokov notes in his letter, "should be familiar to many persons. But I was surprised by what I saw. The family of a senior lieutenant, including two children, are living in a barn 10 square meters in area. And the charge for this so-called dwelling is considerable. Is this really a normal situation? Does an officer really expect a struggle with such difficulties throughout his service? I have prepared myself for ordeals, including everyday ones, but I did not think they were so acute. And obviously, I must talk about this openly today."

Yes, in order to resolve problems, we must speak about them openly. The specific nature of military service is such that officers often have to travel with their families from garrison to garrison. Who is not familiar with the ordeal in searches for a private apartment or even some kind of temporary shelter? As an example, more than 700 families of servicemen have no housing at all at one of the garrisons of the Odessa Military District.

Up to 30 percent of the readers' letters received by the editorial staff touch on the housing problem in one way or another. At the same time, many letters result simply from the lack of knowledge of certain normative documents.

The Decree on the Procedure for Providing Living Space in the Soviet Army and Navy was adopted more than 10 years ago. But after this, the Principles of Housing Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics (1981) and certain other acts were adopted. Necessary changes in the decree were made. But how is a serviceman to detect all these supplements and amendments scattered in many documents? After all, it is no secret that with the mass of papers, and at times with the lack of them as well, at certain garrisons, servicemen and their families attempt to determine their rights by intuition.

Here, for example, is a letter from Comrade S. Koryttseva: "Article 20 of the Principles of Housing Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics calls for improvement in housing conditions for families when twins are born. There has been an addition to our family; twins were born. In the military unit they told my husband that there is no such provision in the Decree. For this reason, please explain if this law, which applies to everyone, is being extended to servicemen. I would like to know the number of the appropriate document as well."

There is no special document for servicemen in this regard. But garrison housing commissions and the housing commissions for military units should also take into account the regional standards on housing matters. But this is not always done. They do not even know about this everywhere. There is a letter in the editors' mail from P. Kostyuk, a housing commission member of one of the military units; he frankly admits finding difficulty in resolving problems such as this.

Obviously, it is now necessary to issue a single collection of all rulings on housing matters which would include all the amendments, specifications, and supplements. This would be an effective aid for the work of housing commissions and would help to eliminate many uncertainties.

But in the meantime, readers are writing letters. A. Kuzmenko, V. Tretyakova, and V. Simirenko are interested in the housing benefits stipulated for the families of servicemen with three or more children. And Lt Col V. Gorbunov wants to know the procedure in which living space is provided for unmarried officers with long length of service. And how can we answer Col A. Korovin, let us say, who writes: "I will be transferred to the reserve this year because of illness. At my previous post I rented housing, but I haven't received it here yet. Do I have the right, taking my long service into account, to be provided with living space when I am transferred to the reserve?" This same question is asked by Comrades Laychuk, Trush, Dedkova, and others.

There is no doubt that clear-cut, specific explanations on these and other problems set forth in a single handbook would also do away with the numerous appeals by servicemen and their family members to different authorities and would free KECh and KEU [Billeting and Maintenance Administration and Billeting and Maintenance Unit] employees from "personal" explanations, and it would cut back on correspondence and free time and working energy.

It has already become nearly the norm for an officer or warrant officer who has been transferred to a new post to be forced to live for months and even years in a private apartment. Previously, partial compensation for expenses in subletting housing accommodations was provided. But after all, the charge for a private apartment has become higher and higher over the years. Now other problems have appeared as well. Lt Col I. Netsvetay bitterly revealed his story: "I arrived to serve in Donetsk in mid-August last year. I couldn't find an apartment until the end of October. Fearing prosecution for unearned income, the free-lance renter was not persuaded. The unit commander explained to me that I will have to wait a year and a half for housing. I understand him. But there must be somewhere for me to live, and not so much for me as for my family. In my 20th year of service, after having rented housing many times, I encountered a serious problem. What solution can there be to the situation that has been created, taking into account that an active struggle against unearned income is being conducted in the country?"

It is doubtful whether Lt Col Netsvetay, or Comrades Pentkovskiy, Sesmekov, Alenkin, or Kalush (this list can be continued) would be satisfied by the reply received in this connection from a responsible official of the GlavKEU [Main Billeting and Maintenance Administration]: "In 1985 the USSR Council of Ministers adopted decree No 241, under which servicemen with family members may be registered for the living space of other persons or the military unit until they receive living space in the established procedure at their new service post." But this refers to registration. And housing?

Construction of hotels and dormitory facilities which could provide temporary accommodations for the families of servicemen arriving at a garrison is proceeding extremely slowly at present. Letters from the Transcaucasus Military District, the Black Sea Fleet, and a number of other regions of the country attest to this. Readers also pose the question directly: "Why aren't dormitory facilities being built? Why aren't we even allowed on the threshold of a military department dormitory facility when we arrive in an unfamiliar city?.." These are lines from the letter by an officer's wife.

It is common knowledge that the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee reviewed the problem of improving housing for servicemen on 30 November 1985. Additional funds were allocated for this purpose. "If part of these funds were allowed to be used for building hotels and dormitory facilities," Maj V. Nikolayev writes in his letter, "the existing problems could be resolved to some extent..."

An inventory of available housing can make a tangible impact in providing housing for servicemen. But despite instructions, an inventory still has not been conducted at many garrisons, as the mail attests. Many readers are also urging that the reservation of apartments be put in order. After all, how does this turn out? Often an officer, in leaving to serve in a group of forces, as an example, rents his apartment to persons who have no relationship at all to the Ministry of Defense. If we cast a critical eye on the lists of residents in buildings under the jurisdiction of a billeting and maintenance unit, we see persons in nearly every one that are not connected with the army.

Apparently the simplest way is to include the chief of the billeting and maintenance section in the clearance chit for departing officers? Here and there this is being done by garrison commanders. But far from everywhere. So such apartments are left uncontrolled. According to a report from our readers, Comrades Samosud and Levoneni, about 500 apartments are being occupied by civilians at one of the garrisons of the North Caucasus Military District.

But including the signature of the chief of the billeting and maintenance unit in the clearance chit provides the opportunity to register reserved apartments for officers' families to occupy them in accordance with a contract.

The apartment problem probably is the most critical one in the social area. And a great deal is being done to resolve it, which is also confirmed by readers' letters. But many problems remain. And at the same time, we cannot help but take into account that here as nowhere else the interests of the person, the collective and the state intersect with each other. And the lack of openness in this matter is being perceived very acutely. "It is necessary that those waiting their turn know their position in line, who has a right to priority, and the principle under which apartments are allocated," writes the wife of officer Kuprin from Sevastopol. And there is a single principle—unswerving adherence to the laws.

The housing problems requires the quickest possible solution. The party is aiming us toward this. At the June (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Committee, it was stated that there has not been a fundamental turning point in housing matters yet. "...And this is explained to a large extent not only by the lack of funds, but by the attitude of many party, soviet and economic organs which supervise personnel." The state of affairs in every garrison must be viewed from these very positions.

8936

CSO: 1801/209

FEBRUARY-MARCH KRASNAYA ZVEZDA LETTERS TO EDITOR, RESPONSES

Protectionism in Military Advancement

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "How Not To Gratify A Native"]

The correspondence under the heading "How Not To Gratify A Native" was published on 12 December 1986. It discussed Senior Lieutenant S. Rogalskiy's unfounded advance in service and other cases of protectionism that certain officials are showing toward their relatives and friends who are serving in the Central group of Forces.

A member of the military council, Chief of Political Affairs for the Group of Forces Major General N. Shlyaga, informed the editor that the facts were supported. The newspaper article was discussed at a session of the military council, in the political directorate, in the cadre section, the political section for the Group of Forces headquarters and directorate and the political sections of the major units. Corrective measures were defined to eliminate the shortcomings that were noted in the newspaper. The problem of increasing party influence over the selection, placement, education and training of the command and political cadre and increasing the role of references and performance reports when advancing officers to higher positions was discussed at a meeting of Group of Forces party activists. Special attention was focused on making political agencies and cadre organizations more responsible for having thorough knowledge about and being objective in evaluating officer cadres and their political and business qualities.

By order of the commander of the Group of Forces, for grossly violating the procedure for selecting officers for assignment to higher position Major H. Bystrov, a worker in the cadre agency, and Deputy Battalion Chief of Staff Captain S. Bichurin were warned about not carrying out their service obligations. Chief of the Cadre Organization Lieutenant Colonel M. Shershnev and Senior Assistant Regimental Chief of Staff Major K. Mironyuk were given a severe reprimand. Major General V. Malashkevich, Major General I. Kondratyev and Colonel A. Yakimov were made to understand the need to increase their control over the activities of cadre agencies. Colonel N. Mukhin was discharged into the reserves. Communists N. Bystrov, K. Mironyuk and F.

Bandurin were held responsible by the party. The Group of Forces commander made the decision to send the sixteen junior officers (to include Senior Lieutenant S. Rogalskiy) whose fathers were serving in the Central Group of Forces out to the inland military districts on official business.

Waste in Aviation Squadron Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Feb 87 p 2

[Letter from Major G. Karpenko, Military Navigator 1st Class, Red Banner Baltic Military District, in the "Answers, Responses, Results" section: "Wastefulness... According to the Plan", first paragraph is author's introduction]

[Text] After reading the article by Major General of Aviation V. Ilyushkin entitled "They Saved A Kilogram and Threw A Ton To The Wind" published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 5 December 1986, I decided to share my observations on how setting up military training improperly negates the efforts of aviators to save material assets.

Airplane Technical Senior Lieutenant Yu. Pomankin began pre-flight preparations, as usual, by checking the fuel. He removed the sediment from each tank and carefully looked to see if there were any traces of harmful mixtures in the fuel. He then carefully poured the fuel into a special tank. And other aviators were working just as carefully.

Major V. Lyashenko said, and not without pride, "We do not waste a single drop of fuel. And this goes for more than just aviation fuel. We avoid having our vehicles make "empty" trips around the airfield and have reduced airplane sorties to the parking area to a minimum. We have a clear schedule that dictates the sequence for the day."

Everything that the officer said was correct. However by observing how much fuel is pumped from the fuel tanker into the tanks of the missile carrying aircraft every time, one begins to think -- although ground specialists are carefully gathering grams of fuel, what sort of coefficient for usefully using the tons of fuel that are burned in the air do they have. How do these tons of fuel "work" to improve the flight skills of the aviators?

I took this question to Lieutenant Colonel A. Zaytsev who was accustomed to looking at all such problems from the point of view of specific practices.

The engineer noted, "This is an interesting question. Take yesterday's flight group for example. Weather conditions were normal and no especially difficult tactical scenario had been selected. As regards the flight route, we used our trite old triangle..."

Actually both the lieutenants and the aerial warriors who had thousands of flight hours were flying that same triangular route. I say this because the latter totally used up their fuel. A lot of expensive fuel. And I think that this is not really logical. People are trying to save what you would call crumbs in some areas and in others they are burning it up in heaps.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Zaytsev it is not too difficult to solve the problem of increasing the effectiveness of fuel use. What is needed most of all is skillful flight planning. For example, one day the plan called for Deputy Squadron Commander Military Pilot 1st Class Major V. Poluektov to fly an exercise at night under difficult weather conditions. Based on this, the exercise would require Major Poluektov and the entire crew to take a new step in improving their military skills. However, you cannot give orders to the weather and the flights took place under normal weather conditions. Nonetheless the crew took off and operated, certainly, under a simplified variation. Obviously it would have been better under these conditions to take the crew off of the planned schedule and let them get involved in some "ground" matters at this time, matters that the deputy squadron commander and his subordinates had more than enough of.

I hear the question, "But what about the flight plan?" This came down to the aviators from "above" and was designed to provide limits on fuel, lubricants, spare parts and other material resources. Certainly, the plan is law and it must be carried out. But not by flying for the sake of flying.

Financial Service Problems Countered

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Feb 87 p 2

[Letter from Colonel L. Sarychev, chief of Financial Services, Northern Group of Forces, in the "Answers, Responses, Results" section, first paragraph is the author's introduction]

[Text] There are times when an article in a newspaper sharply "cuts to the quick" those people, it would seem at first glance, whom the straight talk in the article is not about. I include the article "With the Strength of Right" published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 16 January 1987 as one such article. There was not one word about the Finance Service in that article, but the same spirit and the same idea that ran from the first to the last line also directly affect us, military financial personnel.

Actually this reconstruction matter is complicated. One could say many beautiful and correct things about it and "indulge in vain hopes" without changing anything. For example, what is the most important work indicator that we have? It is the struggle against financial violations. They are reduced, and in any case people do not scold you especially hard, even if there are omissions in the organizational, training and educational and monitoring and revisory work. But if financial violations suddenly "jump up", the reaction is totally different. And it is this "other reaction" that at times obviously forces you to act against your conscience and arouses the desire to show in reporting documents that you are not so bad.

Since our service is primarily a monitoring service, we began reconstruction by strengthening and improving financial controls. We began immediately after the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. We opened the dam as the saying goes and statistics on financial violations went up. We certainly lived through some bitter moments and we had some bad luck. It turned out that we accomplished a lot of good things, increased exactingness and

strengthened control, but the violations grew. And naturally we began to look worse in the summary reports.

We decided to be consistent. The level of control was not reduced, but intensified and everything was done to get more involved in preventing violations. And we would get results, we had to get results. What would we get if we began to "paint over and slick down" violations?

The decision was obviously correct for the 1986 results indicated that the work that was done was providing its first positive results -- we were able to hold the increase in financial violations in check and the time had come to get to the next task on the agenda. We had to do everything possible to totally eliminate them. The conditions for this were here.

Or take the very painful question of staffing the very responsible positions of chief bookkeeper for supply services and KECh [billeting operations units] in rayons with so-called orgnabor [organizational recruiting] specialists. Reality shows that this is not economically suitable. As a rule, what you get is a man who has not previously worked in a military organization.

How does one get out of this situation?

By improving the selection system and giving preference to those workers who already have the experience working in military units. By relying to a degree on local worker resources. There are also experienced experts among the wives of servicemen.

Groundless Charges for Criticism

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "Answers, Responses, Results" section: Who Are Bothered by the Quarrelsome?]

[Text] An article published under the heading "Who Are Bothered by the Quarrelsome" on 22 November, 1986, discussed the persecution that the chief of staff for civil defense for one of the areas in the city of Lvov, Lieutenant Colonel Kryuk, suffered after he spoke out against violations of labor laws and financial regulations committed by several officials. And other facts of persecution for party criticism were also cited.

The editor received an answer to this newspaper article from UkSSR Civil Defense Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Affairs Major General Ye. Prokhorov. The answer stated that many facts were confirmed as a result of a careful on-site investigation. The money that A. Karvatska had illegally obtained for work at which she was actually only on the work roster was recovered. Chief of courses E. Osipyants was punished (the answer did not state how) for white-washing and disciplinary violations. It was admitted that Colonel A. Kondrashov and Colonel L. Basov had not been objective in their attitudes toward retired Colonel P. Nikolenko and reserve Lieutenant Colonel V. Fertenko who correctly criticized Chief of Oblast Courses S. Kharlamov. The answer further stated that Lvov Oblast Civil Defense Chief of

Staff Colonel A. Kondrashov and Lvov City Civil Defense Chief of Staff Yu. Karnaukh "were not always objective in their exactingness toward Lieutenant Colonel I. Kryuk and this caused his retaliatory reaction.

And to prove the fact that I. Kryuk himself was not without fault, there were references to facts earlier in I. Kryuk's personal life both in the official answer and in several letters from I. Kryuk's fellow workers who were dissatisfied with him for one reason or another. These facts stressed his personal shortcomings. It is thus easy to substitute one question for others. But the article discussed the specific persecution of communists for specific criticism. These are the specific facts that must be given a fundamental evaluation.

Unfortunately this evaluation slips away from the official answer. They only reported (and this was stated in the article) that all the charges against P. Nikolenko and V. Fertenko were dropped and readers also know that the party punishment against N. Kryuk was dropped as being groundless. There remains only for us to find out what happened to the people who so persistently brought these groundless charges against these communists because they spoke out against violations and shortcomings.

Waste in Naval Training Cited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 87 p 2

[Letter from reserve Michman P. Syrotyuk in the "Letters to the Editor" section: "They Trained for the Navy..."]

[Text] I served in the Navy for 26 years and after I was dismissed to the reserves I did not break my ties with the sea. My present profession is Master of Production Training and I work in a DOSAAF Naval school in the city of Zhdanov. I understand perfectly well that today's Navy requires specialists with very high qualifications. But do you know how much effort is required to train a good specialist? And we are training representatives of one of the basic specialties -- coxswain signalmen. This is why the training in our school is isolated from production.

But this is not even the main problem. As the saying goes, we teach to teach. It is much more difficult to convince young people to enter the Navy without hesitating, for they have to serve three and not two years in the Navy. And we have to work with conscripts so that we are able to impress on them that they must serve on ships and we must also inculcate them with a love for the sea and open their eyes to the romance of naval service.

We have to go out to schools, meet with parents and hold meetings.

But these problems do not frighten us. We know that young people who have consciously chosen the service will really be loyal to the Navy.

And actually the school is constantly getting letters of thanks from the fleets for training these specialists. And our former pupils write to thank us for our help and for the fact that we trained them so well for the difficult naval service.

But unfortunately there are also other letters. You read them and your spirit drops. How do you explain the fact that despite the fact that they have successfully completed a naval school in the coxswain signalman specialty many of our graduates are sent to serve either in totally different ship subunits or in other arms of the Armed Forces. For example Sergey Romanchenko whose name is inscribed in the school's Book of Honor is serving as an electrician on a floating workshop. Vitaliy Kvitko is a film technician-librarian. Former school cadets E. Strizhak, O. Khurilenko and A. Shevchenko were assigned to other specialties in the Navy. A total of more than forty of the school's graduates who are now in the service did not become coxswain-signalmen because of the desires of voyenkomat's [military registration and enlistment offices] and cadre agencies.

The result is that our work to some degree went for naught. It is more than just the fact that our endeavors and our searches for the methods to effectively train conscripts and our educational work with them turns out to be "unnecessary." There are other appreciable losses in this matter. Acceleration and manifesting the human factor as much as possible is not just a phrase, but a real mechanism for reconstruction.

And it is difficult to talk about improvements in our business of training conscripts when some bureaucrat who is bustling about the "lack of problems" in his own area dares to cross out everything that was done before him with one flourish of a cold-hearted pen. One would think that it is impossible to go on. But this must not happen in our times.

Specialty-Position Mis-Matches Corrected

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "But These Measures Were Not Taken"]

[Text] The retort from Lieutenant Colonel S. Levitskiy that was published on 30 December, 1986 was entitled "But the Measures Were Not Taken." This discussed the fact that graduates from the Kirov Military Aviation and Technical School have been assigned to positions in other specialties for a number of years and yet every time readers' letters about this appear in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA the Directorate of Air Force Cadres reports that measures are being taken...

As Chief of the Directorate of Air Force Cadres Lieutenant General Yu. Simakhin reported to the editor, an order was published which outlined the methods for eliminating the shortcoming in working with VUZ [institutes of higher education] graduates. Colonel R. Uporov was given a reprimand for

neglecting his duty and it was sternly pointed out to Colonels B. Samarin and V. Vodeneyev that they were doing a poor job of monitoring that orders that were given were carried out.

Air Force Commander of the Central Asian Military District Lieutenant General of Aviation Ye. Rusanov informed the editor that he had given strict orders to his deputy for aviation engineering services, Major General of Aviation A. Kondratsov, that formalism was not to be allowed when working with young officers. Graduates of the school are being assigned to positions according to their specialty.

Political Group Leader Problems Solved

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing In KRSNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "The Working Edge"]

[Text] In the article that was published on 19 December 1986 under the heading "The Working Edge" Captain Lieutenant P. Ishchenko expressed critical remarks about the formal attitude on some ships toward the selection of leaders for political exercise groups. As Captain 1st Rank V. Kuleshov reported the political department of the formation pointed out shortcomings in the work of officers V. Yablonskiy, A. Duvanov, N. Paliy, A. Nikolayenko and V. Chernov.

During the new training year group leaders for political exercises are selected after every one of them is carefully discussed by the party buro of the ships' local party organizations

Dismissals, Reductions Listed

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRSNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "For Personnel Goals"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel A. Borovkov's article that was published on 4 April was entitled "For Personal Goals."

The chief of the Kachinskiy Higher Aviation School for Pilots imeni A. F. Myasnikov, Colonel Ya. Kruglov, informed the editor that Lieutenant Colonel V. Verenich did abuse his service position. The party commission for the school's political section decided that communist Verenich was to receive a severe reprimand with a notation on his registration card. He was held both disciplinarily and materially responsible.

In his report on the newspaper article Lieutenant Colonel K. Bondarev writes that former subunit commander and communist Lieutenant Colonel O. Prokofyev was dismissed into the reserves without the right to wear his military uniform for not being attentive to the requests and needs of servicemen's family members.

Warrant Officer A. Titarenko was judged by a warrant officer's Comrades' Court of Honor for a careless attitude toward service and food shortages. The court raised the question of petitioning to have him dismissed into the reserves.

The garrison military procurator gave Lieutenant Colonel V. Verenich a warning not to tolerate violations of the law. Lieutenant Colonels V. Ustinov and G. Logivenko were reduced in position for neglecting their duty.

Reprimands Given for Poor Work

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "Here is the 'Criticism'"]

"Here is the 'Criticism'" was the title over correspondence from Major V. Zyubin that was published on 21 December, 1986.

Colonel Yu. Vasyutin informed the editor that the newspaper article was discussed in the political section in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District's Military Construction Directorate and the criticism was acknowledged as being correct. Lieutenant Colonel V. Kuznetsov was dismissed into the reserves. The UNR [office of the work supervisor] party committee gave the military construction detachment's Deputy Commander for Political Affairs Captain I. Sysoyev a reprimand. Former Komsomol committee secretary communist Warrant Officer A. Baburin was also given a severe reprimand with a notation on his registration card. Senior Lieutenant G. Milyutin was given a reprimand with a notation on his registration card.

The command and party organization will assist the Military Construction Detachment in guaranteeing that Komsomol members set a personal example in work, service and discipline and in mobilizing young people to meet the 20th Komsomol Congress in a worthy manner.

Conscript Improperly Assigned

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "Not in His Specialty"]

[Text] A letter from Guards Private A. Shangin was published on 10 January under the heading "Not in His Specialty." The author reported that after completing the 2nd course in the Minsk Aviation Technical School for Civil Aviation he was called into the Armed Forces, but was not assigned to his specialty.

As Acting Military Commissar for the Belorussian SSR Colonel G. Chebotarev informed the editor, the letter from Guards Private A. Shangin was discussed with personnel in Minsk's Zavodskiy Rayon Voenkomat. The violations in preparing for and calling up conscriptions for active military service were sternly pointed out to the officers in charge of manning the detachments.

Special Services Provided Privileged

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "Answers, Responses, Results" section: "But the List Remained"]

[Text] Colonel A. Soldatov's letter to the editor that was entitled "On an Approved List" was published 25 November 1986. It stated that the Universam Store in the Carpathian Military District had set up an "Order Table" whose services could be used only by personnel on a special list.

This publication did not remain unnoticed. A lot of responses telling about similar cases have come in to the editor and there have been recommendations that the order system be expanded to cover all servicemen.

And official answers were not long in coming. One of them arrived on 15 December 1986 and was signed by Carpathian Military District Military Procurator Major General of Legal Services A. Frolov and a second arrived on 16 December 1986 and was signed by District Deputy Commander for Rear Services Major General G. Nikitin.

Those and other responses confirm that the facts were true and that the district's Directorate of Commerce has taken the appropriate measures to improve service for servicemen and their families. Major General G. Nikitin reports that after he returns from regular leave Universam Store Director A. Pugachev will be subject to administrative actions for gross negligence in his work. Major General of Legal Services A. Frolov's answer said that the district's military procurator and representatives from People's Control had conducted a joint procurator's investigation. A conversation was held with the Universam administration and A. Pugachev himself was singled out for his tactless conduct and his failure to know what was going on.

The answers also reported that "Order Table" services are being used only by officers and generals who are very busy because of service associated with frequent and extended official travels. And the products that are obtained through this service are the same as those sold in Universam's food section. Our correspondent for the Carpathian Military District was charged with visiting the store to see what changes have taken place there.

Privileged Situation Remains

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 87 p 2

[Letter from Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy in the "Answers, Responses, Results" section: "A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Reports"]

[Text] The officers and employees with whom we had occasion to talk unanimously asked, "What changes are you talking about? See for yourself -- the regiment's meat section is empty. And be here when they deliver sausage. People languish in line forever."

"Critical items go on the 'Order Table'," explained acting Universam Store Director D. Vlasyuk.

I will immediately explained that former director A. Pugachev was not subjected to administrative actions. He left his position of his own volition and was immediately assigned as the manager of his own military store. By the way, this was the same position where he worked in the 70's and was dismissed for abusing his service position, poor business qualities and unsatisfactory leadership.

D. Vlasyuk continued, "As you see, we have removed the sign for the 'Order Table'. But the 'table' still remains. And the approved list still remains. I will say this. The 'Order Table' must be used by everyone and if this is impossible it will be closed. If this is not done people will feel that there is an injustice and will complain."

They courteously gave me the opportunity to look at that approved list. 62 individuals were using the services of the "Order Table." They included district rear service officers A. Fomin, V. Ustinov, G. Lukyanenko and several others. It is hardly necessary to confirm that there were more from their service than other headquarters and directorate officers. But there is more to this. Is it possible on principle to use "service employment" as the basis for the existence of such lists? One would think that things would be better if rear area officials regularly visited the Universam food section to have the opportunity of getting acquainted with buyers' services, the assortment of products and the criticisms toward military goods.

But an approved list of officials cannot stand up to criticism, even if the assortment of goods on the "Order Table" and those in the Universam food section were identical. I am convinced that this situation is far from unique.

Illegal Fines Returned

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "Answers, Responses, Results" section: "Without Further Ado"]

[Text] The letter from Captain Yu. Vasilyev that was published under the heading "Without Further Ado" on 24 December 1986 discussed the fact that several officers from the unit where he is serving were illegally held materially responsible.

Military Procurator for the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany Major General of Legal Services A. Perepelitsa and Chief of the unit Political Section informed the editor that the facts were confirmed. Former unit commander Lieutenant Colonel N. Voyna published orders three times that held his subordinates materially responsible, but did not observe the requirements of existing documents.

The new commander revoked these orders and the monies that were illegally held from the servicemen were returned. Disciplinary proceedings were instigated against Lieutenant Colonel Voyna for the violations that he allowed in his relationships and these proceedings were sent to the cadre agency in his new duty station.

Violations Proven, Reactions Made

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial from the "Answers, Responses, Results" section: "At An Open Semaphore"]

[Text] The correspondence published under the heading "At The Open Semaphore" on 11 December, 1986 discussed shortcomings in the organization of educational work and violations of regulatory order in the Leningrad Higher School for Railroad Troops and Military Communications imeni M. V. Frunze.

The editor received an answer signed by Chief of the Department of Organizational and Party Work for the Railroad Troop Political Directorate Colonel G. Gybenko. There was also a response signed by the chief of the school's political department, Major General A. Demin. These replies stated that the facts contained in the original correspondence were valid. The newspaper article was examined at a meeting at the Railroad Troops Political Directorate and a meeting of the school's command-political and professor-instructor groups. Problems of increasing regulatory order were discussed at the school's Komsomol conference and methods for guaranteeing that Komsomol members set the example in training and discipline were defined.

Major A. Kalinovskiy who was named in the correspondence was expelled from the CPSU for military regulatory violations that he allowed and was expelled from the Armed Forces cadre for service discrepancies.

The replies also indicated that several facts in the correspondence were one-sided and were not presented correctly. The correspondence cited the disciplinary violation by Cadet A. Karpukhin, but nothing was said about the school command's reaction to this violation. Moreover A. Karpukhin was held responsible by the Komsomol and was expelled from the school before the newspaper article was published. Thus there was no basis for talking about the supposed liberalism that was allowed in reacting to that violation. The correspondence stated that all of the school's servicemen who had gone to the commandant's office since March 1986 were detained by the patrol detail for using alcohol and for regulatory violations associated with this. However, as was explained, the majority of the arrests were associated with such violations as failing to salute.

The editor is dividing the discussions expressed in the replies according to the facts that they contained and the editor's journalists who were at fault for allowing inaccuracies were severely brought to task.

Michman Selection Process Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 87 p 2

[Letter from Captain 3rd Rank A. Mokhun, Red Banner North Fleet: "Who Is to Be A Michman"]

[Text] The new and the well-forgotten old. I thought about the fairness of this saying when I read the article by Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko entitled "The Shipboard Michman" and other articles in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on this same topic. I agree with the authors. Moral, material and finally social compensation play a major role in increasing the authority of this category of ship's company. But in my opinion, all of this is the second and third stage in resolving the problem under discussion. And to begin to resolve this problem one must answer the question "Who should be a ship-board michman?"

Success in resolving this personnel problem in the future depends on the correct answer to that question. And one would think that this would be a good time to turn to the experience of the past.

A little less than four years ago I served my time on the cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov. Our crew was famous for its friendship, cohesiveness and military skills. And this was due to the services of those people who were serving past their first tour -- the michmen. Many years have passed since then, but I still remember the kind lessons of Michmen V. Mironyuk, A. Suchkov and many others. One did not argue with their authority, primarily because they themselves had gone through the entire school of first-term service, they knew their business perfectly and consequently could teach us, the sailors.

Even then there was a great mass of problems that complicated the lives of michmen. For example, there was the housing problem. Michman Mironyuk lived in the common ward-room for many a year. But nonetheless he did not leave to go on shore and neither guaranteed individual housing or the fully sufficient monetary salary enticed him. Why? Because Mironyuk, as other michmen on the Mikhail Kutuzov, loved ship-board service, could not imagine themselves without it and valued the trust of the command that had helped him select extended duty.

Yes, this selection existed previously. They saw future michmen as potential command starshina and they approach their selection from this basis. By the way, attention was first focused on the level of the sailor's professional training and on his ability to work with people. If you were first class, you carried out the duties at the master level and you had enough organizational abilities to carry out the responsibilities of a section commander, you were invited to discuss the of your service on the ship. If you did not have these skills, no one brought up that discussion.

And there is another feature that is now lost. The first term previously was two years. You endured it and felt that you were involved in your own affairs and you wrote a report about extending your service. If you did not write this report, it meant that it was simply not your fate.

One would think that this experience of the past would not lose its significance. Why not give a candidate for michman the opportunity to try his efforts in extended service? I admit there will be failures. Some will not want to don the michman's shoulderboards after such a check-out and some will show their lack of preparation for this... But this type of thing is simply not done today.

In talking with sailors and starshina, even with those who have expressed their desire to become michmen, there are times when you hear complaints that a michman or team starshina has too many things to worry about, things that are not directly related to teaching his subordinates their specialty and educating them. I remember that military units once had the position of formation starshina, equivalent to a company master sergeant in army units. The formation starshina was involved in preparing the guard of the day, maintaining order in the compartments and so forth, creating all the necessary conditions so that the command specialist starshina (as the command starshina was previously called) could get deeply involved in training personnel to function at their combat positions. By the way, several years ago the anti-submarine cruiser Kiev which was then commanded by Captain 1st Rank V. Pykov took notice of this experience. And, I must say, got good results. And this shows that one must look constructively at the problem of filling out a ship with good michmen and be guided primarily by the interests of the matter at hand.

Commerce Department Personnel Reprimanded

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial on "Measures Taken" in the "Answers, Responses, Results" section: "Straw Figures"]

[Text] Major N. Medvedev's correspondence that was published on 23 December, 1986 under the heading "Straw Figures" told about serious shortcomings in working with personnel in the Central Asian Military District's Directorate of Commerce and about connivance on the part of party organizations and officials. This was especially obvious during then investigation into the personnel affairs of CPSU member and former chief of voyentorg [a trading establishment for military personnel] L. Prisyazhnyuk who actually got away with gross violations of the law and abuses of power.

As military council member and Chief of the District's Political Directorate Lieutenant General F. Kochkin reported to the editor, the criticism was justified. The district troop commander published an order in which district Deputy Commander for Rear Services and district Chief of Rear Services Lieutenant General V. Titov and Chief of the Rear Services Political Department Major General V. Makarov were reprimanded and Chief of the district's Directorate of Commerce Colonel I. Kiselev was warned about not completing his service correspondence.

A number of the leaders of the district's military commerce workers were held responsible to the party. Communists Colonel I. Kiselev, Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate Colonel A. Nalivayko, Deputy Chief of the Department of

Personnel Soviet Army employee N. Chizhma and Deputy Chief of the Department of Trade and Commerce Work Soviet Army employee V. Vinogradov were given severe reprimands. The question of the degree of L. Prisyazhnyuk's party responsibility will be examined by the local party agencies using established methods.

A procurator's investigation established that the former director of the district's univermag [general store], Soviet Army employee T. Kulish, did not abuse his service position. She was given a severe reprimand for carelessness and poor control over her party subordinates' activities and was transferred to a position with a smaller volume of work.

Reserve Dismissal Sequence Violated

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial on "Measures Taken" in the "Answers, Responses, Results" section: "False Chords"]

[Text] The correspondence entitled "False Chords" that was published on 3 January told about violations allowed while dismissing a group of military construction workers into the reserves.

The chief of a military construction organization, Captain 1st Rank L. Lapshin, informed the editor that the newspaper article was discussed at an expanded meeting of the UNR party committee and in other subordinate organizations. UNR Chief Colonel V. Fevralitin and the commander of a military construction detachment, Major V. Kozyuba, were severely warned about not allowing violations in the sequence for dismissing personnel into the reserves.

Workers Left Without Lodging

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 87 p 2

[Responses to KRSNAYA ZVEZDA article in the "Answers, Responses, Results" section: "The Road There and Back", first two paragraphs are KRSNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The correspondence that was published in KRSNAYA ZVEZDA under the heading "The Road There and Back" on 26 December 1986 told about shortcomings in organizing the social call-up of reserve troops for shock Komsomol construction. Volunteers from the Central Asian Military District who had arrived in Transbaykal on Komsomol passes were left without work or places to stay.

Here are two responses to that critical article.

Deputy Minister of Construction for the Eastern USSR Regions Ye. Muzykantov:

The Board of Ministers has examined the KRSNAYA ZVEZDA article and found it to be correct. Main Directorate Chief V. Rabynin was severely censured for

serious shortcomings that were allowed when setting up the work of receiving and accommodating servicemen who were dismissed into the reserves. The Board demanded that this year he guarantee that the tasks of receiving volunteers sent on Komsomol passes be unconditionally carried out. Leaders in the Directorate of Construction were warned about their personal responsibility for this part of their work.

Deputy Main Directorate Chief N. Kalmykov was relieved from the position that he was holding for serious omissions in working with personnel. He and several other officials who did not support the established sequence for receiving reserve soldiers were held disciplinarily responsible and responsible to the party. A Glavk [central board] order gave department chief M. Nechayev a severe reprimand and punished him in party fashion. Cadre Department workers V. Mozgoviy and A. Gorbunov were given severe disciplinary punishments.

The Board of Ministers took into consideration the fact that the Main Directorate has outlined and is carry out out measures to improve the organization of work associated with bringing in young workers for construction, to include servicemen who have been dismissed into the reserve. The Ministry has established controls over the accomplishment of these measures.

First Deputy Chief of the Central Asian Military District's Political Directorate Major General I. Rymarev:

The facts contained in the publication actually occurred. The errors that were allowed are to a great degree explained by the confusion that arose because of the shortage of appropriate contacts between the district's political directorate and Komsomol construction cadre organizations. Specifically, Senior Instructor for the Department of Komsomol Work Captain V. Yelmanov organized the dispatch to Transbaykal of servicemen who had been dismissed into the reserves. Yet he had not learned how he should follow the situation and had not informed the political directorate leadership about a number of circumstances. And several chiefs in political departments and headquarters and also Komsomol workers in major units who did not specify the reception conditions at construction organizations for the reserve soldiers were clearly negligent.

Lieutenant Colonels A. Mazharov and N. Osipenko and the district political directorate chief's assistant for Komsomol work, Major V. Azyamov, were singled out for the deficiencies that they had in setting up the social reception of young people. Senior Instructor for the Department of Komsomol Work V. Yelmanov was given a severe reprimand.

A meeting of the district's political directorate outlined specific measures to improve work in sending servicemen out for shock Komsomol construction.

Training Ship Use Examined

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "There Was No Investigation"]

[Text] Rear Admiral G. Gurinov reported from the Pacific Ocean Fleet that the questions raised in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by the correspondence entitled "There Was No Investigation" published on 27 January, 1987 were discussed at a meeting of command and political personnel. The criticism was found to be correct. Captain 1st Rank Yu. Khaliulin and Chief of the Department of Military Training Rear Admiral B. Petruna were singled out for having poor control over using exercise and training vessels as they are to be used. Captain 2nd Rank N. Tkachuk was reprimanded for his poor work in assisting ship commanders in conducting practical training for their crews in their struggle for survivability in UTS [exercise and training situations]. The Office of Chemical Training was brought to working order and is operating. For carrying out his service responsibilities in an unsatisfactory manner, Flagship Chemist Captain 3rd Rank A. Kanevskiy was warned about not completing his service correspondence and was selected for dismissal into the reserves.

There was a two-day meeting on survivability in training situations led by Captain 2nd Rank V. Nikonov. The meeting included ship commanders, their deputies, the commanders of engineering departments and damage control commanders. During this meeting the participants ran through the indicated exercises and training and also studied the methodology for training on exercise and training vessels. Attendance and the UTS load coefficient for this training year were analyzed. An activist meeting examined the problems of improving training for personnel in fighting for survivability and increasing the use efficiency for exercise and training vessels.

Special Duty Officer System Challenged

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 87 p 2

[Letters in response to a letter from Senior Warrant Officer M. Korolev and a letter from Southern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General A. Demidov, in "Answers, Responses, Results" section, first two paragraphs and the last paragraph are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction and closing]

[Text] "Not Specified in Regulations" was the heading of Southern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General A. Demidov's 21 January commentary on a letter from Senior Warrant Officer M. Korolev. His reply asked what harm there was in the practice of appointing so-called "responsible" officers and warrant officers.

The editor received many letters after the publication. We are bringing some of them to the attention of readers.

[Major A. Grigoryev, Southern Group of Forces: "Who Does Not Want to Work"]

There is a reason for saying that criticism is like bitter medicine: it is unpleasant to take, but you have to for the sake of your health. And if the illness has been neglected, one or two pills is not enough. I am once again convinced of this when I see what is happening in our regiment.

Yes, it was our unit that was discussed in the publication under the heading "Not Specified in Regulations." The Southern Group of Forces commander was certainly positive when he said in his commentary on the letter: "The regimental command has indicated that the practice of appointing a 'responsible' officer is not to be allowed." And he was definitely convincing when he substantiated the fact that "initiative" is harmful in places.

It would seem that all the "i's" had been dotted, they had recognized the errors that had been allowed and would make efforts to correct the situation. But that was not what happened...

Three days after the publication we had a meeting of commissioned and warrant officers at which, at the suggestion of Lieutenant Colonel N. Filippovych, it was decided that we should discuss the article in the newspaper. One would think that this would be a business-like and fundamental discussion on how best to rectify the situation. Actually, this is what had been planned, but what we had occasion to hear, to put it lightly, caused us to be amazed.

Unit party committee members Major V. Aleshkov, Captain V. Korol and Captain of Medical Services V. Safronov were gathered at the meeting podium..

[V. Korol -- chairman] There are those who would like to hear Senior Warrant Officer Korolev discuss his letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[M. Korolev] I feel that I am right. If that publication had not appeared in the newspaper we would still be enduring the duties of "responsible" officers. That is all I have to say.

[Lieutenant Colonel P. Lastochkin] What are we really talking about? We don't have "responsible" officers; it is called "monitoring" observation of the daily routine. The unit commander has the right to entrust some of his commissioned or warrant officers with maintaining control in any subunit at any time of day. We cannot manage without this. Do you not agree, Comrade Emikh?

[Captain V. Emikh, company commander] It is one thing to monitor and another to spend the entire night being seen in a subunit.

[Major O. Sey, deputy battalion commander for political affairs] We have to find the optimum variation. I recommend that we call this individual a "monitor" and let each of them be responsible for his own work area.

[N. Filippoviykh] I want to point out two things in all of this. First of all, "responsible" officers will now be called "monitors." I am prepared to discuss your suggestions relative to the sequence of their actions. Until

these are developed, we will continue as we have been doing. And the second thing relates to Senior Warrant Officer Korolev personally. I think that he wrote the newspaper because his personal interests had been infringed upon. He wanted to get comfortable quarters, but the decision was not in his favor. But if he wants to write, let him write again that he turned to the newspaper in a fit of temper and that he lays no claims against us and specifically against the commander. I want to say one more thing -- a man who wants to work, works and a man who does not want to work, writes. I warn all of you! If a servicemen appeals to higher headquarters and even if they resolve the problem in his favor, the unit command will still not get involved in that problem.

[A remark from the floor] Comrades, we have gotten away from the main problem under discussion. Regardless of what we call it, "responsible" or "monitoring," the essence of the matter has not changed...

In general the "meeting" was over. But once again we have the same problem that the newspaper discussed. Moreover, people who do not want to reconcile themselves with this and who are speaking out against this faulty practice are being accused of trying to work less or, even worse, of not working at all. But I would like to once again cite some excerpts from the commentary to Senior Warrant Officer Korolev's letter. "No, do not replace responsibility with "responsible." An example if this is the situation in the tank regiment where the author of the letter is serving. Despite the assignment of an entire staff of "responsible" officers, they are still not able to maintain the necessary level of order. During a recent inspection serious claims were made against the command both for the way the service was set up and for the state of military discipline."

In this regard I have to ask: "Who does not want to work?" Is it the person who stubbornly continues to rely on minute evaluations, despite the objective necessity of changing things in the life of the unit? Or is it the person who is ready to rely on his own knowledge and experience and is patiently inculcating command skills in his sergeants and developing independence, initiative and a feeling of responsibility both in himself and in his soldiers, but who does not have enough time and energy for this because of senseless night watches and other such hopeless undertakings?

Unfortunately the reality is that the latter do not immediately complain. The night after the situation described above Warrant Officers V. Fokin, Yu. Tarasenko and I. Zvigunov were the "responsible" officers in the subunits and I was entrusted with the task of "monitoring" the daily routine in the regiment. This entire system is still in force today. And those who do not agree with it have been made to understand in every possible way that right is not on their side. In meeting Senior Warrant Officer Korolev the regimental commander asked him one and the same question. "When will you refute it?" He is alluding to the newspaper article.

There you have it, writers, so that you know your place!

It is really a pity that I, Senior Warrant Officer Korolev, and others of our fellow comrades-in-arms are convinced that change is necessary.

[Captain L. Kniga, Red Banner Turkistan Military District]

I would like to ask the editorial workers why and for whom they published such material as "Not Specified in the Regulations"? If it is for those who tour as "responsible" officers, we ourselves know that what they are forcing us to do is illegal. If it is for those people who assign "responsible" officers, they obviously do not take your publications seriously.

"What does it matter what the newspapers say," said Senior Officer V. Pupkov in 1985 whenb they showed him the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article entitled "Responsibility -- According to Schedule."

Years go by and everything remains the same. Our unit now has the "Handbook for Officers which assigns duty consultants (responsible officers) in subunits." It was compiled and signed by Lieutenant Colonel S. Matsuk. I am sending you a copy. As you see, it contains excerpts from articles in the regulations that define the responsibilities of company commanders and company master sergeants, regimental duty officers and company duty officers... Now all of this has been included in the responsibilities of the "responsible" officer. One man must do the work of several officials at the same time. Is this realistic?

[Captain A. Bortnichuk, Red Banner Baltic Military District]

The discussion about the "responsible" officer has been going on in the military press for many years. And what is strange is that the commanders of some units have literally not noticed it. Even after an article in the district ZA RODINY newspaper by our district commander where he explained the falaciousness of the practice of assigning "responsible" officers, we had officers in our units who one after the other spent the night in the barracks. And so that we had no questions relative to these responsibilities which are not covered in the regulations, Regimental Chief of Staff Major A. Yelagin published the "Instructions for Subunit Responsible Officers."

[Major O. Geroimov, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District]

The USSR Armed Forces Regulations for Unit Administration clearly defines the responsibilities of officials and there is not a single word in them about "responsible" officers.

We have often raised this question at party meetings in the unit, but have not been able to resolve it. Everything hinges on existing instructions from higher headquarters to appoint "responsible" officers. I have served in many locations and have run into this same phenomenon everywhere. It is really some kind of disease.

I decided one day at my own responsibility and risk not to carry out the duties of "responsible" officer. My career was almost ended by an officer Comrades' Court of Honor. True, I got by, but such "liberties" are not allowed me now.

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Aleksandrov, Red Banner Carpathian Military District]

No one in our unit is surprised when they read the "responsible" officer roster before free days or holidays. And when you ask to see the directive document that authorizes such a position, no one can give it to you. There is no such document because there cannot be one, for it is directly counter to the requirements of the regulations.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Judging from the numerous responses that have come in to the editor since the publication "Not Stipulated by the Regulations", the practice of using "responsible," "monitoring" and "consultant" officers is very widespread. But regardless of what you call these people who are entrusted with watching the daily routine in subunits and units day and night, they all carry out one and the same role -- they substitute for certain officials defined by regulations. We should note that many authors of letters stated that the majority of officers are ready when necessary to give up their free time for the service and for social matters. Why is it necessary to create an artificial structure parallel to the regulations? We hope that this publication will help get this matter moving again.

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CSO: 1801/192

APRIL-MAY 1987 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA LETTERS TO EDITOR, RESPONSES

Deficiencies in Military Sales

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "Haggling at the Voyentorg"]

[Text] Critical correspondence that this newspaper published on 24 December 1986 was entitled "Haggling at the Voyentorg" [trade establishment for military personnel]. As Temporary Acting Chief of the North Caucasus Military District Directorate of Commerce Colonel Titchenko reported to the editor, the criticism was justified. Store manager T. Krivonosovoy and a number of other workers had allowed serious errors when V. Mogilevskiy was assigned as voyentorg chief. A comprehensive inspection conducted by the Main USSR Ministry of Defense Directorate of Commerce showed that the district's military commerce agencies had not been safeguarding trade and material valuables and had grossly violated the rules for selling critical items. Serious deficiencies were exposed in commercial trade operations and in the organization of public nutrition.

District Directorate of Commerce Chief Colonel A. Shchuplyak was dismissed from his position for not managing his subordinates in a satisfactory manner and for grossly violating the rules of commerce. A number of officials were held severely disciplinarily responsible and responsible to the party. The results of the inspection caused a total of 38 people to be held disciplinarily responsible and 14 responsible to the party.

Party and union meetings were held in all the voyentorgs and specific measures and deadlines were established for eliminating the deficiencies. Legal propaganda has been increased.

Multi-National Cohesion in Military

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 87 p 2

[Three responses in the "The Reader Continues the Discussion" section: "The Multi-National Military", first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] On 12 March 1987 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a dialogue between military sociologist Colonel Yu. Deryugin and motorized training regiment Deputy Commander for Political Affairs Major V. Yelovets under the heading "The Multi-national Military." We are publishing responses that the editor received regarding that article.

[Captain Lieutenant V. Svechnikov, commander of a mine and torpedo section in the large anti-submarine ship Marshal Vasilevskiy, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "Brought Together by Duty"]

I share and warmly support the idea that it is primarily our common duty to our one Motherland and the common difficult work that we do to support the country's security that unite the soldiers of various nationalities into a single military collective and make them stronger than cement. The common work, common interests and common responsibilities for resolving the difficult tasks that are before us all serve as a powerful catalyst for uniting the multi-national military collective.

The entire system of military and political training that is conducted on our ship at an intense rhythm of training and exercises develops an intense understanding in sailors and starshinas for the fact that we can win in battle only if we act in a clear and harmonious fashion, seek mutual gain and help one another. And so when necessary they lend their hands to help their comrades without having to stop and think.

But there are certainly obstacles that reduce the kpd [efficiency factor] for educational work aimed at developing a friendly, monolithic collective. And we have in mind the fact that some sailors have a poor knowledge of the Russian language. There is no doubt that an individual learns to speak Russian well in the two and one half to three years that he is on a ship. All we have to do is remember Azerbaijani Z. Gasanov who spoke almost no Russian when he arrived. And when he was dismissed into the reserves, he was already a Starshina 2nd Class and a section commander who had no special problems with the Russian language. But there is too big a price to pay for this teaching, and of course this cost is paid not by the sailor, but by the ship. It takes one to one and a half years after a sailor is assigned to a ship for him to reach the same level in his specialty and in political training as those who arrived at the same time, but speaking Russian well.

Of course the intense rhythm of combat training leads to increased contact among the sailors of different nationalities. Those who are not strong in the Russian language are quickly provided the necessary supply of dictionaries. But we cannot rely simply on that and therefore we give the sailors who have a poor grasp of Russian all possible assistance.

Since our department is relatively small, we have not set up any special study circles as done in some places. We rely on individual exercises. For example Starshina 2nd Class Simakov took novice Sailor Magmurov under his patronage. The starshina's task was made easier by the fact that Magmurov was his subordinate and there was therefore no need to set up a special time for them to come in contact (and this is very important with the extremely full agenda on a ship).

The friendly and comradely relationship that is maintained in our collective provides very practical return. At the end of last year our ship won the Naval Prize for Anti-Submarine Training.

[Guards Major V. Baygulov, deputy motor rifle battalion commander for political affairs, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "There Is Something to Think About"]

So that the young soldiers who have a poor knowledge of Russian can overcome this obstacle more quickly they have to have as much contact with their soldiers-in-arms as possible. And public speaking is very important. As a rule, during standard training we get by with a minimum of words. These include commands, signals, short energetic instructions and also laconic reports. But the business of evening conversations, conversations about present-day topics and stories about themselves is another matter.

What happens is that at times a novice who is having problems with Russian and who speaks with an accent does not want to speak in front of his comrades. This means that we have to set up special moral conditions for this. In my opinion, the company commanded by Guards Captain R. Usmanov does a good job of this. It has become a tradition there to have "Stories About Yourself" evenings where soldiers from among the many replacements tell their soldiers-in-arms about their lives before the army and about their hobbies and habits. The company commander and his deputy commander for political affairs, Guards Lieutenant I. Gayduk, try to set it up so that the evenings take place in a free and easy, cordial atmosphere.

And it seems to me that there is another thing that is important to this problem. Some commanders, at times subconsciously and involuntarily, are forgiving of soldiers who do not speak Russian well. This is not right. According to my observations, this offends the young soldiers and undermines their confidence that they will soon overcome their difficulty and will master their military specialty at the same level as the others. Demand in the subunit must be equal towards all. It must be maintained at a high level and according to regulations.

[Senior Lieutenant Sh. Gugulashvili, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "We Need a New Approach"]

I would like to join the discussion about the problems that were discussed by the military sociologist and the political worker and specifically address the quality of political exercises. I will not say how important they are in uniting military collectives. I will simply state what is bothering me. The level of these political exercises is certainly not as high as it must be. And this is caused by more than just poor preparations on the part of the instructors themselves.

For example, I have been conducting political exercises for four years now and that entire time we have been teaching the very same thing relative to the nationality question. I feel that we must at least bring in a fresh approach to teaching this subject. We need new developments and closer ties with reality and the present.

I am sure that when working with people we have to aim at more than just keeping discipline at a high level and having our personnel fire their weapons at the expert level. Our mission is to educate true patriots and real internationalists. We must not confine ourselves to lofty words and talking more about the Motherland, military duty and the Fatherland. We cannot hide the fact that in recent times more of our association with our personnel has been in the language of orders while what we need is another language -- the language of sincerity as it is understood and needed by every soldier.

There are more than enough examples of this conversation and this work with people. And there are people to teach us -- our brother soldiers who served on the front line. The Military Oath, Duty and the Motherland united them, just as it now unites those of us who now stand in the army's ranks.

Training Still Not Corrected

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 87 p 2

[Letter from Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "How They 'Overlooked' the Regiment", first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In April 1986 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA made a "raid" on the air defense regiment commanded by Colonel V. Terentyev. The materials that were then published discussed the poor organization of training and how combat training was secondary in the life of the unit. The article also cited how personnel were pulled out of training and how instructors were poorly prepared for exercises.

A year has passed and the editor is again turning to this unit with the question, "How has the organization of military training changed?"

A number of specific measures to improve the training process were implemented after the newspaper article. In particular, the commander published an order that categorically forbids the conduct of any type of activity at the expense of training time. People have to consider military training as the main thing defining life and activities in subunits. Control was established to insure that military training plans were carried out.

Going ahead in time, I can say that the measures that were taken did not give the expected results. The regiment ended the winter training period with very poor indicators. The results of military and political training had still not improved at the end of the training year. And how are things in the area of military training in the unit today?

The author of these lines had occasion to visit exercises in several subunits. One still gets the impression that people are not concerned about how to use training time more intensely and with maximum return, but in fact are only concerned with the fact that training is somehow completed.

For example on one occasion exercises in the battery commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Kuzmenko were held in their firing position. Crews were

operating at "reduced manning" and many of the specialists were absent. Operator Private K. Gafurov, for example, was involved in domestic matters in the subunit. Technical Warrant Officer M. Dorogayev was in a nearby subunit "obtaining" spare parts and Technical Warrant Officer A. Nosov had gone after cots.

I had no trouble becoming convinced during my official trip that it was a common practice to pull people from training. And the attitude toward this was comparable -- people were indifferent and calm. For example we came across this fact. Instead of conducting the exercise, personnel in the battalion crew commanded by Major V. Lazarev had organized a soccer game. Right in the firing position. And no one was especially upset by this. Lieutenant Yu. Rogozik who was running the exercise was flippant in saying that he was a junior officer and how could people demand much from him.

When mulling over these and other such facts, I try to understand what had caused this. Yes, there is certainly irresponsibility, but that is also a symptom and not a cause. The causes are deeper. What are they? Why is the battery commander more interested in having an operator indulge in small, unnecessary duties in the barracks instead of getting involved in military training? I asked Senior Lieutenant Kuzmenko this question, but did not get a direct, sincere answer. But the problem was clear, even without the battery commander being open with me -- the demand made on military training is not high enough.

As has already been said, a year ago a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA raid brigade found these same omissions here. And the reasons for the deficiencies were the same. An entire year has passed and nothing has changed in the regiment. This is especially alarming today, under the conditions of reconstruction. One involuntarily wonders if it is possible that the renovation process that was begun everywhere else has not touched this regiment?

I want to immediately state that I am not judging all aspects of regimental life and am not coming to any generalized conclusions. I am only addressing military training. Yet it is to that area, one that is primary for the regiment, that one must primarily go to find the routes for achieving high end results. The regiment held a lot of discussions about these routes and about reconstruction, but no changes ensued.

I understand that this conclusion will be offensive to some in the regiment. Yes, there are people in the unit who are reconstructing their work and changing their relationships toward people and who have achieved some results in that year. These include Major A. Gromov, Captains V. Smirnov and I. Dragolyub and Lieutenant M. Talybov. However the military training results show that on the whole the regiment is still at its previous level.

Take methodological training for officers for example. One cannot say that the regiment does not pay attention to this, but many measures are conducted in a formal manner and there is actually no daily methodological training set up and this certainly has an impact on the quality of exercises.

Many of the deficiencies in the organization of military training are caused by problems in the work styles of the regimental commander and his staff. Staff officers often visit the batteries and battalions, perhaps even too often, but there is no return from these visits.

Here, if you will, is a characteristic example. A commission from higher headquarters had been working in the regiment and it uncovered a number of deficiencies in the way military training was set up. But a group of staff and regimental headquarters officers had been working in the subunits, literally on the eve of that commission's arrival. Could they have seen these deficiencies? Certainly! But they passed over them because they were accustomed to them.

Before I left the unit I again met with the regimental commander. The facts about the poor organization of military training that I had found did not especially upset Colonel Terentyev.

"We certainly have enough deficiencies," he pensively said. "But at times you do not know what to make of this. There are so many different instructions and orders every day..."

Military training is at a secondary level and it appears that the regimental commander is resigned to this situation. And how does the major unit headquarters relate to this?

They are well informed about the military training situation in the regiment. There is no one that has not seen the negative facts that have already been discussed. They know that personnel are pulled away from training, about the low quality of some of the military training exercises... But what have the commander and the staff done to eliminate the illness of formalism and the indifferent attitude toward military training that have stricken the regiment?

I was told that the staff regularly visits the regiment on inspections. Actually the regiment has not received such attention. Traces of the work by the various groups from the major unit headquarters are visible in the "Book of Notes on Inspection Results." Few deficiencies have been noted in that book. And have they been eliminated? Unfortunately the inspectors themselves very seldom got involved with this aspect. New omissions were noted during each subsequent trip, but no one was interested in whether the old problems had been eliminated.

For example, at the beginning of the summer training period a group of officers from major unit headquarters were working in the regiment and they uncovered a number of deviations in the organization of training and the work of the apparatus. But on the whole the situation in the subunits was evaluated as being totally satisfactory. But a surprise inspection by officers from Moscow Air Defense District's Combat Training Department that took place immediately after that uncovered a number of scandalous deficiencies. People in the regiment were not used to such evaluations. Senior Lieutenant I. Mayorov did not agree with the inspectors' conclusions then and turned to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for an explanation. We related this to the readers in August 1986 in article entitled "One Sunday Night." After this the

major unit headquarters outlined a number of measures which, they thought, would radically change the situation in the regiment and turn people, as the saying goes, back to military training. But as we see, the situation has still not improved today.

Take the planning of military training for example. The major unit requires the regiment to have its monthly training plan and calendar of primary military training events made up by the 25th of the month. Yet at the same time higher headquarters "sends down" to its units extracts from its plan at times only at the end of the month or during the first few days of the following month. Here is a specific example. Extracts of the basic plans for February arrived on 1 February, when all the exercises had already been planned for the month. Naturally they had to catch a lot of conflicts and rewrite the schedule.

And this is not an isolated example. Here is some information that was obtained in a front line unit of the regiment. Plan extracts did not come "down" to the regiment in a timely manner a single time between December and March. This also had an impact on the work style of the corresponding services in the major unit headquarters.

Unfortunately it was more than just the flaws in planning that disrupted the normal rhythm of military training in the unit. One could say that the real scourge in the regiment in the past year has been demonstration exercises. These exercises, which were essentially designated to display the foremost training methods, in fact are a reason for pulling personnel away from planned military training.

For example, in December, when it was especially necessary to provide clear rhythm to the training process and set the required tempo for military training, the regiment was given the mission of quickly setting up a demonstration exercise. More than two weeks were totally devoted to this preparation. In addition, soldiers cleared snow, leveled side drains where necessary and painted the area. Lieutenant Colonel V. Katilov followed the work. But for some reason the officers for whom this was set up did not make it to this "position."

And people in the major unit headquarters know how these demonstration exercises break up the rhythm of training. But unfortunately the force of inertia and the desire to hold exercises the same place they were held the previous year and the year before that have an affect. What happens is that according to reports and information the number of hours spent on the military training program in the regiment is totally filled, whereas in fact it is all fiction.

Major unit headquarters staff officer V. Trofimov admits, "Yes, we overlooked the regiment..."

"Overlooked" the regiment. Or more precisely military training in the regiment. And the ones who overlooked it were those whose service duty, as the saying goes, was to get involved with training. And the problem expands involuntarily. What about the party organization and the political

department. Were they not able to correct those who "overlooked"? For military training is the most important aspect in the life of the regiment.

Everyone agrees with this. But often only in words. When the discussion moves to specific matters aimed at increasing the quality of military training and its effectiveness, one often hears the well-known thesis, "But this is not happening in my unit..." Regardless of how strange it is, there are times when one can hear this from the lips of a political worker. The problem of the boiler room, in addition to the other unresolved problems associated with military training, was also broached in conversations with Colonel V. Morozov.

The officer was quick to establish the boundaries by saying, "The political department does not get involved in boiler rooms."

Certainly, concerns about a boiler room in and of themselves are a matter for the rear services. But here we are discussing taking personnel away from military training. Instead of training, dozens of specialists from the crews are involved in unloading coal and in a very literal sense thousands of hours of training time fly up the chimneys. And who is supposed to take measures in this area?

Do people in the district know the real state of affairs in the regiment? And if they know, what are they doing to organize military training in the unit in accordance with current demands? I turned to District Deputy Commander for Military Training Lieutenant General of Aviation P. Khatylev with these questions.

"Yes, we know that everything is not going well in military training in this regiment," he said. "We have taken several measures to improve the situation, but frankly speaking we have to admit that we are not really working in earnest with the regiment."

Actually they are not working with the regiment at all. Officers V. Nemchinov, V. Kurnosenko and others did actually visit the regiment on inspections, but did they see these deficiencies? Yes. They themselves led several exercises in order to eliminate the deficiencies and offered the commander advice and suggestions. And they were satisfied with this. No decisive measures were taken even after the scandalous deficiencies that we have already talked about were found in one of the subunits.

Obviously the district's Department of Military Training must also take a critical look at its own work in units. And specifically at when and how to get their plans down to the regiments and how they impact on the rhythm of military training. It is obviously necessary for demonstration exercises to be put in proper order. In any case, there are doubts that this approach should be used in a unit that is lagging behind.

And finally, the question about boiler rooms must be resolved. (By the way, this is a serious problem in more than just this regiment). I asked then Acting District KEU [Housing Operation Administration] Chief Colonel L. Kitari-Olga what stage of resolution this problem was in?

"It is being studied."

Hasn't this ill-fated stage been drawn out too far?

Regimental Commander Colonel Terentyev was recently removed from his post for serious deficiencies in his work. But it is more than just his omissions that are have an affect on the state of affairs in the unit.

The regiment is the basic tactical and administrative-domestic organization. It is primarily here that problems of combat readiness, strengthening military discipline and educating personnel are resolved. Matters are going well in the regiments and the major unit is at a high state of combat readiness. And so is the district. In order for things to be going well in this specific air defense missile regiment, they have to reorganize many things. And as the facts show, this is not limited to within the boundaries of this one regiment.

Aviation Economizing Again Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 87 p 2

[Letter from Major General of Aviation V. Nedoveskov in the "Answers, Responses, Results" section: "Reserves for Economizing", first paragraph is the author's introduction]

[Text] I always follow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publications on issues of economizing and thrift, especially when this problem is being resolved in aviation units. The article by Major General of Aviation V. Ilyushkin, "A Kilogram of Saving, A Ton into the Wind," that was published on 5 December 1986 caught my attention. I would like to share my own observations in the development of this important topic.

In my opinion, there are several conditions that are necessary in order to develop the work in economizing on fuel and other material assets in aviation units and have it be effective. First of all, we must get away from bald appeals and loud, but non-specific phrases about economizing and thrift and move the center of the practical work directly into subunits, the aviation squadrons, technical and operational elements of the regiment and the aviation repair enterprise workshops. And before he can talk about savings, every operator must completely know the expenditure norms, have an extended technical outlook and a good technical background.

These qualities do not develop in and of themselves; it takes specific work by the appropriate officials to develop them. What do I mean? The work to save material assets must have an official foundation and must be reflected in orders to units and major units. I feel that it is advisable to introduce personal economizing accounts into subunits, accounts that call for an accounting of the fuel and lubricants received from subunits that supply the unit and the amount expended according to the actual flights that the subunit's aircraft make and the amount of servicing and repair work that is done. The criterion for the savings readings must be the single norm for expenditures as established by higher headquarters and must be scientifically based.

This requires a reorientation of the attitude that many aviation specialists have toward their duties. For example, after dividing the accounting of the material asset expenditures, specialists in regimental engineer and aviation services should establish more reliable contact with personnel that work in the GSM [fuel and lubricants] supply service that supports the subunit. In order to escape the consumer's attitude that some aviators still have, we have to make the turn-in and accounting of GSM that is removed from airplanes as simple and easy as when it is issued. The main thing, and I am firmly convinced about this, is that everyone must understand that our battle for economizing and the careful expenditure of material assets is a living, creative, daily battle and not simply a raid or campaign. In order to really save, every individual must know "what it costs" and be able to calculate. And this is a task not only for aviation unit commands, but for all their personnel.

I must frankly state that there are few subunits where one can see stands or placards with data on GSM expenditure norms and their cost in rubles for each flight hour. When visiting subunits on my service duty I meet few specialists who know the exact cost of a ton of aviation fuel, what one flight hour in an airplane or helicopter costs the state or how much more economical it is to operate a very powerful airfield launcher assembly than a heavy airplane auxiliary power unit.

I am sure that there are efficiency experts and inventors, skilled craftsmen, and masters with the "golden hands" in every subunit who will be able to work under existing unit conditions and think up and make very simple devices and assets that will make it easy for engineer and aviation service personnel to collect and turn in aviation fuel dregs and used oils. It is not necessary to bind the people's initiative, only to support it in a timely manner. We certainly don't have to wait until material and moral incentives for zealous servicemen are developed and introduced at the Air Force level. It is within the power of unit and subunit commanders to do this. And there will be an appreciable benefit for all aviation.

Reassignment Procrastination Countered

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "Two in One Position"]

[Text] We published a letter from Major V. Vnuchkov on 23 December 1986 under the heading "Two in One Position." It discussed procrastination in assigning an officer to the position when he was reassigned from a Group of Forces to a domestic military district.

As Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander for the Odessa Military District Lieutenant General V. Semenov reported to the editor, the facts were confirmed. The district commander ordered that the officers from the personnel section who were guilty of the procrastination, Yu. Vybornov and P. Zakharov, be disciplined and they were given a reprimand. They had to make

compensation for material losses that were suffered. Major V. Vmukhov was assigned to another position in his specialty. The newspaper article was discussed with all the workers in the district's personnel section.

Mismatched Specialty Assignments

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "Measures Taken" section: "Not in their Specialty"]

[Text] On 22 March KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a letter entitled "Not in their Specialty" from Major N. Nagaytsev and ten other transportation officers. In this letter they complained that after service in the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] they were assigned to construction units in the Pacific Fleet in other than their specialties.

Lieutenant General K. Mukhin informed the editor that Major N. Nagaytsev and the other transportation officers have been assigned to positions in their specialty and have departed for their new assignments.

Colonel V. Minin who had allowed formalism in resolving personnel problems was given a strong warning.

Need To Support Reconstruction Stressed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 May 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA"]

[Text] Hundreds of letters arrive at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA every day from the various corners of the country. Army and Navy servicemen, members of the families of servicemen, people who took part in the Great Patriotic War, young pre-military age young people, workers and kolkhoz workers write. The editor has received 76,161 letters in just the first four months of this year. Some of the letters that have arrived are in one way or another about the reconstruction that is taking place in the country and in the Armed Forces. Readers express their readiness to take practical measures to support the party's course toward accelerating the social and economic development of our society, establishing order and strengthening discipline. They are responding to the day's agenda, informing us about positive changes, sharing their opinions and arguing. These letters are the warm breath of life itself.

The January CPSU Central Committee Plenum noted that a new moral and political atmosphere is developing in this country. Glasnost, objectivity in evaluating phenomena and events, irreconcilability with deficiencies and an active position in life are being asserted more and more. When reading the editorial mail, it is impossible not to feel the political and social upheaval that the intense change in our life has caused in the Soviet people.

At the same time these letters show that there are still places where reconstruction in the work styles of commanders, political agencies and party organizations is moving slowly. Such negative phenomena as simplifications and indulgences in military training, attempts to cover over the real state of affairs, formalism in competition and document cover-ups still persist. At times there are more discussions about the necessity and the benefits of reconstruction than there are specific advancements toward improvements. Major N. Novokshonov feels, "Words without actions bring irreparable harm to reconstruction and our faith in it." I. Sergeyev, a reader from Krasnoyarsk, solidly supports him. "We have to fight for reconstruction and defend it with total party passion. And especially by personal selfless labor at our work and military posts." As if continuing this same thought, Captain V. Vdovin from Belorussia writes, "Unfortunately there are enough indifferent, passive people. They are like observers on the sideline. They prefer to await the desired changes without getting the least bit involved. We do not have the right to gaze indifferently at these people. We must create an atmosphere of intolerance around those people who avoid an active militant position in reconstruction..."

And the publication of the letter from tank battalion commander Guards Major A. Papakin entitled "If Everyone Makes Demands on Himself" brought in a lot of reader mail. The authors of these responses tell about people who began reconstruction by working on themselves, by activating their political and labor activities, increasing their personal responsibility for what was entrusted to them and for the end results of their own training and educational work. They had sharp criticism for people who are not able to make up their mind to perceive the new and search for accelerating mechanisms and are not able to change their work styles in accordance with the demands of the times. The letters contain an uncompromising attitude toward cases of bad management, lack of discipline, bureaucratism and other negative phenomena. Readers are unanimous in their opinion that unless each and every one of us personally takes part in reconstruction and unless "glasnost" is expanded it will be impossible to imagine the total strengthening of social justice in our life.

By writing to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, readers are offering constructive suggestions, sensible advice and recommendations and are expressing their wish that every critical word from the pages of this newspaper hit the target and bring the necessary results so that amateurs who keep silent or write for form only are forced to change their attitudes to criticism. On Press Day, a day that has become a real national holiday for us, the editor is extending heart-felt thanks to all our readers for their good wishes and critical remarks. These help make the material in our newspaper more specific, actual and military.

As in the thousands of other issues, behind each reader letter published in this issue is the image of a Soviet person, our contemporary, a builder and defender of the new society, a patriot who has taken all of these problems of the country to heart and an internationalist who able to take any misfortune as his own. The business of reconstruction and of accelerating the social and economic development of the Motherland and reliably defending socialism are of vital importance to him.

Complaints About Illegal Flight Assignment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 May 87 p 2

[Letter from Lieutenant M. Il'in, Red Banner North Fleet: "A Year Without Flying"]

[Text] Dear Editor!

After completing the Balashovskiy Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov I was assigned to serve in North Fleet aviation. But my dreams of flying were shattered in the aviation regiment. I was immediately removed from the staff. Sometime later I was assigned to the crew. But how did this happen? They removed the deputy assistant commander (regiment had ordered that he be suspended from flying) from his position and assigned me to this position. But higher headquarters did not approve the decision by our command the first time and the crew then had two officers in one position. I was totally disappointed, but people told me to look around. And in fact our squadron commander had two assistants and his deputy also had two... The order assigning me to an AN-12 airplane later arrived, but this was for my flight allowance and not so that I could fly.

With all this time on "flight duty" I still have few flying hours, but this is okay. Three of our junior pilots are in the crew of an AN-2 that stands at an "eternal halt."

And I have just one more question. There are two aviation subunits that are positioned close to one another. One is subordinated to the Leningrad Military District and the other to the North Fleet. In one, there is a clear sequence of replacements from Zapolyary and in the second there is no such thing. Why is that?

Store Closing Decried

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 87 p 2

[Letter from Galaguz, Ilyenko and six others in the "Letters to the Editor" section: "A Garrison Without A Store"]

[Text] We work in the voyentorg grocery store. The store is located right in a military cantonment and it has served its buyers for many years.

In early March of this year store manager I. Dolgysheva asked the fire inspector to inspect the building and give his conclusions as to the building's fire safety. The inspection was made and the recommendation was that the building be closed. Within two days the deficiencies had been eliminated and an official statement that the store could operate had been written up. But the voyentorg chief ordered that the store not open and that all the goods be moved to the base area. And we were told that all the workers with the exception of the manager would be dismissed.

We feel that these actions are unnecessary. The inhabitants of this garrison, and there are many of them, will be left without goods that they need on a daily basis and the eight workers will be left without jobs. And there is no reason for creating such problems.

Alcohol Smuggling Cited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "An 'Awl' in the Diplomat"]

[Text] The critical correspondence from Captain 2nd Rank V. Shirokov that was published on 3 March, 1987, cited facts about the illegal use of alcohol and the attempts by some officers to carry alcohol in air transport. The editor received an answer signed by Acting Pacific Fleet Military Procurator Lieutenant Colonel of Legal Services V. Suchkov. The answer stated that Captain-Lieutenant G. Orliyevskiy was investigated for abusing his service position. It was established that from 1984 to 1986 he obtained a total of 4037 rubles worth of alcohol and 250 kilograms of fish (costing 750 rubles) from various officials. Orliyevskiy appropriated two liters of alcohol and 10 kilograms of fish for himself and gave the rest to Captain 2nd Rank V. Belodedov, Captain 2nd Rank A. Lukyanov, Captain 3rd Rank V. Orlov and other officials.

During the course of the investigation the guilty parties reimbursed a total of 10,000 rubles of material losses (taking the coefficient that was used into account). By considering the fact that Orliyevskiy had repented with total candor and was not after mercenary goals (he had kept only a small part of the alcohol and fish that had been given to him), the fact that the material losses had been totally repaid and also that considering the nature of his personality, it was possible to correct this without legal measures, on the basis of Article 7 of the RSFSR UPK [Code of Criminal Procedures] criminal proceedings against him were suspended. After being judged by a junior officer's Comrade's Court of Honor it was recommended that N. Orliyevskiy be dismissed from the Armed Forces into the reserves.

Rear Admiral F. Gurinov was given the paperwork by the military procurator. Following its recommendations, Captains 2nd Rank V. Belodedov and A. Lukyanov were dismissed from their position and Captains 2nd Rank M. Kotov, R. Zozuly, N. Darvin and other officers were held disciplinarily responsible. Captain 3rd Rank V. Orlov was judged by a senior officer's Comrade's Court of Honor and was removed from his post. All of the guilty officials were also held responsible to the party.

The procurator's investigation also established the fact that alcohol had been misappropriated in Captain Lieutenant V. Nevmerzhitskiy's unit. He was given a reprimand by order of the unit commander and was held materially responsible for the full amount of the losses that were incurred.

Major of Medical Services S. Parshin was given a severe reprimand for concealing from the unit command that alcohol had been kept at the airfield in connection with its illegal transport.

At meetings of unit commanders and chiefs of political departments where the article "An Owl in the Diplomat" was discussed, the decision was made to conduct inspections in subordinate troop units by People's Controllers and to revise the rules for accepting, storing and expending alcohol.

Reprimands For Not Forwarding Records

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRSNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "The Circle Closed"]

[Text] Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Timofeyev's letter that was published under the heading "The Circle Closed" on 25 March 1987 asked that he be helped in obtaining his traveling expenses and financial compensation since his personal records had not been forwarded during his transfer to his new assignment and all attempts to find them had been fruitless.

Pacific Fleet Commander Rear Admiral G. Khvatov reported to the editor that at the present time Captain 3rd Rank Timofeyev's personal records were located on the ship where he is serving. The officer is totally satisfied with all issues contained in the letter. The officials who were guilty of not sending his records in a timely fashion were held disciplinarily responsible.

The answers received from the Navy Finance Service and the Pacific Fleet Military Procurator were more precise. By order of the senior chief, Vice Admiral V. Darnopykh was severely warned for not sending Officer Yu. Timofeyev's personal records to his new assignment and Captain 2nd Rank A. Klimenk, Captain 3rd Rank V. Cherezov and Michmen V. Bayrakov and S. Vostrukhin were given severe reprimands. Captain 2nd Rank N. Meshcheryakov was given a reprimand.

Mini-Rayon Support Cited

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 87 p 2

[Editorial in the "After Appearing in KRSNAYA ZVEZDA" section: "The Forgotten 'Voyenved'"]

[Text] Correspondence from Lieutenant Colonel O. Grishenkov that was published on 29 March 1987 under the heading "The Forgotten 'Voyenved'" criticized cultural and domestic support for Voyenved Mini-Rayon in the city of Rostov-on-Don.

As First Deputy Chief of the North Caucasus Military District's Political Directorate Major General M. Kovalevskiy reported to the editor, the newspaper article was discussed at a meeting of the district military council and at a

meeting held by the First Secretary of the CPSU Gorkom. The criticism and deficiencies that were noted were acknowledged as being correct.

A comprehensive plan for developing residential construction, increasing the quality of residential repairs and improving cultural services for the inhabitants of Voyenved for 1987 to 1990 was developed and approved to eliminate these deficiencies.

At the present time the territory of the Voyenved mini-rayon has been put in order. Centralized deliveries of goods and the execution of orders to sell potatoes and vegetables have been set up for its inhabitants.

By order of the district commander KECh [housing operation administration] Chief for the Rostov-on-Don Garrison Colonel Yu. Kacharov and UNR [office of the work supervisor] Chief Major G. Strakhov were given reprimands for the serious omissions that they allowed in residential construction, the poor quality of repairs on existing residences and the unsatisfactory resolution of material and domestic support problems of servicemen, members of their families, workers and employees of Voyenved Mini-Rayon. Deputy District Commander for Construction and Billeting Major General V. Zakurdayev and Colonel V. Siukhin were given stern warnings about the low quality of residential construction and municipal works. District KECh Chief Colonel O. Gladkikh was warned about his unscrupulous approach to evaluating the objectives that were being used, the poor quality of residential repairs and the inconsistent water support to the Voyenved Mini-Rayon.

12511

CSO: 1801/193

OBITUARY: COL GEN AVN P. F. CHUPIKOV

Moscow KRA SNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 87 p 4

[Obituary of Colonel General of Aviation Pavel Fedorovich Chupikov (retired) signed by A. N. Yefimov, L. L. Batekhin, B. F. Korolkov, V. Ye. Pankin, O. F. Kulishev, S. A. Stychinskiy, I. Ye. Buravkov, A. F. Borsuk, G. U. Dolnikov, V. M. Shishkin, N. G. Shishkov, A. N. Zakrevskiy, V. V. Yefanov, S. I. Rudenko, A. P. Silant'yev, I. N. Kozhedub, I. I. Pstygo, and A. N. Katrich]

[Text] Pavel Fedorovich Chupikov, participant in the Great Patriotic War, Hero of the Soviet Union and retired colonel general of aviation, has passed away after a long and painful illness.

He departed our ranks a true son of the Soviet people, after devoting all his conscious life to selfless service to the socialist Motherland and the work of the Communist Party. He was party member since 1939.

P. F. Chupikov was born in a worker's family in the city of Tashkent on 21 December 1913. He began work as an employee at the Tashkent Plant imeni October Revolution. In 1931 he was sent to the Volsk Military School for Aircraft Technicians on a Komsomol authorization, and in 1940, after completing the Kachinskaya Military Aviation School for Pilots, P. F. Chupikov was assigned as senior pilot in a fighter wing. He took part in battles near (Khasan) Lake.

During the Great Patriotic War, he took part in combat actions on the Western, Southern, Northwest, Voronezh, First Ukrainian, and First Belorussian Fronts.

P. F. Chupikov ended the war as the commander of a fighter wing. He made 437 operational flights, led over 150 air engagements, and personally shot down 16 enemy aircraft.

After the war, P. F. Chupikov commanded aviation units and served as chief of the Combat Training Administration of the Air Forces and inspector general of the Air Forces Inspectorate of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Wherever he was sent by his party, P. F. Chupikov carried out the mission with which he was entrusted with a high sense of responsibility and took an active part in public work. He was elected a delegate to the 22d CPSU Congress.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state valued P. F. Chupikov's services to the Motherland highly. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and was decorated with four Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, five Red Banner Orders, the Order of Suvorov Third Degree, two Orders of the Patriotic War First Degree, four Red Star Orders, and many medals.

The blessed memory of Pavel Fedorovich Chupikov, an ardent patriot of our native land, will always remain in our hearts.

8936

CSO: 1801/209

GEN ARMY IVANOVSKIY ON EDUCATION OF OFFICER CADRES

Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian No 6, Jun 87 (signed to press 8 May 87)
pp 2-5

[Article by General of the Army Ye. Ivanovskiy, commander in chief of the Ground Forces, USSR deputy minister of defense, Hero of the Soviet Union: "The Education of Officer Cadres"]

[Text] Cadres decide everything! This fighting slogan of the first 5-year plans resounds today with new force at a critical stage in the life of the land of the Soviets. In fact, restructuring is a process of a revolutionary character. It is making qualitatively new demands on supervisors of every rank and on every communist.

What is the essence of the tasks in cadre policy established by the January (1987) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee?

The main thing now is TO SEE TO IT THAT EACH ELEMENT IN PARTY, STATE AND ECONOMIC WORK IS HEADED BY PEOPLE WHO ARE DEDICATED TO THE IDEALS OF COMMUNISM, THAT THESE PEOPLE ARE INNOVATORS WHO PERCEIVE THE NEED FOR CHANGES IN SOCIETY AND ARE CAPABLE OF BREAKING INERTIA AND ROUTINE, AND WHO CAN CREATIVELY AND PURPOSEFULLY PURSUE A POLICY OF REVIVING ALL SPHERES OF OUR LIFE.

This requirement also impacts in full measure on military cadres. It is to them that the Communist Party has assigned the decisive role in further increasing the defense capability of the country. And this means that their activity must take into account the complexity and explosive nature of the current international situation and the changes that are occurring in the means and methods of armed conflict and in the social structure of personnel of the Army and the Navy. Only those officers can properly organize the training and educational process in the forces who possess excellent methodological and pedagogic skills, who display firmness of purpose and foresight, who fully support what is progressive and reject everything that is obsolete and that causes stagnation in teaching, and who fight against formalism and oversimplification. ONLY CREATIVE LABOR, ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE, AND WORK WITH TOTAL EFFICIENCY CAN LEAD US TO GENUINE SUCCESS.

The Soviet people and our party are relying on our armed forces and are doing everything to strengthen their combat power, and they have a right to expect that no aggressive forces will catch us by surprise. This obliges command cadres to steadfastly strengthen their ideological and political determination, continuously improve their professional knowledge and skills, and develop organizational capabilities to be ready at the first call of the party to lead subordinates into battle for the homeland.

This is why work with officers must occupy a central place in the activity of all commanders and political and cadre organs. Success is present in military collectives where they understand this, where day in and day out officer staffs are trained and educated in a well-thought out and steady way, and where tactfulness and voluntariness are displayed as well. There, as a rule, the results are greater in operational and political training and the moral and ethical climate is better, mobilizing all soldiers for efficient military labor. In a word, POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL WORK WITH EACH OFFICER, REGARDLESS OF THE POSITION HE OCCUPIES, AND FIRST AND FOREMOST INDIVIDUAL, IS A GUARANTEE OF HIGHER RESULTS. It comes, as the saying goes, from life, and it must in turn influence life.

Continuous concern about the education of officers has become the norm in the activity of an overwhelming majority of our commanders and political workers.

This is exactly the way in which regimental commander Lt Col Vyacheslav Yefremovich Marin arranges his work. He is distinguished by ideological conviction, a high level of organizational ability and efficiency, professional competence and active participation in political education measures. Lieutenant Colonel Marin maintains military order in the unit as required by regulations through demands on himself and his subordinates, commander tact, personal example, a well-thought out approach to training and education of officers and a desire to see the person in each of them.

In daily life, Vyacheslav Yefimovich is guided by the party and Komsomol organization, and he listens to them and takes their opinions into consideration in evaluating the activity of officers.

But the main thing that helps Lieutenant Colonel Marin in work is UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE, THEIR CAPABILITIES AND PROPENSITIES AND THEIR STRONG AND WEAK POINTS. He spares no time in getting to know subordinates: he is convinced that all the time expended will bring returns with interest. Continuous communication with officers has become a law for him. Also within the purview of a commander are families on whom the attitude, and so the service, of an officer depends in no small degree.

Lt Cols V. Chichko and V. Sharigin and Majs I. Parshin and A. Sherstyuk are also thoughtfully arranging educational work with officers. Its positive effect tells on all aspects of life of the subunits that they head. A healthy moral climate and strong military discipline have been created in the subunits. A daily effort to perfect their training characterizes the soldiers and sergeants. The personnel of these subunits assumed great responsibilities in honor of the 70th anniversary of Great October and steadfastly fight for their fulfillment.

BELIEF IN THE CAPABILITIES OF PEOPLE AND OPTIMISM, REINFORCED BY CONSTANT HELP IN FORMING A HIGH LEVEL OF PROFESSIONAL AND MORAL QUALITIES IN SUBORDINATES, ENABLE COMMANDERS AND POLITICAL WORKERS TO MOTIVATE THE HUMAN FACTOR AND, ON THIS BASIS, TO ACHIEVE A HIGH LEVEL OF RESULTS IN TRAINING AND EDUCATION.

Today, the lessons of truth, creativity, adherence to principles and the findings of the 27th CPSU Congress define the vital position of an overwhelming majority of our officer supervisors. In their light, the negative phenomena which hinder our movement forward are also especially noticeable. It is impossible not to see that INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS, WHO VOCALLY COME OUT FOR RESTRUCTURING, STILL CONTINUE TO DO THEIR WORK IN THE OLD WAY, AND THEY DISPLAY FORMALISM AND CONVENTIONALISM. Unfortunately, there are also those who underestimate the dangers of rudeness, self-conceit and showiness.

Some comrades do not have enough courage to openly admit their own mistakes and to react correctly to criticism directed at them. There also are supervisors who stand aloof from subordinates and who communicate with them only at unit and subunit meetings, assemblies and parade formations and who decline individual political education work under every kind of pretext.

The commanders we are talking about "do not find" the opportunity to converse with officers, "to mess" with those who are shy, to help them gain confidence in their own strengths and to advise on how to correct a situation in an assigned sector. They see the way to resolve all problems that come up in a strictly administrative way and in unfounded punishment of people for slips in service or behavior.

As a rule, this type of supervision leads to a decrease in the level of operational and political training, and it gives rise to an unhealthy ethical and moral climate among the officers. This is what happened, in particular, in the military collective which was headed until recently by officer A. Misuryagin. He practically opposed subordinates through rudeness and a disrespectful attitude toward people. AND WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE COLLECTIVE, WITHOUT A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF SENIOR AND JUNIOR OFFICERS, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASSURE THE RESOLUTION OF ANY TASK. And this is what actually happened.

Officer Misuryagin tried to explain that all that had occurred was a result of his supposed demands on people. But does genuine exactingness have anything to do at all with rudeness and insults? Of course not. This should become an immutable law for each officer: IN PLACING DEMANDS ON THOSE IN SUBORDINATE POSITIONS, IT IS NECESSARY TO PLACE THE SAME DEMANDS ON ONESELF TO AN EQUAL DEGREE. IN OTHER WORDS, BE YOURSELF WHAT YOU WANT YOUR SUBORDINATES TO BE.

Whatever task faces a subunit or unit, the entire collective resolves it--it is not within the power of a commander and single manager alone. This means that work with people and their education and training, very likely, is primary in his activity. But its effectiveness, as practice shows, depends directly on the authority of the educator. AN OFFICER WHO ENJOYS THE RESPECT OF SUBORDINATES CAN LEAD THEM AND STIR THEM, AND THEY WILL BE DRAWN TO HIM AND WILL IMITATE HIM.

Naturally, the question arises: but how is this achieved?

It is difficult to give a simple answer. However, there are qualities which any commander and political worker should possess in full measure. First, HE MUST HAVE A HIGH LEVEL OF PROFESSIONAL TRAINING, I.E., HE MUST BE COMPETENT. As is known, one can achieve this as a result of laborious training. And the basic form of enlarging knowledge was and remains independent work. The one who rests his hopes only on classwork in the system of commander training is living in the past; he is not in a position to keep in step with the times, and he lags behind the changes that are occurring in the theory and practice of military affairs and, of course, he loses authority in the eyes of subordinates. The power of his educational influence on people is also reduced.

Second, an officer must serve as an example for his subordinates through a conscientious attitude toward his responsibilities and to the fulfillment of his military duty, AND HE MUST BE A MODEL OF IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION, POLITICAL MATURITY, COURAGE, SELF-CONTROL, SKILL AND DILIGENCE.

Education according to the principle "Do as I do" better than any other words influences subordinates and is a pedagogical means without which it is impossible to achieve success in any matter. Without personal example in service, a commander does not and cannot have authority. They are in serious error who believe that a position in itself automatically creates it. Sooner or later such a commander is doomed to failure.

In this connection, I would like to emphasize the importance TO ANY SUPERVISOR OF THE UNITY OF WORDS AND ACTIONS AS AN INDISPENSABLE CONDITION FOR SUCCESSFUL WORK WITH PEOPLE. But do you know how it is sometimes? An officer speaks passionately, convinces and appeals, but his actions cancel out what was said. It is clear that he will not have authority or successes in educating subordinates. It was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress that any differences between what is said and what is done will inflict damage on the main authority--the authority of party policy--and cannot be tolerated in any form.

Third, an officer must be DISCIPLINED AND A DOER. Without this, his activity in educating subordinates is inconceivable. Those officers behave incorrectly who influence subordinates only with the force of coercion, who display elements of a personal lack of discipline and who indulge themselves.

Our famed military commanders A. V. Suvorov, M. V. Frunze and G. K. Zhukov taught: If you are unable to obey, you will not learn how to command and, of course, you will not be able to educate subordinates properly.

And finally, there is one more important feature of a supervisor of a military collective--HIS ORGANIC ASSOCIATION WITH PERSONNEL, CONSTANT SUPPORT OF SOLDIERS, SERGEANTS, WARRANT OFFICERS AND OFFICERS AND CONCERN FOR THEIR IDEOLOGICAL AND PROFESSIONAL GROWTH, HEALTH, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT.

V. I. Lenin taught that association with the masses is the most important and most basic condition of success of any kind of public activity whatsoever. Concern for a subordinate, and closeness to him, are also the first party and service duty of any supervisor, especially a military supervisor. By virtue of the specifics of army service, he has been given important rights and opportunities for influencing the fate of people. This includes promotion to a higher position, granting a promotion to the next higher rank, the right to motivate subordinates and much else. In resolving each problem, it is important TO WEIGH EVERYTHING CAREFULLY, GUIDED BY THE REQUIREMENTS OF SOVIET LAWS AND REGULATIONS AND OUR ETHICS AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OPINIONS OF PARTY AND KOMSOMOL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE OFFICER COMMUNITY. In other words, every measure relating to one or another commander and political worker must carry an educational load and give him a new urge to become more active.

There are officers in some collectives who, as the saying goes, have stayed too long in one and the same position. As a rule, they have a lot of experience, solid knowledge and a sufficiently high level of methodological training. But in a specific sense, having lost the prospect for promotion in service, it often happens that they show much less effort in service than previously.

To change their attitude toward their duties, it is necessary to open up before them real prospects for growth. It is important to steadily search for such opportunities. At the same time it is necessary to increase the prestige of experienced commanders and political workers.

Taking into account the leading role of the officer corps in strengthening the combat potential of the Soviet armed forces, the Communist Party, its Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy require that WE TAKE ALL MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL WORK AMONG THIS CATEGORY OF SERVICEMEN. It should be kept in mind that this work is a constituent part of the decision reached at the January (1987) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on the task of putting the cadre policy of the party into practice.

The Soviet officer is a political educator. The interests of the job require of him a high level of ideological conviction, a clear party and civic position, knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, the fundamentals of military pedagogy and psychology and military ethics. It is not permissible, it was emphasized at the January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, to underestimate the political and theoretical training of cadres and a weakening in their ideological and moral training. THE MAIN EFFORTS OF SUPERVISORS AND ORGANIZERS OF OFFICER TRAINING MUST BE DIRECTED AT THE FORMATION OF IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, A READINESS TO SUBORDINATE PERSONAL INTERESTS TO PUBLIC INTERESTS AND TIRELESS SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE.

The characteristic features of the Leninist style of work, as is known, are communist ideology, party adherence to principles, a scientific approach to the resolution of assigned tasks, a high level of personal responsibility for an assigned task and a critical attitude toward the results of one's labor. It is the duty of every officer to instill these qualities in oneself and in subordinates firmly.

An officer's responsibilities are complex and multifaceted. Therefore, senior chiefs are called on to direct subordinates to those questions on whose resolution at a given moment success depends: operational and political training, strengthening of military discipline, order and organization, educational work, concern for personnel and attention to their needs and requests. Success will come to those WHO WILL BE ABLE TO RALLY THE OFFICERS, MOBILIZE THEIR WILL AND ENERGY AND CREATE IN EACH MILITARY COLLECTIVE A SITUATION OF HIGH DEMANDS, ORGANIZATION, EFFICIENCY AND CREATIVITY.

"The Central Committee is relying heavily on army cadres and the Soviet officer corps in the resolution of tasks to strengthen the defense capability of the state, confident that in today's complicated international situation communists and all cadres of the Army and the Navy will act with the utmost responsibility and that they will also raise and perfect skills and the combat readiness of all services and combat arms"--these words of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev, which resounded from the rostrum of the January (1987) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, clearly expressed that great trust that the party and the people have in their armed forces.

To justify the great trust of the motherland with honor--this is the sacred filial duty of each commander, political worker, staff officer and of all those to whom the training and education of Soviet soldiers has been entrusted.

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13052

CSO: 1801/203

DISCUSSION OF AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEM FOR INTERCEPTORS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Yelgin, senior navigator of an air regiment, military pilot first class: "Computer Guidance to the Target"]

[Text] 1. The Effect of Surprise.

"Command post, why are you not vectoring?" The question coming to the command post from the skies was filled with impatient exactingness.

Maj S. Dobronravov, the tactical control officer, broke away from the air situation display screen and glanced at the regimental commander. Col A. Golev closely watched how Jr Sgt I. Glukhov made two dotted lines with colored grease pencils on the frosted glass of plotting board: one for the "enemy's" route; and the second for the flight trajectory of the interceptor-fighter. An inspector from higher headquarters, a sniper-pilot, was playing the role of the enemy and knew the flight area down to the finest details. His mission was to break up the interceptors' attack. The regimental commander barely held back the smile: "The inspector is becoming agitated; he does not like the silence in the air. Well done, interceptors."

"Continue guidance as arranged with the pilots," he told Dobronravov.

The flight of interceptor-fighters was led by military sniper-pilot Maj Ye. Chernykh. He had not uttered a single word from the time he started engines. But the mutual understanding between the pilots was complete, and each of them knew with utmost precision where the "enemy" was located at a given moment. The interceptors had an advantage he did not: The tactical control officer was guiding them to the target in the automated mode.

Back before the flight took off, Maj Dobronravov had received the initial data on the "enemy": altitude, course, and type of aircraft. The radar operators had detected the "enemy" at maximum range and efficiently relayed the information to the aviators' command post. It was a routine matter for first-class specialist Maj Dobronravov to perform the computations and feed the program into the computer. He had thoroughly mastered the command post's automatic equipment, was one of the first tactical control officers to learn the instrument guidance system, and became an enthusiastic advocate of it.

The next command came from the ground, and in response the pilot's manipulations special lights suddenly lit up on the signal panel, indicating the readiness of onboard weapons for combat. The instrument's arrow moves smoothly--after computing the "enemy's" maneuver, the automated control system (ASU) informs the interceptors about it. The ASU frees the pilots from performing a number of secondary functions; therefore, the tactical control officer and the pilots waging aerial combat have more time for creatively analyzing the situation. In addition, the instrument guidance makes it possible to maintain complete radio silence. During this "blind" search the pilots receive data from the command post.

The inspector simulating the enemy, it seems, had taken everything into account in the interceptors' training and was confident that he would dictate his will to them in aerial combat. However, likewise he was counting on the battle going the same as before. The pilots being checked would take chances and experiment with new elements of tactics in a tactical flight exercise! But he did not know that during training flights we had worked out our actions using the ASU.

The attack warning system activated in his aircraft at the same time as Maj Chernykh reported to the command post:

"I have fired! Breaking off from the attack!"

The other targets were intercepted just as suddenly also.

On the ground, the objective control data of the aerial battle was thoroughly checked by the inspectors. But the fact remained--the interceptors had carried out their mission in an excellent manner. Special note was made of the competent use of the equipment's combat capabilities and the boldness and unconventional tactics.

2. "But the Old Way Is Simpler..."

That episode in the live-firing tactical flight exercise taught us much: It is one thing to hear about the capabilities of equipment and an entirely different thing to check these capabilities personally in practice and be convinced that the tactical range of employing the intercept complex is increased significantly when using the ASU. Maj Dobronravov began to be invited more often to preliminary preparation, to be questioned about the peculiarities of instrument guidance, and to suggest his variants of coordination.

One would think everyone would enthusiastically adopt such methods for training airborne warriors. After all, we already had a certain amount of experience in using the ASU in training combat.

However, the massive number of flights using the adopted methods identified a number of contradictions between how some pilots talked about the ASU on the ground and how they actually used the system in the air. Whereas the majority of pilots and tactical control officers quickly grasped the main idea in the

procedure and successfully began employing it after thorough preparation on the ground while improving their own personal combat training, some of them were primarily struck by the apparent ease with which their comrades intercepted the "enemy." They just took off for aerial combat and returned... unsuccessful. An interesting trend, in my opinion, became apparent. Most often the most experienced pilots brought back the unsuccessful film. What was the problem here?

Here is what an analysis of the flights by military pilot first-class Capt S. Akopyan showed. Well trained for waging aerial combat solo and as part of a group, time after time this officer suddenly began returning from training missions without having carried them out. His answer to the questions was the same: "The automatic system is at fault; it does not guide me to where I need to go." It should be said that this argument is not new; pilots sometimes use it as an excuse. But from my own experience I know that the ground equipment for guiding interceptors to the target is so reliable in operation that it is simply unfounded to make references to it being "at fault." Nevertheless, the commanders, it seemed, had no reason to distrust the pilots. They should have investigated the matter to clarify what was the reason for the unsuccessful flights.

That is how they acted in checking Capt Akopyan's actions during his aerial battles in the ASU mode. But first the squadron commander gave the officer several check "flights" on a simulator, completely re-creating the actual situation during intercept of the target using the automated control system. On the ground, Akopyan flawlessly carried out the assignment. But the very first flight in a combat fighter-trainer (usually intercepts in a trainer are not carried out in the ASU mode; it is believed that pilots are quite able to manage without monitoring in this type of combat training) showed: after several minutes of radio silence, i.e., without radio transmissions between the pilot and the command post, Capt Akopyan began to feel nervous. Rudder movements began more abrupt, and he was slow in reacting to instrument commands. Switching his attention to the readings of the ASU instruments, the pilot forgot to monitor other indicators.

Then the squadron commander conducted an experiment. He made contact with the tactical control officer and suggested he continue guidance to the target in the old way--by voice. All it took was for Capt Akopyan to hear the first command from the ground, and the picture changed. The aircraft became obedient, the pilot's actions gained confidence, and he began demonstrating initiative. One sensed that he had a complete mutual understanding with the command post. Akopyan intercepted the target in an excellent manner at a great angle of attack--one of the most difficult types of combat training for aviators.

"Voice guidance is more reliable!" the pilot amused. Having discovered the reason for his first unsuccessful flights in the ASU mode, we were able without any great difficulty to make up a program for Akopyan to master intercepts by instruments. The training had to break the psychological barrier of the pilot, who had become used to waging aerial battles in the old manner, with constant prompting from the ground. However, the barrier was finally overcome. But today we still cannot say that we no longer encounter

similar difficulties in individual pilots' mastery of the ASU. Figuratively speaking, the new has to fight its way through a cobweb of old habits which seem easier for some people. Then the question arises: It may be easier today, but what about tomorrow?

3. Looking to the Future

Not only individual pilots but also many experienced tactical control officers preferred and, to be completely frank, still prefer to control the aerial battle using the old methods to which they have long become accustomed. But in our own house, as they say, we will look into the matter and try to see that operating in the ASU mode becomes a requirement for every pilot. Difficulties of another sort are being encountered. For example, recently we were preparing for a tactical flight exercise. We had no confidence that the "enemy" would inform us in advance about his flight routes and sortie times. We expected him to use heavy jamming, energetic maneuvers, and all kinds of tricky tactics. Therefore, the regiment commander decided that all intercepts would be made using the ASU. We were not able to implement this plan completely. During the period of most intense combat work, the regimental command post received a command from above to guide the interceptors to the targets by voice.

Apparently, certain officials felt more at ease after this. But on the other hand, in the air the interceptors had to work quite a bit in the air. The "enemy" tried to jam the radio channels being used for vectoring, and the radar sights locked on to false targets. The crews who had the greatest success were the ones we nevertheless vectored using the ASU.

Thus, is it worth while to advocate in word further incorporating flights using the ASU in the training process but in deed operate under the old system? After all, we are fooling ourselves and undermining subordinates' faith in the ASU. There is only one answer, and experience itself dictates it: We must persistently introduce into the training process the complete use of the capabilities of automated control systems. This is the guarantee of success of actions by aviation. In my opinion, very soon it will simply be impossible to control aerial combat in a qualitative manner in a rapidly changing situation and with a shortage of time without using the ASU. The automated control system does not preclude or restrict the human role, it helps relieve the commander of mechanical operations in control and gives a new impetus to developing his tactical thinking.

That is why now in planning the next flight shift we are trying to make the maximum use of the ASU we have. Our task is to accelerate restructuring in the minds of the doubters, those who prefer for now to use yesterday's methods. The combat training work in the summer period will be aimed at this.

12567

CSO: 1801/206

REAR ADMIRAL DISMISSED FOR MISMANAGING NAVAL EXERCISE

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 87 p 1

[Editorial: "An Accident-Free Cruise -- The Commander's Special Role"]

[Text] When the atomic submarine Leninskiy Komsomol left in July 1962 to make our Navy's first trip under the ice to the North Pole, several nuclear officers who saw the ship off were concerned about the success of the cruise. The commander of the Leninskiy Komsomol, Captain 2nd Rank L. Zhiltsov, and engineer-mechanic Captain 2nd Rank P. Timofeyev also understood the immense difficulty of the situation. But they and the entire crew of the ship were firmly convinced that the cruise would be favorable. The crew of the first Soviet atomic submarine was noted for its great skill, military organization and discipline. The Leninskiy Komsomol confidently went to the Pole and proved that the equipment was very reliable under skillful, adroit operations. This had a great moral echo in the country's atomic submarine fleet that had just been born and increased the sailors' confidence in the reliability of their ships.

However the reliability of ships, equipment and armament relies not only on their construction qualities, but also to a great degree on the professional skills of the commanders and crews and their intense realization of their responsibility for the ship and for accomplishing their missions.

There is no doubt that it is a difficult proposition any time a ship leaves for the sea, especially for an extended time in remote areas of the world's oceans. The ocean elements are still contain a factor of increased danger for contemporary seafarers. However modern ships and vessels possess high reliability, survivability and improved equipment to guarantee accuracy and a safe cruise. Only an unskilled and irresponsible attitude toward the use of all the possibilities for guaranteeing cruise safety can lead to unpleasanties at sea.

Rear Admiral L. Golovko was recently dismissed from his post for grossly violating the appropriate manuals and safety measures while setting up and conducting ship's training. As the analysis of the situation that had developed at sea showed, many officers on whom the outcome depended did not have enough professionalism, which means that they lacked decisiveness of action, skills, discipline, execution, economy, and the ability to estimate

the situation and the possible consequences. The loss of this professionalism and command and party responsibility did not take place at once. The senior chiefs, political departments and party organizations had noticed it in the officers in its early stages, but it was not evaluated in the proper manner.

The Shipboard Regulation lists the duties of the ship's commander, a list that takes up twenty six pages. The first article says that a commander is responsible for the safety of the cruise and for controlling the ship's maneuvers... for training the crew to battle for survivability." By the way, practice shows that the regulation's attention toward questions of an accident-free cruise and safety in operating the ship are still not always definitive in the daily activities of commanders, crews and senior chiefs. The struggle to increase cruise safety is often like a campaign and is activated only when errors have been allowed, without a completely well thought-out plan or a consistent system that relies on an intense study and analysis of the situation on ships and in units and formations.

The problems of increasing safety and accident-free cruises requires an all-encompassing approach to their resolution, an approach that is based on comprehensively increasing the skills of the ship's company, their training and active educational work to reinforce the military discipline of sailors and also on developing a feeling of deep responsibility for the equipment and weapons that are entrusted to them.

As practice shows, in its search for reliable actions the Navy focuses special attention on working with officers who have recently been assigned as ship commanders. This is natural, for commanders acquire practical experience and master the skills of independent actions under various conditions. And help in every possible way from senior chiefs, staffs, political departments, and party organizations is important, help in developing the necessary responsibility and comprehensive maturity in officers who have risen to the bridge. The method of trial and error cannot be allowed on the path toward acquiring the professional skill of a modern ship's commander, just as guardianship on this path or attempts to create simplified conditions for development cannot be allowed. The lack of daring and independence leads to sluggishness and passiveness in a commander, to the inability to show the daring and decisiveness in a training battle and in other possible intense cruise situations. The lack of discretion and economy takes form in the no less dangerous self-confidence, rashness and bravery.

We have noticed that the flaws in the development of professional qualities in the commander often show up when it would seem that he has finally developed, after five or six years as commander of a ship. It is precisely at this stage that a significant percentage of ship's commanders are dismissed from their posts for allowing the prerequisites for navigational incidents and accidents. This is usually the aftereffect of reduced demand on themselves and complacency and also less strict monitoring by senior chiefs.

There is no doubt that safety and accident-free sailing are a general concern and responsibility and there can be no non-participation by anyone or any departmental dismissals. But the central figure in the Navy is the ship's commander. He has a special responsibility for the ship and the crew. And

therefore the attention placed on the commander by flag officers, staffs and political departments and the demand made on them and the concern for them must be primary. Reconstruction is detecting a lot of problems that require decisive resolution. And the first and foremost is the problem of increasing ideological tempering and the professional competence of commanders, of regulating their service time, freeing them from secondary concerns that are really those of other people and of letting them have more independence in training and educating their subordinates and in the military training of their crews. There are many unutilized possibilities and reserves in the training of commanders themselves. It is impossible to resolve the problem of increasing the effectiveness and reliability of the actions of ship's commanders without actually increasing the prestige of the ship's company as a whole and especially the authority of the command position.

There are many ships and vessels from our Navy everyday that are far from their native shores, in the various latitudes of the planet. And today we must be especially conscious of the fact that the level of safety and accident-free sailing depends on the level of the ship commander's professionalism, his ideological maturity and his high moral and military qualities. And on how they are selected and advanced, educated and trained.

12511

CSO: 1801/205

R ADM KOKOTKIN INTERVIEWED ON NAVAL CADRE POLICY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 87 p 2

[Interview with Rear Admiral S. Kokotkin, deputy chief of the Naval Cadre Directorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Military Personnel: Duty and Responsibility": "The Reliability of a Reserve"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee reemphasized the paramount importance of putting the party's personnel policy into effect. "It has become apparent," it was noted at the plenum, "that no one can stand aside from restructuring--each one should take up his position." Such a position is especially important in personnel work. R Adm S. Kokotkin, deputy chief of the Naval Cadre Directorate, describes to a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent how restructuring is proceeding in the Navy's personnel work.

[Question] Comrade rear admiral, what is your general impression of the changes which have taken place in the Navy after the January plenum? How may they be assessed today?

[Answer] Let us come to an understanding right away that I will be stressing what is still not being achieved and the shortcomings and items of unfinished work. Not because we have nothing positive, but because the unresolved problems should be in the center of our attention today, of course. But if we are speaking of general impressions, as strange as it may seem, the erroneous, but obviously more convenient, opinion that the January Plenum set tasks not for restructuring work with personnel, but for restructuring the work of personnel organs is accepted in the consciousness of many individuals. This fallacy cannot be tolerated, for the tendency of certain officials, and those in high ranks, to shift off all work with personnel to the personnel organs is behind it.

Indeed, we must realistically conceive of the place and role of personnel organs in resolving the problems of selecting, training, placing, and educating personnel. We have become accustomed to uttering these four words rapidly. But after all, the most important areas of activity and the high personal responsibility of commanders, political organs, and personnel organs are behind them. Are personnel organs in a position to cope with all these

tasks alone? Anyone who thinks so is deluding himself. Even in units where there are staff personnel workers. But in units where one of the flagship specialists not on the regular staff usually carry this workload? Can this officer solve the problem of training reserves for ship commanders, let us say?

[Question] Work to train a personnel reserve for advancement requires radical improvement, it was noted at the January Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. What is foremost in resolving this most important problem today in the Navy?

[Answer] This question probably is the most complicated one today. The restricted nature of old forms and inertia in thinking, a departmental approach, and the lack of desire or ability to assume real responsibility have an effect here as nowhere else.

Here is a list of the reserves for different positions in the Navy from the commander of a strategic nuclear submarine, a cruiser, and more. It was compiled at the beginning of the year, and already a sizable part of this reserve has "disappeared." That is, persons remain with all their qualities and merits that have been verified over many years, but the possibility of advancing them turns out to be subject to question. Why? Because senior officers in the fleets, after recommending them for advancement, have managed to impose serious penalties on them. And often ones which are not appropriate for the oversights permitted.

For higher authorities, a penalty imposed on an officer, beginning with a reprimand—that is almost his rejection from the reserves. In the fleets, such penalties are viewed as customary training measures which far from always or obligatorily involve complications in the official development of an officer or admiral. It seems to me that we should work out a unified approach to personnel reserves here. One that is strict, fair and prudent, which responds to the interests of the work first of all. The documents of the January Plenum note that "...the attitude toward restructuring and specific deeds to implement it is the decisive approach in evaluating personnel." This is the criterion which should prevail for others who are artificial and formal at times.

Prudent treatment of the personnel reserves begins with their practical, thoughtful development. The predominant role here unquestionably belongs to flag officers. The quality of the reserves is higher and the treatment of candidates for advancement in accordance with service is more valid if this is not done carelessly, not just to carry out directives.

We have introduced the concept of an "irreducible level of ready reserves" in the commands and units of fleets. That is, two candidates for a position, based on realistic requirements. This has been done so that commanders and headquarters continuously think about reinforcement of the reserves. Unfortunately, the psychology of some officers in the field is still like this: while I am sitting, let my subordinates sit as well, without thinking about training or about advancement. The position of political organs plays a special role in breaking this harmful attitude, which is not responsive to the spirit of the time or the interests of the work.

But we cannot help but mention the difficulties which probably cannot be resolved by the navy's efforts alone. I refer to the unfair limitation of officers' prospects because of age. Other things being equal, only a ship commander who is young enough and has an academic education can be put in the reserves for the chiefs of staff and commanders of units [soyedineniya] today. Until recently a commander of a strategic nuclear submarine, let us say, who did not have an academic education, regardless of all his merits, fell into the category of those without prospects at age 37. But after all, by this age an officer who commands a first line ship is just beginning to accumulate the experience of a commander properly and to prove himself adequately.

Here is a specific case. We suggested a very experienced, competent officer who had commanded a nuclear submarine for 10 years for the position of deputy commander of a submarine division. The position requires that submarine commanders have practical training related to an extended stay at sea. Let us say frankly that a commander who has sailed for some time is not very eager for this. But this officer accepted the offer enthusiastically. But the assignment was not made. The reasons? He had no academic education and his age (43) was beyond the limit established. We found one who was a little younger who had the education, of course, but the substitution was far from equivalent and was not in accord with the interests of the work.

A ship commander, officer V. Ivanov, went beyond the formal limits for prospective candidates in his time because he had not had the chance to enter the Naval Academy in time. The unit commander and the chief of the political department made many efforts to ensure that the commander was sent for training just the same. Had they not been persistent, we do not know what the future would have been for the present commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral V. Ivanov.

Incidentally, there is a document which provides for advancement to an academic position for officers who have completed higher schools and who have undergone special training. All future ship commanders are undergoing such training in the Navy's Higher Specialized Officers Classes. It is precisely there that the Navy is preparing its ship commanders, not at the academy. Chiefs of staff and unit commanders are trained in the Naval Academy. For this reason, it is time to really take advantage of the provisions of the document cited in practice.

[Question] The "track of long-term prospects" which has taken shape in the past turns out to be too narrow to be considered in accord with the Navy's interests?

[Answer] Determining an officer's prospects in general in accordance with formal indications cannot be tolerated, in my view. Each officer, especially a ship commander, should be confident that if he serves selflessly and his strength and health is adequate, he will be evaluated on merit and then will be provided with the opportunity to prove himself more completely, including in a higher and more complicated position.

We are encountering a situation such as this more and more frequently now: after 5 or 6 years of ship command, an officer's diligence in service decreases, notwithstanding expectations. To a certain extent this attests to the insufficient maturity of individual commanders, of course. But hasn't this taken place as well because the officer came to the conclusion during this period that he will not succeed in acquiring an academic education, so he is being deprived of tangible prospects? After all, he could not even have grounds to count on service in headquarters, where he would be most useful, by the way. Most of the fleets' staff officers today are former flagship specialists. They prove to be in an advantageous position, since they have had greater opportunity to acquire an academic education in good time. Not everyone is allowed to complete his service in the position of ship commander. Let us say frankly that excellent health is necessary for this. And a ship commander 50 years old is an exceptional rarity. Moreover, we do not have the opportunity at present to provide the conditions to ensure that commanders will be interested in serving on ships until they are transferred to the reserve. For this, it is necessary first of all to resolve the problem of increasing the authority of shipboard personnel, especially the position of commander, which Navy headquarters is seriously concerned about now, and which has been discussed in the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA as well.

[Question] In speaking about restructuring work with personnel and existing problems, we have mainly touched upon commanders. This is natural, since positive changes here will provide for the necessary changes at other levels to a large extent. However, what is particular attention being devoted to now in work with all the shipboard officers, especially the young ones?

[Answer] Today's young officers are the future of the Navy, of course. And the more rapidly they become familiar with their positions, the more strongly they prove themselves, the greater their contribution will be. Considerable attention is now being devoted in the fleets to faster professional orientation for lieutenants. Our schools are turning out specialists with specialties that are quite restricted. But the future commander should expand his professional scope and develop the necessary qualities as early as his years as a lieutenant. These inclinations among young officers can be brought to light only as the result of well-grounded individual work.

Work with personnel can only be successful only when it is based on an individual approach. Two young senior lieutenants were put forward in one of the units of the Northern Fleet for the position of senior assistants to the commander of a strategic nuclear submarine. This was unprecedented for this ship. But they began looking into this, and it turned out that they had really selected very capable officers who had been excellently trained. And the assignment was made.

[Question] The selection and correct evaluation of persons is just the beginning in work with personnel, however. What can and must be done here, in your view?

[Answer] The quality of certification work must be increased first of all. We conducted the last certification here and we remained dissatisfied with it. No matter how much we call for responsibility, adherence to principle and party spirit here, there turns out to be a great deal of formalism in the end all the same. But the certification should provide a well-grounded, overall picture of a person.

I think it is very useful to direct attention to the certifications for ship commanders of the war years. They are based on a structure of brief, clear-cut questions to which only a specific answer can be given. A more accurate picture is made up of more precise elements. This is the so-called formalized type of certification. But it has nothing in common with the formal type. On the contrary, the flexible, vague wording of current certifications make it possible for supervisors to "maneuver" and deviate from an accurate and principled evaluation of a person in such a way that it is very difficult to form a complete opinion of him.

Certification on a formalized basis makes it possible to be processed by computer more efficiently. And the work of personnel organs is simply impossible today without a computer. We are making extensive use of the computer. Personal data on practically all officers in the Navy have now been put into its memory. And both the effectiveness and efficiency of our work would be significantly greater if certification data were put there as well.

The Cadre Directorate intends to ask for authorization to conduct certification in the Navy in a new way as an experiment. At the same time, naturally, we are proceeding from the assumption that work with personnel, in my view, requires improvement in all its elements in combination. Real deeds, not words in which there is no shortcoming, are needed here. And let us say frankly, we have not taken many specific steps yet. And we need support not only in words here. First of all, both personnel organs and supervisors of all ranks should have a greater degree of freedom here with the increasing degree of responsibility. The decisive role in resolving personnel problems should belong primarily to those who work with personnel and who are fully responsible for the results of their work.

8936

CSO: 1801/209

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA RAID: SAFETY IN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jun 87 p 1

[Report by Colonel A. Sanyavskiy, retired; A. Konyakhin, technical labor inspector of the central committee of the Trade Union of Workers in Construction and the Construction Materials Industry; and Major A. Vorobyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA nonstaff correspondent, under the rubric "Spot-Check by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: Safety for Work": "They Let Matters Take Their Course"]

[Text] In the hour and a half that the spot-check brigade spent at the traffic control point of the UNR [office of the work supervisor] for mechanization headed by Colonel V. Fevralitin, not one truck crane came out through the gates.

"They could not come out on the line today because nearly all of them are out of order," one of the workers told us. And here he waved his hand in annoyance: "What's the use of talking--you can see for yourselves..."

The picture revealed was really dismal. Part of the truck cranes had been disassembled, and repairmen were having trouble with some of the vehicles. To tell the truth, we did not expect to see such a situation, although the address for conducting the spot-check was not selected accidentally. It was prompted by a letter from the workers to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

They reported that they often have to work on truck cranes that are out of order, running the risk that they will turn out to be in trouble at any moment. More than half the machines have no safety devices, and they do not function on the rest of them.

The workers' letter had the truck cranes idle as well. The order signed by Col L. Lapshin, chief of a higher military construction organization, also attested to this. We learned from it that literally the day before a special commission acknowledged that 32 of the 33 truck cranes checked were unfit for service and it suspended their operation.

But here is what is strange. We did not count 32 truck cranes in the park at all. Perhaps some of them have been repaired? No. In spite of the strict order, one-third of the defective machines had managed to "slip through" to projects. Intervention by higher organizations, including the central committee of the sectorial trade union, was needed for a ban to come into force.

The question arises: why did the chief of the work supervisor's office, for whom a disciplinary penalty was announced, willfully jeopardize work safety at construction projects again? Colonel Fevralitin answered our question this way:

"They require a plan from us in addition to adherence to safety rules..."

In accordance with the results of the check, additional steps were taken, but they believe at the Main Military Construction Administration that they are not removing this problem completely, unfortunately. The entire problem is that the safety devices for truck cranes are being delivered in such limited quantities that they cannot meet one-tenth of the requirements. But we cannot resign ourselves to this, after all.

The next project which our spot-check brigade visited was a concrete and mortar center where the chief until recently was an employee of the Soviet Army, I. Shabunin.

There was such an unimaginable din and clanging all around and thick cement dust swirling in the air that the figures of people wearing respirators were hardly distinguishable. How is it to work under such conditions?

The specialists shrug their shoulders: what can be done, they say, not only the equipment is obsolete, but the technology itself as well.

Quite naturally, this cannot help but have an effect on the fulfillment of production targets. The problem of labor safety procedures is even more critical. There were two accidents at concrete and mortar centers of the center's Main Military Construction Administration last year.

What is impeding the development and reconstruction of concrete and mortar centers? The technical capacities for this exist. There is no unified policy, persistence and efficiency in renovating the production base. Otherwise, how can we explain the excessive delay in putting the equipment of four cement container plants into use? True, construction is under way on the only unitized automated concrete and mortar center at present, but it is still not up to planned capacity and construction of a number of shops which support it has not been completed. But after all, this an advanced, powerful complex which can be maintained with success by just four persons.

We think it is time to realize that preventive measures against injuries at construction sites and the establishment of healthy and safe working and living conditions are inseparable from overall mechanization and automation of operations and increasing the level of their organization. Delaying here and letting matters take their course is impermissible.

8936

CSO: 1801/209

SPECIAL TROOPS

CHEMICAL TROOPS COMBAT CHLORINE SPILL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jul 87 p 4

[Report by Col G. Ivanov under the rubric "We Report the Details": "They Averted A Disaster"]

[Text] It has already been reported in the press that there was toxic chlorine spill from a defective tank at the station of Annau near Ashkhabad.

The situation became far more complex when a passenger train traveling to Ashkhabad arrived on a track adjacent to the one on which the defective tank leaking the toxic liquid chlorine was standing. There was a danger that people would be poisoned.

When the commandant's office at the Ashkhabad Garrison learned what had happened, the signal to assemble was given and a group of military chemical specialists headed by Officer M. Obydenov immediately went into action.

The officer assessed the difficult situation at the site. The specialists could not begin working as soon as they arrived, since the tank had heated up considerably under the southern sun. Fire crews cooled down the container to make it safe for the men to work.

By that time Officers V. Skvortsov and V. Nozdryukhin and Sergeants V. Demyanov, D. Abdelmyanov and D. Goginashvili had donned their personal protective gear and picked up their tools. Their mission was to plug the tap from which the chlorine was flowing with an adapter nut.

The first attempt was unsuccessful, however. The liquid, spurting out under great pressure, broke off the adapter nut. It was clear that further attempts would also be unfruitful if the pressure were not reduced. They found a practical solution. They succeeded in reducing the pressure of the liquid for a short time.

It was very difficult to work in the sealed clothing under the rays of the scorching sun and in the environment of toxic vapors.

Despite this, the fightingmen performed smoothly, precisely and decisively. The adapter nut was placed onto the tap and secured. The chlorine flow was halted.

11499

CSO: 1801/221

ECONOMIES IN COMMUNICATION MAY LOWER COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jul 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Kulish, communication chief for air formation "X": "But the Problems Remain"]

[Text] I keep hearing appeals and the right kind of statements, but the problems remain unresolved.

I am writing about something which troubles me. My conscience will not let me be an unconcerned "sideline" observer.

Let me begin with the main thing--combat readiness. For us signalmen, this is primarily a matter of the time we need to set up communications equipment at the command and control posts, and how well the equipment and the servicing specialists operate. What is necessary in order to maintain the combat readiness at the proper level? Regular drills, well organized combat training and material support for the training. You can judge for yourself what our situation is in this respect.

The separate radio communications and radiotechnical support battalion (OBS, RTO) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Miroshnichenko needs a certain amount of gasoline to provide for a normal training process and to conduct all of the mandatory, scheduled drills and special tactical classes with the various subunits. About half as much gasoline was allocated for this year. How, one asks, is it possible to perform the mandatory monthly march training for the drivers of the special vehicles without the required fuel? It is not performed, because flight support is a more important mission, one which absolutely cannot be canceled. I am not against conservation, but there are reasonable limits beyond which "economy" results in immeasurable detriment to the state and in lowered combat readiness and flight safety.

Each year the inspection documents contain entries to the effect that the quality of the telegraph communications leaves something to be desired, let us say. The documents are signed and filed, but the situation does not improve. This is because the equipment used by the signalmen has long since become "veterans," as we say, and there are not enough spare parts for it. We haul the sets hundreds of kilometers to be repaired. A few days later, first one and then another unit breaks down again, and we start all over again preparing the equipment for the long trip. Incidentally, a large amount of fuel is used in these operations.

Here is another example. There is a radio facility which, according to the specifications, is supposed to be serviced by five people, but only two specialists work there. It is impossible even theoretically for the two of them to raise and secure the antenna within the allotted time in order to put the unit into operating status. The norms specified for setting it up are based on a full crew.

Today there is a great deal of talk about the human factor. In the final analysis everything is done by the specialists, but for some reason the people here frequently forget that these are living people, that their dignity should be respected and their authority protected. An officer from higher headquarters recently came to inspect us. He compiled evaluations of the subunit commanders and ordered that they be telegraphed to headquarters. I am incensed not just at this method of transmitting information on officers subordinate to me, but also by the evaluations themselves, with which I fundamentally disagree. The inspector was not at all interested in my opinion, however. He felt that he had gotten to know the people better in a day or so than I had during my years of working with them.

I have gone through the chain of command about these and other problems more than once and spoken out at a party meeting at the formation headquarters, in which I was secretary of the party organization last year and am deputy secretary this year. I spoke about the deficiencies from the speaker's platform at a meeting of the party aktiv, but I achieved nothing except trouble for myself. I do not know what else I can do as I bump up against the solid wall of indifference. I keep hearing appeals and the right kind of statements, but the problem remain unresolved.

11499

CSO: 1801/221

AVIATION FACILITY'S 1ST 6 MONTHS UNDER NEW LAW ON ENTERPRISES

Moscow KRA SNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jul 87 second edition p 2

[Article by Major N. Gorenko: "An Aircraft Maintenance Enterprise Attempts to Peer Into the Future"]

[Text] A heavy, overcast sky, overwhelming in its crushing bulk...

"On days like this we get uneasy about the plan," says Lieutenant Colonel V. Kupch, aircraft maintenance enterprise director, "because the plan 'gives' us the airfield, although the principal work is accomplished in the shops. A good many aircraft arrive here at the enterprise not on their own power, but that is the only way they can leave--through the sky."

The aircraft fly out, but the people who have returned them to the skies remain here with their problems and concerns, their plans and hopes.

In January of this year the enterprise underwent transition to new methods of economic management, maintaining all in all a fair margin of safety. With regard to production output, the 1986 plan was fulfilled 101 percent. Labor productivity for the year increased almost 12 percent and the prime cost of commodity output decreased by 0.7 percent as compared to the plan. These indices have secured for the collective a place of honor within the ranks of competition winners and earned them the challenge Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, USSR Central Trade Union Council and Komsomol Central Committee.

In former times people didn't even think about the big picture. But the restructuring of the enterprise's economic activity necessitated realization of practical movement forward and constant improvement in economic indicators. This is especially true now, following the decisions of the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum with regard to large-scale restructuring of the economic mechanism.

"The enterprise must earn a certain amount this year," states Lt Col Kupch, "in order to insure realization of the new system of workers' wages. Other categories of production personnel will effect transition to the new wage conditions over a two-year period."

Let me say in passing that formerly these assets had to come out of the state's pocket. Now it is necessary to significantly increase production output and labor productivity for this; in other words, we must mobilize our own intrinsic reserves. What kind of reserves are we talking about? Let us get acquainted with them using as an example the shop headed by Major A. Shamov.

"We began with recommendations at the work place," relates S. Stadnik, trade union shop committee chairman, "and revised the wage rates. The brigade system of labor underwent development and the policy for awarding bonuses was changed. Now an operations management council determines the labor-share coefficient for each worker in accordance with labor quality. Remuneration is then determined based on the labor-share coefficient."

The enterprise's operations management has boosted labor productivity, enhanced discipline and improved the quality of aircraft maintenance and repair not only in the shop, but throughout the enterprise--truly the new methods have been widely disseminated.

The management has also reactivated other mechanisms for increasing production efficiency. The enterprise has undertaken to more fully utilize scientific and technological achievements. But it would be incorrect to say that the enterprise leadership did not pay particular attention before to progressive technology and equipment. They did--as far as they were able, they were involved in its introduction. Where then is the change?

The change is reflected in the fact that scientific and technological progress has now shifted from casting a consultative vote in deciding production tasks to casting the decisive vote. It has moved from the secondary line to the forefront in both work planning and appraising work results.

What did it used to be like? A variety of test rigs and control panels occupied the major portion of the work area. These were intended in most instances to test one or two units or assemblies and consisted of several instruments, dozens of switches and indicator lamps, and bulky equipment. It was a non-integrated scheme which wasted time and labor expenditure.

And now? A set of general-purpose, automated test equipment has been developed by the test automation laboratory which may be used in the repair and maintenance of most of the aircraft received by the enterprise. Time expenditure for the testing cycle following repair or service has been reduced from two shifts to 25-30 minutes--with a verification quality of 100 percent!

What other reserves are being introduced?

"We are activating the human factor--our most important area of potential," stressed Lt Col Kupch.

The headquarters, party organization and trade union committee are seeking new approaches towards further consolidating labor discipline, intensifying the development of socialist competition and concentrating attention on social and everyday-lifestyle concerns. The Central Committee plenum and the seventh

session of the USSR Supreme Soviet have provided new incentive to seeking improved methods, to exercising initiative and proprietary keen-wittedness. All of this has had a beneficial effect on people's dispositions and on how they relate to their jobs.

Formerly, for example, the production control section was not among competition leaders due to infractions of labor discipline which were just never eradicated. New conditions for the conduct of competition have forced those remiss to straighten up. What kind of conditions?

"Essentially, we have shifted from paired to group competition," explains socialist competition engineer Ya. Mukha. "Now it is impossible for someone to become a victor because his rival failed to meet his obligations. Reducing the number of indices and using an operations-oriented approach facilitate evaluation of the most important factor with regard to those competing--work quality. The labor of each employee has become visible..."

Yes, today every worker is visible. And the party committee, union committee and primary labor collectives fight--and I am not afraid to use the word--for every worker. Lt Col Kupch believes that the enterprise must now develop two major directions in its restructuring.

The first entails further improvements in production efficiency and the quality of aircraft repair and maintenance by virtue of mobilizing reserves in the production sphere. The second accomplishes this by improving the social and everyday lifestyle conditions of workers and other employees in every possible way.

I will cite some figures to illustrate the latter effort. Housing conditions for 77 individuals were improved last year. Funds were allocated and a decision made by the rayispolkom to provide share-based participation by the aircraft enterprise in construction of a youth housing project. There is a pioneer camp for 220 children and a historical, public-information center of aviation and cosmonautics that attracts kids from all over the city... All of this has served to reduce personnel turnover from 17 to 5 percent. But it is felt that this marks just the beginning of the changes destined to achieve a state of affairs, the nature of which depends at this time primarily on enterprise workers themselves.

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CSO: 1801/214

YAZOV, LIZICHEV MEET WITH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL WORKERS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 87 p 5

[Text] A delegation of leading political workers of the Vietnamese People's Army led by Colonel General Nguyen (Ku Et), secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee, deputy chairman of the SRV State Council, SRV deputy minister of national defense, and chief of the Main Political Administration of the Vietnamese People's Army, which was in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, departed Moscow for their homeland on 3 July.

The delegation was received by Army General D. T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, and had a discussion in the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Discussions were held with Army General A. D. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Fleet Admiral A. I. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and other responsible political workers took part in them.

In the course of the discussions held in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, in the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and in the political administrations of the Air Forces and the Kiev Military District, the Vietnamese comrades were familiarized with experience in party and political work in the Armed Forces of the USSR and activity by political organs in implementing the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on restructuring matters. The Vietnamese political workers provided information on progress made in implementing the decisions of the Sixth Vietnam Communist Party Congress and the Second Plenum of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee by the Vietnamese People's Army. The talks were held in a warm, friendly atmosphere in a spirit of full mutual understanding of the matters discussed.

The Vietnamese political workers visited the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin and an aviation unit of the Moscow Military District. The delegation visited the tomb of V. I. Lenin and laid a wreath. A wreath also was laid at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin wall.

The guests from Vietnam acquainted themselves with places commemorating the revolutionary, combat, and labor glory of the Soviet people and the sights of Moscow and Kiev. A Soviet-Vietnamese friendship meeting was held in one of the military units of the Kiev Military District.

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